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3Risk is a highly salient psychological decision variable, and sensitivity to risk is an evolutionarilyancient attribute. In this thesis I address the neurobiological foundation of risk assessment, andshow that behaviour is driven by an underlying distributed neural representation of differentelements of risk in the brain. In particular, I show using fMRI (in Chapter 4) and MEG (in Chapter8) that variance (dispersion) and skewness (asymmetry) of gambles evokes anatomicallyseparable neural responses in a parietal, prefrontal and insula cortical network. I discusspossible theoretical neurobiological mechanisms by which preferences could be imbued tochoice, and show that subjective tastes for risk, in terms of behavioural sensitivity to each ofthese risk dimensions, influences the encoding of risk and subsequent anticipatory responses.
In Chapter 5, I show that a representation of prospective outcomes several trials into the futureis supported by a dissociated encoding of the statistical information of future states in medialprefrontal cortex; furthermore that this encoding is contingent upon overarching goals orconstraints.
In Chapter 6, I demonstrate that economic choice is highly susceptible to exogenous biologicalinfluences, namely the effect of metabolic state, whilst in Chapter 7 I provide evidence that theencoding of risk is not affected by dopaminergic disruption, suggesting that dopamine mightmediate effects on risk-taking via its role in reward feedback representation.
In summary, the studies in this thesis elaborate the neural mechanisms underlying how humansmake both single-shot and sequential decisions under risk, central elements in decision-makingscenarios ranging from foraging to financial investment. This demonstrates that phylogeneticallyancient circuitry subserving valuation and reward decompose choice into their salient statisticalfeatures, enabling the sophisticated representation of the future and its alternatives.
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1.1 WHAT IS ‘RISK’, AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?
Stochasticity is a fundamental property of natural environments, and maintenance ofadequate nutrition and energy stores in the face of this environmental variability is criticalfor survival and reproduction. It is therefore unsurprising that sensitivity to environmentaluncertainty or variation in resources reflects a phylogenetically conserved adaptation,evident in a pervasive sensitivity to risk across species (Real et al., 1982; Barnard and Brown,1985; Wunderle et al., 1987; Croy and Hughes, 1991; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1997).
Risk in this sense is a property of the outside world, describing a fundamental indeterminismin possible future outcomes1. Foraging animals, or humans in a modern economy, canmodulate their exposure to risk by making appropriate choices. An assessment of alternativeactions is central to decision-making, requiring a weighing up of each potential outcomearising from different choices, and the chance of each outcome occurring. Thus, decision-making under risk entails the evaluation of a probability distribution over outcomes,including a judgement of the intrinsic value of each of these outcomes to an individualdecision-maker.
For example, imagine you are considering purchasing one of two property investments for£100k (Figure 1.1). Property A has a predicted market value in 5 years time of either £115k(with a 70% chance), £100k (15% chance), or £30k (15% chance). How much is thisproperty worth? Or property B, whose worth is £170k (with a 15% chance), 100k (15%chance), or £85k (70% chance). Which property is preferred? If we considered only theexpected value (average or mean value of the properties) then we should be indifferent as
1 This is in contrast to internally generated uncertainty about the state of the world, reflecting imprecision in
perception, lack of knowledge about the relative chance of possible future events (also called ambiguity), or
prior hypotheses about these probabilities. These types of uncertainty are closely related and often
intertwined in real-world decisions.
NTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
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both are worth exactly £100k. However, in the examples outlined the price one is willing topay also depends upon an individual’s taste for risk (i.e. their risk-preference).
Risk-sensitivity is integral to psychological descriptions of human personality and decision-making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Loewenstein, 2001), while economic models attemptto provide a quantitative framework for behaviour under risk (Sharpe, 1964; Rothschild andStiglitz, 1971). Borrowing from these ideas, in ecology, risk-sensitive foraging theorydescribes an integration of risk and reward in decision making, a formulation echoingfinancial analysis (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964; Stephens, 1981).
Recent financial crises highlight the consequences for society of inappropriate riskevaluation. There is understandable interest in psychological and economic fields inelucidating the mechanisms of, and influences upon, decision-making under risk, albeit fromdifferent perspectives and with different motivations. There are clear practical implicationsin understanding this process: financial advisors seek to measure risk-attitudes beforerecommending appropriately tailored investment strategies to clients (Bluethgen et al.,2008); analysts utilise diverse models of behaviour based upon specific economic tenets topredict individual or group choice; marketing managers and policy makers increasinglyleverage descriptive insights from behavioural economics and psychology aiming tosystematically influence behaviour (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008a).
Figure 1.1 A “risky” decision. Deciding between an investment in one of two properties,
with a chance of making a profit or a loss.
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Risk is also a key computational variable. Knowledge of risk or uncertainty allows deviationsfrom expected outcomes (i.e. prediction error) to be appropriately weighted in learning andestimation (Preuschoff et al., 2008). Detection of environmental change requires acomparison of sampled outcomes to a predicted distribution of outcomes; if consistent nonew learning or exploration needs to occur, but if these representations fail to match thisindicates that the parameters of the world have shifted (and, for example, the learning rateneeds to be increased (Behrens et al., 2007)).
From a clinical perspective, aberrant risk-taking with potentially devastating sequelae is afeature of neurological and psychiatric disorders (e.g. frontal lobe injury, Parkinson’s disease,addiction) (Gallagher et al., 2007), and can be pharmacologically induced (e.g. by alcohol,amphetamines, dopamine agonists) (Zeeb et al., 2009). An understanding of theneurophysiological machinery underlying risky decisions would provide a cogent proximatedescription of risk evaluation. A coherent framework based upon neurobiologicalfoundations may enable a quantitative assessment of decision making deficits, allowarbitration between competing decision theories, and reveal systematic biological influenceson behaviour.
1.2 INVESTIGATING DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK
1.2.1 DIMENSIONS OF RISK
Risk is psychologically multi-faceted and, in the example of a decision between housepurchases, could relate to the spread of outcomes (e.g. measured as variance) or anasymmetry between better or worse than average outcomes (e.g. measured as skewness). Alike or dislike of variance dictates that both houses are equally valued (both sets of outcomeshave equal variance). A preference for one of the houses indicates an additional preferencefor either negatively skewed (house A – small chance of a poor outcome), or positivelyskewed (house B – small chance of a good outcome) distributions.
In Chapter 4, I present a decision-making paradigm designed to dissociate these separatedimensions of risk, and to dissociate distinct neural mechanisms contributing to theevaluation of different aspects of an outcome distribution, as well as determining how theserepresentations are integrated with an individuals’ risk-preference. Directly building upon
18
these findings of the functional anatomy of decision making under risk, Chapter 8 employsmagnetoencephalography (MEG) to map out the precise timing of these same decisionprocesses.
1.2.2 PROSPECTIVE DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK
Many everyday situations require agents to prospectively generate a chain of actions (a paththrough a decision-tree). This also leads to a distribution of outcomes, again engenderinguncertainty or risk. Such sequential decisions are a prime focus in ecology, where animalsforage to ensure intake exceeds minimal need constraints (Stephens et al., 2007), and infinance where traders reap bonuses by exceeding a target return from sequentialtransactions (Panageas and Westerfield, 2009). Common to these examples is that thedistribution of possible outcomes (energy, money) differs for each available series of choices.For sequential decisions this representation of a distribution of outcomes may pertain toevents sometime in the future, and also be conditioned upon a whole series of anticipatedactions of the decision-maker.
In Chapter 5, I present a sequential decision-making paradigm designed to address howexpected risks (i.e. the distribution of outcomes) are tracked prospectively when formulatinga chain of decisions, and how this representation is integrated with the need to reach anoverarching goal.
1.2.3 PHYSIOLOGICAL AND PHARMACOLOGICAL INFLUENCES
In addition, anticipated distributions of outcomes (the risk) can be altered by shifts inexternal or internal parameters (such as a change in financial target, or a change in metabolicstate). Thus, an integration is required between these exogenous variables and the process ofevaluating outcomes in order for organisms to choose appropriately. In Chapter 6, I focus onchanges in behaviour induced by physiological changes in metabolic state, aiming to map outthe influence of hunger and satiety on the evaluation of economic decision making variables.
An important, and widely reported finding, is that specific neuromodulatoryneurotransmitters play a key role in decision making and learning. In particular, dopaminehas an integral role in reward processing, and aberrant dopamine signalling, either becauseof disease processes (i.e. Parkinson’s disease) or when exogenously manipulated, can lead todeficits on tasks involving risk. In Chapter 7, I examine the effects of levodopa
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administration on the evaluation of risk, using the carefully controlled paradigms developedin previous chapters to assay specific effects on the appraisal of reward distributions.
1.2.4 COMPETING ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RISK
EVALUATION
There are two dominant theories of risk-evaluation, which we discuss more fully in Chapter
2. (see e.g. Weber and Johnson for a review (Weber and Johnson, 2008)). In brief, ExpectedUtility Theory in microeconomics, originally proposed by Bernoulli, and later axiomatized byVon Neumann and Morgenstern (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), proposes that adecision-makers’ subjective values for each possible outcome are determined by an implicitutility function. Here, ‘utilities’ are weighted by the probability of each outcome and risk-preference emerges as a by-product of this framework (Pratt, 1964). Alternative theories infinance (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964), psychology (Coombs and Huang, 1970), andecology (Stephens, 1981) propose that outcome distributions are decomposed into“summary statistics”2 (e.g. mean, variance, skewness), with risk-preference directlygenerated by preference for each component. More recent economic and psychologicaltheories (such as Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,1992), or Scalar Utility Theory (Marsh and Kacelnik, 2002)), fall into one of these two camps.It turns out that observation of behaviour alone cannot distinguish Expected Utility (EU)from summary statistic models, since both make identical choice predictions, as any utilityfunction can be approximated by preferences for summary statistics using a polynomial(Taylor series) expansion (Scott and Horvath, 1980; Müller and Machina, 1987; D'Acremontand Bossaerts, 2008).
1.2.5 NEUROBIOLOGY OF DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK: AIMS OF THE STUDIES
Neuroscientific evidence can play a key role in distinguishing between these competingdecision theories. Expected utility and related theories ascribe risk no special role as aseparate cognitive variable. A decision-maker who obeys a specific set of axioms of rationalchoice, and who behaves as if he is maximising an implicit non-linear utility function will
2 Normally, summary statistics refer to quantities that summarise effects in hierarchical statistical models.
Here, we use summary statistics to refer to the sufficient statistics of a probability distribution that
summarise its form. These are generally taken to be the first few moments of a distribution (e.g., the mean,
variance, skew and kurtosis).
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necessarily be observed to manifest a taste for risk. This does not require an explicitcomputation of risk (or any proxy for risk), and this is in sharp contrast to mean-risk models.Any evidence for a neural representation of risk during decision making is supportive of thelatter process. Thus, one aim of the studies in this thesis (specifically in Chapter 4, Chapter
5, and Chapter 8) exploit choice-generated neural data in adjudicating between differentmodels and theoretical camps.
The use of parametric predictor variables to model neural responses to complex stimuli withseveral dimensions is well established (Buchel et al., 1998; Wood et al., 2008), and thecorrelation of neural data with dynamically changing internal variables of a computationalmodel has been implemented in several studies of valuation (O'Doherty et al., 2004;Samejima et al., 2005); for review see (Corrado and Doya, 2007). We discuss this approach in
Chapter 2.
Several previous neuroimaging studies have focused on representations of variance(Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009),which reflects only a first-order approximation of risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1971) andignores the influence of positive and negative skewness on risk perception, as in my examplewhere variance between choices is equivalent (Garrett and Sobel, 1999). Hence, by usingmodel-based fMRI analysis (O'Doherty et al., 2007) I aimed to determine directly whetherthe brain encodes the summary statistics (variance and skewness) of a decision.
Chapter 5 tackles the more complex question of how planned choices, and the resultinganticipated distribution of outcomes (i.e. predicted risk), is tracked several trials ahead andhow this representation takes account of available strategies and externally imposed targets.Again, decision strategies can be formulated as a series of mathematical models, and bothbehavioural and neural data can be utilised to ask which model(s) best explain choice andconcurrent neural activity (Symmonds et al., 2010a).
Chapters 6 and 7 go on to investigate the impact of physiological and pharmacologicalmanipulations on the decision making process, and specifically how they influence theevaluation of risk. Here, I again utilise decision models to test competing hypotheses, as wellas using model parameters to quantify these induced effects.
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1.3 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the literature on the neurobiology of preference, and ofdecision making under risk. In Chapter 3 I outline the behavioural modelling andneuroimaging methods used in this thesis. Building on this conceptual outline, I then detailthe specifics of the techniques employed in each subsequent chapter.
The empirical studies presented in Chapters 4-8 all explore the central theme of decisionmaking under risk, and are broadly divided into three types. Chapters 4 and 5 use functionalmagnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to delineate the neural circuitry involved in processingrisk both in single-shot and in sequential decisions. Chapter 4 in particular sets the scene forthe subsequent investigations, as here I test a variety of behavioural models which recurthroughout all chapters of the thesis. Chapters 6 and 7 investigate behaviouralperturbations in risk evaluation by experimentally controlled manipulations of physiology(both metabolic and neuromodulatory). Chapter 8 uses magnetoencephalography (MEG) tomap out the chronometry of decision making under risk in the brain.
Core to all these studies is the use of economically-inspired models of behaviour to delineatedecision making and choice, and a framework borrowed from financial economics todescribe risk in terms of probability distributions of outcomes. This in turn enables adissociation of different risk dimensions, particularly pertinent in the novel experimentaldesign of studies in Chapter 4 and 8. By independently manipulating risk dimensions, Idissociate different regions of the brain interested in specific aspects of risky outcomes, andalso use this to dissociate the objective assessment of risk (i.e. risk perception, in theneurobiological sense akin to sensory perception), from the integration of this statisticalinformation with subjective attitudes towards risk (i.e. personal preferences).
Finally, Chapter 9 draws together the findings from these experiments, returning to thethemes discussed in Chapter 2 to highlight the mechanistic implications for understandingthe biology of risk processing and to consider the future directions and importantunanswered questions in the field.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
Choice conjures the idea of a volitional or directed selection of desirable actions, motivated byinternal likes and dislikes. Unsurprisingly, the conundrums raised by choice are centre stage inphilosophical and scientific debate since antiquity (MacPherson, 1968; Aristotle, 1998). Choice isgenerally envisaged as a conscious selection of alternatives, under an assumption thatindividuals possess ‘preferences’, or a predilection to make certain types of choice in specificsituations. This realisation is often thought to reflect the expression of either acquired or ‘hard-wired’ drives that are expressed in a biological substrate. Thus, an individual with a preferencefor chocolate over lemon is considered to possess an internal machinery capable of representingthis enhanced valuation of chocolate relative to lemon, a valuation that provides the basis for aconsistent and rational selection between these two goods.
Traditional economic thinking relates preferences to a statement about well-being. An agentwho expresses a particular choice is considered to be maximising their own subjective ‘utility’ orwelfare. Every decision or choice is considered an expression of preference and in the ‘revealedpreference’ framework (Samuelson, 1938), choice and preference are synonymous. Whilerevealed choices are ultimately the dependent variable for classical economics, understandingthe neurobiology of preferences necessitates that we entertain a range of mechanisms by whichhuman choices are generated, expressed and influenced.
ACKGROUND ITERATURE EVIEW
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2.1.1 THE NEUROSCIENCE OF DECISION MAKING
The neuroscience of choice and preference dates back to the 19th century, with the emergence ofthe idea of functional specialisation as a fundamental organisational principle of the brain. Whilephrenologists attributed behavioural characteristics to the contours of the scalp (Gall andSpurzheim, 1818), the observation of specific and consistent behavioural deficits followinglocalised brain damage led to the development of neurology as a medical speciality (Broca, 1865;Jackson, 1873). The tradition of inferring function from structural and electrophysiologicalperturbations has remained powerful, enabling a mapping of both primary sensory and motorsystems (Penfield and Boldrey, 1937), complex cognitive processes such as language (Head,1920; Ojemann, 1978), memory (Scoville and Milner, 1957), and more recently a mapping ofareas important in decision making, strategy selection and learning (Shallice and Burgess, 1991;Bechara et al., 1994).
The early 20th century heralded the birth of behavioural psychology, pioneered by the classicfindings of Pavlov, Skinner, Tolman, Hull and others (Schultz and Schultz, 2007). This traditionprovided insights into core processes mediating learning and choice, but was restricted in scopeby the primitive methods available to study concurrent neurobiological activity during decisionmaking. In the 1960’s Olds and colleagues produced a startling finding that stimulation ofspecific brain loci in animals imbued behaviour with apparent hedonic value. For example, self-stimulation experiments in rats showed they were disposed to compulsively press a lever to theexclusion of other hedonic behavioural options. Thus, a dramatic form of preference could bedriven by electrical stimulation of the rats’ subcortical dopaminergic structures (Olds andMilner, 1954).
A refinement in neuroscientific techniques in the 1980’s saw the emergence of single-unitrecording methodologies. These revealed that activity of individual neurons in early visual areascould predict trial-by-trial choices of an animal in a random-dot motion discriminationexperiments (Parker and Newsome, 1998). Such an approach provided the first direct linkbetween neural activity at a single unit level and the expression of choice behaviour. Subsequentstudies have asked more sophisticated questions about the construction of value and choice inan economic framework. A key example is a report showing that a region of parietal cortex
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called LIP, expressed activity that correlated with the reward magnitude and probability(expected value) associated with an upcoming action (Platt and Glimcher, 1999).
The development of neuroimaging techniques, in particular functional magnetic resonanceimaging (fMRI), has meant questions related to choice and preference can now be addressednon-invasively in humans. Early neuroimaging studies of financial decision making dissected outregions involved in processing monetary gain and loss (Thut et al., 1997; Elliott et al., 2000), aswell as brain activation related to anticipation versus receipt of reward (Breiter et al., 2001).More sophisticated studies have borrowed economically-inspired models of behaviour to seekout a brain representation of key decision variables. Notable examples include a demonstrationthat brain activity tracks a Pascalian idea of a value representation constructed from acombination of amount and probability (Knutson et al., 2005; Dreher et al., 2006), to financialand ecological concepts of risk and uncertainty (Preuschoff et al., 2006; Christopoulos et al.,2009; Mohr et al., 2010a), and the idea that anticipated temporal delay reduces the value ofrewards (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Pine et al., 2009).
2.1.2 THE NATURE OF PREFERENCES
Preferences can be thought of as biologically determined traits (Eysenck, 1990; Ebstein, 2006),but in reality they are dynamic and flexible, and indeed often inconsistent. The idea ofpreference is broad and diverse, encompassing a liking for different goods, a favouring of rewardover punishment through to preferences for specific components of a decision (‘decisionvariables’). The latter can encompass risk preference, impulsivity (the preference for delayedversus immediate goods) and social preferences (‘other-regarding’ preferences, altruism andfairness). Whether such preferences are convenient theoretical artefacts for classifyingindividual choice or whether they relate to intrinsic biological processes and inter-individualdifferences is the subject of intense and wide-ranging programmes of research. This breadth isevident in a facility to draw on human and animal psychology, neurobiology, economics, ecologyand computational science, though a source of confusion can be each discipline’s differentterminology, theory, experimental technique and hypothetical assumptions that colour theliterature. There are many excellent reviews and recent descriptions of these conceptualedifices, along with attempts to bridge between them (Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004; Kenningand Plassmann, 2005; Sanfey et al., 2006; Berns et al., 2007; Doya, 2008). The aim here, and
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throughout this thesis, is to discuss preferences from a biological perspective, acknowledgingthat this strays outside a traditional boundary of what some would regard as preference.
In this review, I first survey examples of preference and choice that raise questions as to theirbiological implementation. I then discuss how strict economically-inspired definitions ofpreference might need to be loosened, or expanded, when probing the biological systems thatdrive choice behaviour. Finally, I examine plausible mechanisms for a neural instantiation ofpreference and discuss how preference can be modulated by physiological, pharmacological ordirect neural manipulation. These latter concepts then form the springboard for the subsequentexperimental investigations described herein.
2.2 CONCEPTS OF CHOICE AND PREFERENCE
2.2.1 REVEALED PREFERENCES OR BEHAVIOURAL BIASES?
‘Revealed preference’ is often assumed to imply that an individual wants the chosen outcome,but there are many scenarios where this is not necessarily the case. For example, the status quobias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), where individuals show a predilection to stick with apreviously selected option would not necessarily be thought of as an expression of an internaldesire. Instead, it is more parsimonious to think of it as reflecting a biological intrinsic defaultresponse mode which needs to be overcome, usually requiring an expenditure of effort to recruitan alternative motor action program. Overcoming this default has been demonstrated to evokeenhanced activity in the subthalamic nucleus (Fleming et al., 2010a), paralleling earlier findingsfrom single-unit recordings where ‘incorrect’ actions (saccadic eye movements in monkeys in asimple instrumental task) have been attributed to baseline (pre-stimulus) neuronal activityencoding a default motor action program (Lauwereyns et al., 2002). These examples highlight arecurring dichotomy that different types of choice may be generated by entirely disparatemechanisms despite the end result (the apparent ‘revealed preference’) being indistinguishable.Strictly speaking the status quo bias is a preference to stay with the default rather than change,despite clearly not being driven by any desire to attain an internal goal or ‘utility maximize’. Thisexample illustrates a necessity to invoke ideas beyond the typical remit of an economicdefinition of preference to fully understand the biological generators of choice.
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2.2.2 COMPETING VALUATION SYSTEMS
There are important examples where choices do not accord with internal wants. An addict mayperform an action (e.g. taking drugs or alcohol) in the present despite expressing a desire toavoid doing this very action on a prior occasion. Explanations exist that fit in with a classicalconcept of preference, such as state-dependent utility (Karni et al., 1983), where due tophysiologically-driven craving, at the point of consumption the addictive substance it truly isvalued more than it is disliked. Alternative explanations include the idea that choices alterdepending upon the particular choice set available to the decision maker (Koszegi and Rabin,2007). However, we know that relapses are frequently triggered by environmental cues (e.g.seeing drug-related paraphernalia, watching others drinking alcohol, or the roguery ofadvertising) and this suggests an alternative possibility of a mistake, lapse or default action.Rather than being a momentary failure to execute a desired action, addicts seem to pursue asequence of deliberate and complex actions to attain a goal that seems is simultaneously cravedbut not wanted.
Young children and animals are notoriously impulsive, being unable to delay gratification ofdesire (Mischel et al., 1989). From an economic perspective they can be considered to express ahigh temporal discount rate (delayed reward is worth less than immediate reward, so 1marshmallow now is preferred to waiting minutes for 2 marshmallows). However, the drivesdirecting such behaviours do not always fall neatly in line with an economic model. In reverse-reward experiments, participants are simultaneously shown 2 options of different numericalmagnitude (e.g. 5 versus 2 raisins). Whichever set of items is selected, the opposite set is actuallyreceived. So for a chimpanzee to obtain 5 raisins from the experimenter, they must select thesmaller set of 2 raisins. Both primates (Boysen and Berntson, 1995) and preschool children(Carlson et al., 2005) are notoriously poor at learning to pick the smaller option, despite beingvisibly upset when they fail to get the larger reward.
Where is the preference in the above? Is it for the chosen, or the unchosen option that chimpsand children are distressed at not getting? The effect is not a failure in understanding the correctcontingency or an inability to appreciate number. In fact when edible items are replaced withinedible items, performance significantly improves (Boysen and Berntson, 1995; Schmitt andFischer, 2011). Instead, the magnetic pull of a large pile of food interferes with the ability to
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preferentially select the smaller option. Similar examples from the animal literature includeHershenberger’s experiments (Hershberger, 1986), demonstrating that while chicks readilyacquire an instrumental approach response to obtain food, they are totally unable to learn areversed ‘move away’ response to obtain the same outcome. These difficulties are thought toreflect conflict between Pavlovian (i.e. conditioned) and instrumental (‘goal-directed’)responses. This speaks to the more general idea of multiple valuation systems that are underdifferent degrees of control and amenable to different types of overt and covert influences.
2.2.3 SEARCHING FOR A HEDONIMETER
In contrast to the idea of multiple valuation systems is the concept of a unitary representation ofvalue, corresponding to a classical idea of ‘utility’. Utility theory is based on a set of axioms orrules about consistent behaviour, and generates strong constraints upon allowable choice.However, there are multiple examples of behavioural biases that contradict the assumptions ofutility theory, for example the Allais paradox (Figure 2.1). Implicit in utility models of behaviouris the idea that value is an integrated measure, constructed from different influences on choiceand the product of interactions between internal preference and external information about adecision.
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First decision Second decisionGamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble DOutcome Probability Outcome Probability Outcome Probability Outcome Probability10000 1 10000 0.89 0 0.89 0 0.90 0.01 10000 0.1150000 0.1 50000 0.1
First decision Second decisionGamble A Gamble B Gamble C Gamble DOutcome Probability Outcome Probability Outcome Probability Outcome Probability10000 0.89 10000 0.89 0 0.89 0 0.8910000 0.11 0 0.01 10000 0.11 0 0.0150000 0.1 50000 0.1
However, there is no biological necessity for there to be a single area, an internalhomunculus or hedonimeter (Edgeworth, 1881) tracking or constructing implicit value.While sectors of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) have emerged as leading candidate regions forrepresenting value, OFC lacks direct access to motor output networks and shares reciprocalconnections with many other cortical and subcortical regions (e.g. the interconnectedposterior parietal, cingulate and insular cortex and striatum) strongly associated withvaluation (Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Sesack et al., 1989; Shi and Cassell, 1998;Haber, 2003). Indeed, some neurobiological theories echo the revealed preference idea thatvalue is choice, positing that valuable states of the world are simply states that fulfil priorexpectations of actions, these expectations having been engendered by evolution to conferadaptive survival (Friston, 2010).
Figure 2.1. The Allais paradox. Allais’ paradox illustrates one violation of expected utility
theory. Top - when given a choice between Gamble A and Gamble B, the modal preference
is A>B. In a second decision between Gamble C and Gamble D, the modal preference is
D>C. Bottom – the fact that this violates expected utility can be seen if the gamble
outcomes are decomposed into a common consequence (the outcomes in the first row with
0.89 probability), and the remaining state-outcomes. If the outcomes common to A,B and
C,D are ignored, gambles A/C and gambles B/D are identical. However most individuals
reverse their preference between the first and the second decision. This either implies that
probabilities cannot be linearly decomposed, or that the values of outcomes from a given
gamble are not independent.
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2.2.4 THE RANDOMNESS OF CHOICE
A major conundrum when thinking about neurobiological mechanisms in decision making isthe fact that choices are often noisy or stochastic. While ‘preference’ to a traditionaleconomist implies a consistent ordering of choices, real choices show a high variability,being probabilistic rather than deterministic (Herrnstein, 1974). This is accounted for incomputational behavioural modelling by the addition of a stochastic choice generatingfunction (e.g. logit-softmax or probit choice models). In practice, noise could arise prior tothe valuation process, for example in primary or associative sensory cortex encodingstimulus properties as is evident in situations of sensory uncertainty (Knill and Pouget,2004). Cortical neuronal firing rates are inherently stochastic, with one root of thisrandomness being variability in synaptic vesicular release (Korn et al., 1993; Faisal et al.,2008). Variability in spike trains often, but not always, conform to a Poisson process(Tolhurst et al., 1983; Maimon and Assad, 2009). Models of noisy evidence accumulationduring the formation of a decision can thus account for a considerable degree of stochasticityseen in choice (Resulaj et al., 2009).
In contrast to the idea that variability in behaviour solely reflects noise in sensorimotorneurons, data from monkeys performing an depth-discrimination task (‘near’ or ‘far’ randomdot stereogram stimuli presented as a noisy stimulus) show that choice-related neuronalactivity in disparity-sensitive neurons in area V2 during can be temporally decoupled fromperformance effects of sensory uncertainty on behaviour (Nienborg and Cumming, 2009).While stimulus information in the first few hundred milliseconds of presentation predictsbehaviour, neuronal activity predictive of choice in these sensory neurons arises later.Moreover, this choice-related activity reflects a difference in sensitivity (‘gain’) for near andfar stimuli, a change modulated by reward size. For large rewards, performance is better, butthe correlation between V2 neuronal activity and choice is worse (i.e. a better couplingbetween stimulus-encoding properties of these neurons and behaviour with large rewards atstake). This strongly suggests that ‘top-down’ expectations influence a coupling betweenstimulus and choice in early sensory regions. In a similar vein, modulations in the degree ofcorrelation between neuronal firing within areas also vary the stochasticity of a neuralensemble (Shadlen and Newsome, 1998).
Economists have dealt with this issue by proposing different models of stochastic preference.These models loosely map on to the many neurobiological loci where noise is generated. Thevaluation process itself could be prone to random error, akin to ‘random utility’ models from
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economics, where noise is injected into the utility function (Hey and Orme, 1994). Iinstantiate this noisy valuation method for the behavioural modelling in this thesis (see
Chapter 3 for a discussion). Alternatively, motor selection itself could be variable (theanalogous ‘trembling hand’ models of choice (Harless and Camerer, 1994), where you knowwhat you want to choose but imprecision in your executed actions leads to ‘mistakes’).Individual preferences themselves could be stochastically sampled from an underlyinggenerative function (Loomes and Sugden, 1995). Other possibilities include the idea thatpotential outcomes from all possible choices influence the decision process. While choice isusually envisaged as a selection of an optimal action in accordance with one’s own priors andpreferences, there is good evidence that suboptimal outcomes (i.e. potentially irrelevantalternatives) impact on decisions. These irrelevant outcomes contribute to classic paradoxesof choice (Birnbaum, 2008), such as the impact of regret (Loomes and Sugden, 1982).Weighting of alternative unchosen outcomes also forms a key component in multiattributedecision theories (Roe et al., 2001; Stewart et al., 2003), I also find evidence of this in
Chapter 5, where individuals make dynamically inconsistent strategic decisions. Indeedcounterfactual outcomes are represented in prefrontal cortex (Ursu and Carter, 2005) whilefictive errors in economic learning tasks are seen in striatum (Lohrenz et al., 2007). Choicevariability could arise, in part, from a differential weighting of these suboptimal outcomes.
Thus, a range of plausible neurobiological mechanisms could contribute to variability inchoice at a whole-organism level; noise at different levels of the decision process is notdiscrete. There is a dearth of evidence exploring the genesis of choice variability in humans.However the mapping of such processes onto economic theories of stochastic preferencecould provide a fruitful source of testable hypotheses to better understand the whims andvagaries of choice, and moment-by-moment fluctuations in preference.
2.2.5 DIFFERENT TYPES OF VALUE?
If indeed there are multiple brain areas tracking value, this means that multiple valuationsystems may be susceptible to distinct influences and potentially come into conflict. Thisraises deeper questions about what is actually meant by value and preference. The addictionexample highlights a disparity between temporary cravings and long-term desires, aconsideration that led Berridge and colleagues (Berridge, 1996) to propose a distinctionbetween ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’. While ‘liking’ corresponds to hedonic pleasure (i.e. theexperience of reward), ‘wanting’ is more aligned with appetitive salience and motivation (i.e.anticipated reward). An extended account of this parsing of choice behaviour involves a
31
pharmacological division between these two components, with ‘wanting’ dependent uponthe dopaminergic system and ‘liking’ on an endogenous opiod system. This in turn highlightsanother biological level within which preference can be generated – rather than beingregionally encoded, some aspects of preferences might be a property of a distributedpharmacological neuromodulatory influence. I explore and experimentally test this idea(specifically the influence of dopamine) in Chapter 7.
While providing a compelling heuristic, it turns out that a distinction between ‘wanting’ and‘liking’ is not entirely clear cut. Tindell (Tindell et al., 2009) has shown that salt-deprived ratscan acquire preferences (i.e. instrumental choices) for previously disliked salt-giving leversin the absence of any new training or experience of the now beneficial salty outcome. Thisindicates that systems controlling preference can also integrate information aboutphysiological state, in the absence of information about hedonic pleasure or ‘liking’, althoughphysiological state may well have immediate access to a value-signalling system (as opposedto complex goals) given its’ central role in shaping adaptive fitness. Indeed, supporting thisidea, in Chapter 6 I present evidence that physiological state can bias preference in theeconomic domain.
2.2.6 DYNAMIC CHANGES IN PREFERENCE
A final consideration about preferences is their lability. Behaviour often shows responseshifts to exogenous and endogenous variables, from the typically economic (price, resourceavailability) to the biological and psychological (physiological state, arousal, emotion).Preference also changes over time, both in response to changes in environmental conditions(e.g. accumulation of wealth, reproductive success) and sources of unobserved heterogeneity(e.g. drifting of preferences over time). For biological success, it makes sense thatpreferences are amenable to ‘top-down’ cognitive influences. For example, it may beappropriate in times of financial crisis to make a ‘risk-averse’ choice and stick with a steadyreliable source of income, while in more optimistic times ‘risk-seeking’ or entrepreneurialchoices may be of greater long-term benefit (see Chapter 5 for an experimental test ofdecision making under an externally imposed constraint).
Many preferences are phylogenetically ancient. Drosophila flies can choose betweencompeting cues to avoid punishment, a function supported by their dopaminergic system(Zhang et al., 2007). There is also a pervasive sensitivity to risk not only in humans(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), but also in distantly related species including birds and fish
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(Real et al., 1982; Wunderle et al., 1987; Croy and Hughes, 1991; Bateson and Kacelnik,1997). These ‘evolved’ preferences suggest biological hard-wiring. Indeed, many of thesespecies lack an highly developed prefrontal cortex, yet manifest preferences that aredynamically altered in response to complicated strategic motives. Flexible preferences meanthat even if a specific neural substrate is responsible for a general tendency to emit distinctbehaviours, these regions necessarily need to receive information both from a hierarchy of‘higher’ (e.g. maintaining a strategy) and ‘lower-level’ inputs (e.g. physiological or emotionalstate).
These behavioural switches link more broadly to the idea of ‘exploratory’ behaviour. Ahesitancy to explore is used as a biological marker of trait anxiety in animal models (Hogg,1996). Can we call exploration a preference? A ‘preference’ to explore the unknown bucksthe natural trend to stay with known rewarding actions (‘exploitation’), and can lead to adifferent selection of actions (choices) depending on circumstance, a process poorly-captured in many economic models. Computationally, this explore-exploit dilemma is criticalin learning theory, and there is evidence that exploratory behaviour is instantiated in rostralanterior prefrontal cortex (Daw et al., 2006) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Procyk etal., 2000). Thus an ‘exploratory’ preference could reflect the function of a very different kindof neural process, more related to task-switching and behavioural flexibility (Ragozzino,2007), perhaps an example of a top-down process that modulates classical preferencesrather than a biological predilection in itself.
2.2.7 THE ROLE OF NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
On the one hand, choice and preference can be considered the only relevant end-product of a‘black-box’ process (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008). This is perfectly reasonable as an approachto decision making as economic models are designed solely to predict choice, not to implybiological mechanisms. However, neuroscientists are primarily interested in mechanistic‘proximate’ questions - it is not sufficient to observe how cars move if you want tounderstand the internal workings of a combustion engine. The aims of neuroscience includeunderstanding the biological underpinnings of behaviour and beyond this a biophysically-motivated model of choice. This in turn can yield insights about disease processes, revealneural targets that determine pathological behaviour, and even potentially ‘improve’ anindividuals’ decision-making. As framed by Marr (Marr, 1982), to address these questionsone needs to specify computational goals, their algorithmic basis, as well as the biologicalhardware that implements these processes.
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2.3 RISK
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION
Risk is a paradigmatic example of a decision variable. Risk has many components – in layterms a decision is ‘risky’ if it is uncertain, has a small chance of success, if the potential lossis large, or if there are extreme losses or gains relative to the status quo. Thus the perceptionof risk captures elements of both the probabilities and magnitudes of possible outcomes. Thequantification of risk is key to modern economics, and how individuals treat risk – their riskpreferences – dictates a large range of choices. This thesis focuses on decision making underrisk as a means to understand the neurobiological mechanisms underpinning decisionmaking.
Using risk as an example is informative for several reasons. Firstly, risk is a well-exploredconcept in economics, from which ideas in psychology and ecology have derived. It can beobjectively quantified in a straightforward manner based on an economic framework, andpreferences for risk can be measured in monetary terms. Financial risk is also simple tomanipulate, and money is a motivating secondary reinforcer that can elicit attentive and real(incentive compatible) behaviour in human experimental participants. Parallels can be drawnwith sensory variables – many of the early advances in sensory neuroscience were based onthe visual system, with its precisely quantifiable stimuli possessing different stimulusattributes or dimensions, and the robust and simple manner in which psychophysicalresponses could be elicited.
We can therefore use risk to understand neural processing of abstract decision variables.Conversely, neuroscientific enquiry into risk processing can offer insights for economictheory. There exist well-defined alternative explanations for the construction of riskpreference in economics and finance (and psychology and ecology). Many of the predictionsof these theories pertain to choice, the ultimate measurable variable, but all can be accurateenough in their choice predictions such that the theories are rendered indistinguishable.However, as discussed above, neuroscientific evidence can evince the underpinnings ofbehaviour, and potentially map neural circuitry onto the elements or building blocks of thesedisparate theoretical structures. This therefore can provide evidence in favour of specificmechanisms for constructing decisions.
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2.3.2 CLASSICAL ECONOMIC THEORY
A description of how much a gamble was worth became necessary at the start of the modernfinancial era, when investors wished to calculate the value of their prospective property andtrade investments.
In the mid-17th century, Blaise Pascal proposed that the value of a lottery X with n potentialoutcomes should be quantified by its expectation (average outcome).
( 2.1 )
While ‘rational’, this does not explain why most people would prefer a certain amount ofmoney to taking a risk on a lottery with equal expected value. This problem was illustratedby the St Petersburg Paradox. Imagine the following game. A coin is flipped – if it lands heads,the game stops and the winnings are £1. If tails, the coin is flipped again. A heads on thesecond toss stops the game but this time with winnings of £2, whilst tails permits a furtherthrow. The game continues until a heads is thrown, at which point the winnings are 2N-1,where N is the number of coin tosses. The probability distribution of outcomes is shown in
Figure 2.2. How much should a decision-maker pay to play such a game? According toPascal’s logic, this lottery is literally invaluable:
( 2.2 )
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Daniel Bernoulli advanced a solution to this ‘paradox’, suggesting that individuals transformthe outcomes from a lottery into subjective values (expected utility – EU) according to animplicit concave ‘utility function’.
( 2.3 )
A logarithmic transformation of objective amounts to subjective values (i.e . )yields an expected utility for the St Petersberg paradox of:
( 2.4 )
This translates in to a more realistic monetary equivalent value of 2EU(X)=£23.
3 A flaw in Bernoulli’s solution can be seen if we exponentiate possible winnings: i.e. winnings are nowexp(2N-1). This again yields an infinite sum of series, and by a similar logic any non-lineartransformation of utility will be susceptible to this trick. A decision maker only prepared to pay a finiteamount to play these games must ignore probabilities below some threshold (or magnitudes above athreshold).
Figure 2.2. Outcome distribution for the St Petersburg paradox. A fair coin is tossed N
times until a “head” is thrown, at which point the game ends and the winnings are 2N-1. This
highly positively skewed distribution has infinite expected value.
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More generally, a lottery is worth less than its expected value for an individual with aconcave utility function, by Jensen’s inequality (Figure 2.3). In other words, there is a risk
premium to pay for accepting such a gamble. Bernoulli’s marginally decreasing utilitycaptures the intuitive concept that a £1 gain from £100 to £101 does not feel as valuable asan increment from £1 to £2. This has close parallels with Weber’s ‘law’ in psychophysics,where sensitivity to a sensory increment scales with the absolute magnitude, leading todiminishing marginal sensitivity.
The power of Expected Utility Theory was firmly established by von Neumann andMorgenstern (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), who derived the same mathematicalform from axiomatic first principles. An individual who possesses preferences for all possiblelotteries (completeness), consistently rank orders these lotteries (transitivity), can constructnew lotteries of intermediate value from a mixture of existing gambles (continuity), and whodoes not change their preference ordering of 2 lotteries in the presence of a new outcomecommon to both (independence), will prefer lottery 1 (L1) to lottery 2 (L2) if and only if
Figure 2.3. Illustration of a concave utility function. For a 2 outcome lottery M = [M1,M2; ½,
½], the expected value of the lottery . . For a concave utility function, the
expected utility of the lottery . This translates into an
equivalent amount of . This is true for all concave functions and any
probability mixture of amounts, by Jensen’s inequality. This difference is the risk premium
of the lottery – how much extra an individual would have to be paid to yield indifference
between the lottery and a sure amount with matched expected value.
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EU(L1)≥EU(L2), as defined by equation ( 2.3 ). Completeness and transitivity ensure thatthe axes in Figure 2.3 are invariant and can be given a scale, while continuity ensures thatprobability mixtures of outcomes can be mapped between the x and y axes. Independencemeans that this mapping is linear in probabilities.
There are several points to note about the concept of utility functions in Expected UtilityTheory. Firstly, they are unique up to a linear monotone transformation – in other words,utility is ordinal, but the specific utilities themselves do not have an implicit meaning. Utilityof a gamble for different individuals can only be compared under the assumption that theyare using the same utility function to construct value, as a transformation of utility values (byaddition of a constant, or a scaling) does not alter the relative ordering of these numbers.Secondly, in expected utility theory, probabilities and amounts are defined independently.This is called probabilistic sophistication (Machina, 2005). Thirdly, risk is a by-product of theprocess of transforming objective into subjective value, rather than a variable in itself.Indeed, the shape of the utility function defines risk, in the sense that the same distribution ofoutcomes will yield very different risk premia dependent upon the form of the utilityfunction.
Absolute risk aversion (ARA) can be defined in the EUT framework by the Arrow-Prattmeasure (Pratt, 1964):
( 2.5 )
where u is an individual’s utility function. ARA scales an individual’s risk premia, and isusually assumed to be a decreasing function of wealth (x). In other words, the richer you are,the more likely you are to pay a fixed amount to play a given gamble. Relative risk aversionis:
( 2.6 )
In this thesis (see Chapters 4-8), when modelling classical expected utility, I use theisoelastic function , which exhibits constant relative risk aversion and iswidely used in economics because of its attractive mathematical property that the relativeutility of a risky vs risk-free asset is independent of initial wealth levels. In practice, this
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scale-free utility function is inaccurate (Rabin, 2000), but serves its purpose in the conditionsI consider in this thesis where wealth does not appreciably change. I save further discussionof reference-dependence and scaling for Chapter 5.
2.3.3 BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AND UTILITY THEORIES
Since its inception, EUT has come under attack from behavioural theorists because of itsnormative approach. Many famous violations of EUT have been demonstrated, including theAllais paradox (see above), the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961), and a host of otherdiscrepancies highlighted by the heuristics and biases program (Tversky and Kahneman,1974), and the concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982; Gigerenzer and Goldstein,1996). These ideas have been hugely influential, both spawning new fields of research inbehavioural economics, ecology, and evolutionary psychology, and pervasive in society(Levitt and Dubner, 2006; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008b). Here I discuss Prospect Theory,which directly addresses decision making under risk, and which I have used as a benchmarchutility function in Chapters 4 and 5.
2.3.3.1 Prospect theories
Kahneman and Tversky outlined several key behavioural findings which they sought tocapture in a new, all-encompassing choice theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The basicformulation is identical to EUT, with outcomes specified as amounts and probabilities.Prospect theory (PT) then diverges in several ways. One proposition is that individualsoverweight events with small probabilities. This has received considerable empirical support(Gonzalez and Wu, 1999), and can explain the Allais paradox. A second cornerstone is thatlosses have more impact than equivalent monetary gains. This is important in explaining theframing effect where choices for the same gamble differ depending on whether it ispresented as either a potential gain or a potential loss (Gonzalez et al., 2005). This alsoexplains the reflection effect where preference reversal are seen for choices between agambles with positive outcomes and a matched sure amount, versus equivalently setupchoices where all outcomes are translated into the negative domain (Fagley, 1993). Inclassical expected utility theory the utility function is concave (or convex) everywhere whichproscribes such a reversal. However actual experimental comparisons of the weightattributed to losses and gains are sparse and the picture is inconsistent (Hershey andSchoemaker, 1980; Schneider and Lopes, 1986; Budescu and Weiss, 1987). The third
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component of Prospect Theory is that risk preference can differ between losses and gains,which can also explain the reflection and framing effects,
Another feature is that outcomes are evaluated with respect to a reference point rather thanzero wealth. Thus outcomes falling below the reference point are treated as losses. Thisreference point was originally and is most commonly suggested to be the status quo(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Schneider, 1992), although inpractice the reference point could be any individual (Köszegi and Rabin, 2006) or evenmultiple (Lopes and Oden, 1999) anchors. A last difference is that Kahneman and Tverskysuggested an editing procedure, whereby some choice options are ruled out at the outset ofthe decision process. This is necessary to prevent violations of stochastic dominance (wherea quirk of probability weighting means that for gambles with very rare outcomes the theorycan lead to a prediction of a more risky choice even when this option is the least valuable andthere is a clear alternative winning option under all eventualities).
This theory redefined the interaction between psychologists and economists, presenting wellthought out experimental hypotheses and evidence that systematically took on the tenets ofneoclassical microeconomic theory. Despite this, there are many difficulties with thisapproach. Perhaps foremost is that the editing procedure is nebulously defined. A laterformulation, Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), improvedthe theory by specifying that probabilities are weighted in a rank-dependent way (similar toQuiggin (1982)), where the weighting is a function of the cumulative probability of an eventrather than its absolute probability. This leads to greater generalisability and avoidssituations of stochastic dominance violation. I use CPT in Chapter 4, which contains amathematical exposition.
A second and more general problem with the theory is its broad parameterisation. Ifindividuals possess independent risk preferences, weighting functions, loss aversion, andreference points, this means that 6 parameters are required to describe behaviour. It alsomeans that the unrestricted version of PT can predict virtually any pattern of behaviour, forinstance the finding that individuals in learning situations often underweight rather thanoverweight small probabilities (Camerer, 2000). This is much more complex than the modelsit was designed to replace, and also leads to some practical problems with behavioural fittingas parameters are not necessarily independent. For example, choices for mixed gambles canbe explained both in terms of different risk-preferences for relative gains and losses, as wellas by loss aversion.
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A third, and perhaps more pervasive issue, is that PT remains a description of behaviourunder particular circumstances rather than explaining or specifying a mechanisticformulation of choice. Although various neurobiological investigations have addressed theinstantiation of Prospect Theory in the brain (De Martino et al., 2006; Tom et al., 2007; Hsu etal., 2009), and have been successful in demonstrating that the brain does not behaveaccording to EUT predictions, these focus on specific elements of PT under specificmanipulations (framing effect, binary mixed gambles, and win-lose gambles). PT thusremains an extension of EUT (Harrison and Rutström, 2009), applicable and very powerful inspecific scenarios (e.g. probability extremes). For more complex decisions, with multiplealternatives or a distribution of outcomes, and in particular in learning situations where amodel of the world needs to be updated following receipt of new information, PT (and EUT)becomes less useful as a realistic bottom-up computational model (D'Acremont andBossaerts, 2008).
2.3.4 FINANCE AND MEAN-RISK THEORIES
EUT and Prospect theory propose that decision-makers’ subjective values for each possibleoutcome are determined by an implicit utility function, with ‘utilities’ weighted by theprobability of each outcome and risk-preference emerging as a by-product of this framework(Pratt, 1964). Alternative theories in finance (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964), psychology(Coombs and Huang, 1970), and ecology (Stephens, 1981) propose that outcomedistributions are decomposed into “summary statistics” (e.g. mean, variance, skewness), withrisk-preference directly generated by preference for each component. These models are acentral focus of this thesis, and I describe their implementation in detail in subsequentchapters.
Mean-risk theories have advantages over EUT-type models. Firstly, they generalise to anyoutcome distribution. Secondly, complex outcomes with multiple probabilities and outcomescan be simplified into a few descriptive parameters, which is computationally attractive,useful for learning, and neurobiologically appealing. Moreover, they can capture manyfeatures of the behavioural models such as Prospect Theory, as relative gains and losses(compared to an average outcome), and overweighting or underweighting of probabilityextremes can also fall out of mean-risk models. They have disadvantages – specifically thatthey are not probabilistically sophisticated, so that information about some outcomes can belost in summarisation, in other words some outcomes assume more importance than others
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due to their contribution to the overall shape of the distribution. A lack of probabilisticsophistication is no bar in itself, and indeed CPT itself does not preserve the distinctionbetween probabilities and amounts.
It turns out that observation of behaviour alone cannot distinguish Expected Utility fromsummary statistic models. Both can make identical choice predictions, as any utility functioncan be approximated by preferences for summary statistics using a polynomial expansion(Scott and Horvath, 1980; Müller and Machina, 1987; D'Acremont and Bossaerts, 2008). Toillustrate, for any utility function, , a Taylor expansion of the outcomes in gamble xabout an arbitrary mean outcome amount µ gives:
( 2.7 )
Taking the expectation (average) of both sides:
( 2.8 )
which has the form of a mean-variance-skewness model, with variance and skewnesspreference determined by the (local) curvature of an individual’s utility function (and visaversa).
This raises the critical importance of exploiting choice generated neural data in adjudicatingbetween these models. Several studies have focused on variance (Preuschoff et al., 2006;Tobler et al., 2007; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009), which reflects a first-orderapproximation of risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1971) but ignores the influence of positiveand negative skewness on risk perception, as in the example in Chapter 1 where variancebetween choices is equivalent (Garrett and Sobel, 1999).
One key aim in this thesis was to use model-based fMRI analysis (O'Doherty et al., 2007) todetermine directly whether the brain encodes the summary statistics (variance andskewness) of a decision.
2.3.5 PSYCHOLOGY: RISK AND AFFECT
Finally, there has been an alternative psychological tradition that focuses on risk sensitivityas a product of affective state (Loewenstein, 2001). The central proposal is that the
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contribution of emotions to decision making is often neglected in traditional theories. This isdespite clear evidence that, for example, emotional state influences risk taking (Isen andPatrick, 1983; Isen and Geva, 1987). A similar biological position has been advocated byDamasio and colleagues as the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio et al., 1996).
The strong hypothesis that decisions are a consequence of the affective assessment of bodilystates is clearly neurobiologically implausible, and much of the evidence for this theory isbased upon the Iowa Gambling task which has inherent difficulties in interpretation (see
Chapter 7 for a further discussion). However, the notion that emotions are important indecision making under risk is resonant, and I would argue that rather than a separate streamof influence, emotions are both a product and contributor to valuation. The sensation andanticipation of ‘loss’ is potently emotional, and has been incorporated in regret theory(Loomes and Sugden, 1982), however ‘loss’ is simply a categorical definition of oneparticular consequence of a risky decision. A fuller conceptualisation accounting for therelative (‘emotional’) weight of different outcomes converges with the economic ideasexpressed above – measuring preferences could be construed as a proxy for measuring theaffective assessment of different stimulus dimensions, in as far as they impact on choice.
Similarly, the idea that emotions exploit a privileged subconscious pathway (Bechara et al.,2000) reflects the idea of multiple valuation processes discussed in the previous section. Thepertinent questions then becomes not if emotion is important in decision making under risk,but how risky decisions are assessed and executed by the brain, and where differentinfluences (emotional or otherwise) might take effect.
2.3.6 METHODS OF EVALUATING DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK
Multiple methods have been employed to assess decision making under risk. Qualitativemethods have involved questionnaires – very useful in assessing responses to ‘real-world’decision scenarios across domains, however difficult to quantify in economic terms. Not onlyare the values attributed to such outcomes tricky to ascertain, but also one usually does notknow the priors that individuals bring to bear in answering such questions, nor the validityof responses. For this reason experimental economics has concentrated on eliciting choicesfor lotteries.
A variety of methods risk-preference elicitation methods exist (Harrison and Rutström,2008), including direct elicitation of certainty equivalents with the Becker-DeGroot-
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Marschak procedure (Becker et al., 1964), a multiple price list design (Holt and Laury, 2002),and a multiple paired lottery choice task (Hey and Orme, 1994). In the studies in this thesis, Ihave used either a paired lottery design, or the simpler two-alternative forced choicebetween a lottery and a sure amount of money. The principal difference between theparadigms developed herein and preceeding studies is that the lotteries used possessmultiple rather than binary outcomes. The advantage of a comparison between a lottery anda fixed sure amount is that neural responses to individually presented risks can be isolated.
A variety of other risk assessment methods have been used in psychological paradigms,including the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1997), and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task(Lejuez et al., 2002). These have the problem that risks are unknown or ambiguous, thus thetasks require learning and feedback. Other tasks present explicit risks, such as Rogers’Cambridge Gamble Task (Rogers et al., 1999), and Game of Dice task (Brand et al., 2005).These are similar to the pie-chart tasks used in this thesis. The advantage of the latter is thatmultiple outcome lotteries can be presented in a visually straightforward way.
Having examined both controversies and difficulties in understanding the biology of choiceand preference, and subsequently discussing behavioural approaches to risk, I next focus onhow preferences in general, and specifically attitudes to risk, might be implemented in thebrain.
2.4 WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL NEURAL MECHANISMS BY
WHICH PREFERENCES COULD BE EXPRESSED?
What are the plausible mechanisms by which preferences are expressed in the brain? Themost obvious is a direct neural instantiation of an hedonimeter (Edgeworth, 1881), aregionally specific encoding of intrinsic value. A more subtle question is to ask how‘preference’ is reflected within a single neural region. Alternatively, preferences may bedetermined by concentrations of neurotransmitters, a whole-brain property at the synapticlevel. Preferences might be expressed at different time-points in the process of decisionmaking, thus we can ask whether preferences are generated in early valuation or later motorresponse systems. Finally, rather than individual regions or systems in the brain beingcritical for generating preferences, one can consider whether modulations in the interactionor communication within a network of regions holds the key to understanding inter-individual variability in choice.
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2.4.1 REGIONALLY-SPECIFIC ENCODING OF INTRINSIC VALUE
Gottfried et al measured fMRI data during an appetitive olfactory conditioning paradigm,where arbitrary picture stimuli were paired with pleasant smells of different foods (Gottfriedet al., 2003). Following learning, one of the olfactory stimuli was selectively devalued byconsuming the associated food to satiety. This enabled a distinction between stimulus-boundneural responses predicting simply the type of odour (i.e. a ‘flavour’ response) fromresponses that differentiated between valued versus devalued cues (i.e. an anticipatedhedonic response that could reflect preference). While a network of regions in OFC,amygdala, piriform cortex and midbrain were activated during presentation of odours, onlysubregions of amygdala and OFC exhibited responses that paralleled the effects of selectivesatiety, showing decreased activation for sated compared to unsated odour cues.
Of course this is not a causal demonstration of neural activity tied to preference, butexemplifies one of the earliest usages of neuroimaging to identify regions conforming to theinternal representation of a decision variable. In this case, the fact that the OFC activation forthe same physical stimulus changed in a manner that correlated with a behaviouralmanipulation of preference highlighted the OFC as a candidate region instantiating theexpression of preferences. In the same study other regions, for example insula cortex andstriatum, decreased their activity for the sated stimulus, but increased their activity for thealternative control stimulus. This observation highlights that an interpretation of findings isconstrained by the purported models being tested. If, for example, one hypothesises that thebrain forms a relative ranking of value, rather than representing value on a cardinal scale,then the insula would fit this description. A rigorous specification of choice models can helpmarshal divergent findings and this is the essential advantage of model-based approaches,whether neuroeconomic or biophysically inspired.
Converging evidence for over a decade has identified the OFC as encoding reward value.Single neuron recordings have shown a correlation in firing of OFC neurons with preferencesin monkeys (Tremblay and Schultz, 1999). Neuroimaging studies show that OFC responsesare neither valence-specific, manifesting responses to both rewards and punishments(O'Doherty et al., 2001a), nor domain-specific showing responses to food and other primaryreinforcers (Small et al., 2001), money (Elliott et al., 2000) and social value (Rushworth etal., 2007). These responses also appropriately scale with increasing amounts of anticipatedvalue (Elliott et al., 2003), and actual behavioural preference (Plassmann et al., 2007b).
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Recent findings from direct neuronal recordings in monkeys show that a proportion of OFCneurons adapt to condition, manifesting similar ranges of response under different scales ofoutcome (Padoa-Schioppa, 2009). This suggests that the OFC not only responds to changes invalue, but also integrates value with contextual and other goal-orientated information. Indifferent paradigms, OFC also encodes differences in stimulus value (FitzGerald et al.,2009b), choice value (Boorman et al., 2009) and counterfactual outcomes (Coricelli et al.,2005). These components are all important for the generation of choice. Nevertheless findinga region that maintains a stable, ordered, and scaled representation of value is not the sameas finding the seat of preferences in the brain. OFC and similar regions could be representingvalue for other reasons, for instance maintaining a representation of anticipated versusreceived rewards contingent on choice for learning purposes, or being an arbiter inproviding control of behavioural responses by gating influences from other valuationregions. For instance, value-sensitive responses to reward feedback have been found inprimary somatosensory (Pleger et al., 2008) and visual (Weil et al., 2010) cortices inperceptual learning paradigms. Even if OFC performs computations of differences in value,perhaps being the generator of probabilistic choices for abstract value-based decisionsrather than decisions based on comparisons of direct sensory evidence, it appears to be onlyone component of a network of value-sensitive regions. Moreover, it is plausible that‘preference’ or intrinsic value is imbued to decision values prior to this information arrivingin OFC.
Multiple candidate regions that have been reported to express value-related responsesinclude posterior parietal cortex (PPC) (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Iyer et al., 2010), posteriorcingulate cortex (PCC) (McCoy and Platt, 2005), insula (Yacubian et al., 2006), nucleusaccumbens/ventral striatum (Elliott et al., 2003; Knutson et al., 2005), the ventral tegmental(VTA) and substantia nigra (SN) areas of midbrain (Tobler et al., 2005). Other value-sensitive brain regions such as ACC appear to encode negatively-valenced components, suchas cost or effort (Walton et al., 2003).
The range of findings support one hypothesis – that OFC and similar regions encode the(non-linear) sum of value-sensitive inputs in an excitatory manner that in turn positivelycorrelate with desired stimuli and actions. Equally possible is that decrements in activity in aregion could influence choice (perhaps by a reduction in tonic inhibition of action), as isevident in basal ganglia circuitry (Mink, 2003). In other words, even if there were aregionally specific encoding of preference, this does not mean that value necessarilycorresponds to increases in neuronal activity. It is also possible that disparate pools of
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neurons within a region could exhibit very different relationships with stimuli or behaviour,either individually influencing a target region or interacting within a region (e.g. by lateralinhibition, Blakemore and Tobin, 1972). Single-cell recording studies in orbitofrontal cortexyield this mixed picture, revealing distinct populations of adjacent neurons that are valuesensitive, some expressing increases and others decreases in firing rate with increments insubjective value (Kennerley et al., 2009).
2.4.2 A CHANGE IN NEURAL SENSITIVITY WITHIN A BRAIN REGION
‘Preference’ describes a tendency to select a particular kind of action. The ‘sweet-toothed’choose sugary rather than savory foods; a ‘risk-seeking’ person chooses uncertain options;an ‘impulsive’ child fails to temper desire for immediate gratification while an ‘altruistic’individual takes account of others’ welfare. Whilst these disparate tendencies may sharecommon neural representations of value, economic models point to overall value asconstructed from intrinsic subcomponents.
One can represent this process as , where µ are the stimulusproperties or biological primitives relevant to behavior, and represents the parametersthat govern how an individual treats or processes these properties. µ can relate to primarysensory properties of the stimulus (form, taste, smell etc), but equally can be a function ofthese sensory properties (i.e. ). For example, this could be atransformation of visual information presented in a gamble into decision variables such asmagnitude and risk, or a non-linear weighting of more abstract stimulus feature such asreward probability. This framework partitions the decision making process into four sub-components, each represented in the brain. Choice pertains to action, the end-product of amotoric network. Value relates to affective or hedonic anticipation or impact of those actions(as I discuss above), but µ and pertain to underlying decision variables. While µ is afunction of the stimulus properties themselves and invariant with respect to behaviouralpredilections, describes how individuals treat each of these underlying properties (e.g.whether magnitude has a positive or negative impact on value). Thus, a search for the neuralinstantiation of preferences can be seen as a search for a representation of these underlyingparameters.
One means of identification of such candidate areas would be to segregate areas representing
µ (potentially processing these decision variables) from areas encoding (behaviouralpreference toward these decision variables). Lesion studies implicate both factors – for
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example the finding that patients with damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex(VMPFC) are less averse to uncertainty than healthy counterparts (Hsu et al., 2005; Shiv etal., 2005) could be interpreted as the emergence of normative economic behaviour (a changein ) or simply reflect a lack of sensitivity to this stimulus variable because of an inability toprocess uncertainty (no representation of µ). There have been a large cohort of studiesdemonstrating neural sensitivity to decision-relevant stimulus properties (µ), ranging fromsensory attributes (O'Doherty et al., 2001b) and reward identity (Chib et al., 2009), toabstract decision variables such as financial magnitude of reward (Elliott et al., 2000),probability (Hsu et al., 2009), expected value (Knutson et al., 2005), valence (Delgado et al.,2000), and risk (Preuschoff et al., 2006).
Other studies have attempted to identify regions correlating directly with preferences ( ).Structural studies have reported that prefrontal grey matter volume is inversely correlatedwith impulsivity (Bjork et al., 2009), and right prefrontal cortex lesions promote riskierchoice (Clark et al., 2003). Alternatively, functional observations include findings thatactivation in striatal (Tom et al., 2007) and prefrontal (Gianotti et al., 2009) regionscorrelates with loss and risk aversion, while lateral and medial OFC correlate positively andnegatively with risk aversion respectively (Tobler et al., 2007).
When making a decision, brain areas governing preference need to interact with circuitryinvolved in valuation, a process I summarise above as . This influence could occur atan early stage of processing, during encoding of stimulus properties themselves. Bothinferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and adjacent lateral prefrontal cortex express differential
Figure 2.4. Example of a study examining stimulus variable encoding. Correlation of ventral
striatal activity with anticipated expected value and uncertainty in a binary-outcome
decision making task (adapted from Preuschoff et al., 2006).
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responses to high and low risk, with greater responses for high than low risk in risk-seekers,but an opposite response in risk-averse individuals (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al.,2009). This expression of risk-sensitivity would be expected from areas extracting orconstructing the subjective value of risk, making this cortical zone a good candidate locus forintegration of different aspects of financial value with intrinsic economic preferences.
This interaction between an observed behavioural preference and a regional expression ofneural activity in response to a stimulus, context or decision trial has also been applied instudies of intertemporal and interpersonal (‘social’) choice. The effect of delay on behaviour(preference for impulsive choice) is mirrored by the effect of delay on neural responses inventral striatum, medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortex (Kable and Glimcher,2007). In this task, striatal responses demonstrate an integration of two types of economicpreference, for both magnitude (marginally decreasing utility) and delay (Pine et al., 2009).
Invetigations of moral judgements and social preferences implicate prefrontal and insularcortices (Koenigs et al., 2007; Hsu et al., 2008). For example, the Ultimatum Game is astylized economic paradigm of social interaction used to investigate the neural basis of socialpreference. Here, a ‘proposer’ might offer a fair 50:50 split of a £10 kitty to a ‘responder’– thecrucial element is that the ‘responder’ can elect to accept the offer, in which both partiesreceive the split as proposed, or reject the offer, in which case both parties get nothing. Whilethe ‘rational’ response in a one-shot anonymised version of this task is to accept any offeramount, even in these circumstances of no reciprocity or reputation-formation real-liferesponders typically reject offers of up to 30% of the kitty (Camerer, 2003). This punishesthe proposer for an inequitable split despite a personal financial cost incurred by theresponder, hence indexing the responder’s trade-off between self- and other-regardingpreferences. Here, the stimulus variable of interest (µ) is inequity itself, an objective measureof fairness. How such inequity influences the responder’s choice to accept or reject isproposed to depend upon their ‘inequity-aversion’ ( ) (Edgeworth, 1881; Fehr and Schmidt,1999).
One can employ a version of Ultimatum Game where participants think they are respondingto human proposers, but where offers are actually experimentally controlled (Wright et al.,2011). This enables a manipulation of inequity (i.e. the objective stimulus property µ), whichwas found to linearly correlate with activity in posterior insula. Crucially in this study, a biasin subjective appreciation of fairness was induced by altering the context of the decision –responders believed that offers were made by three socially different groups of subjects,
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offering fairer or less fair splits of the kitty. Identical offers from these different social groupsinduced differential neural responses to inequity in mid-insula, responses that paralleled abehavioural bias in choice. A different network of regions in precuneus, left prefrontal andtemproparietal cortex reflected endogenous inequity-aversion across subjects (i.e.independent of the contextual manipulation), illustrating that even within the context of aspecific task, preferences for the same stimulus feature can be expressed in different regionsand modulated in a distinct manner.
2.4.3 DISTRIBUTED ENCODING OF VALUE BY NEUROTRANSMITTERS
Midbrain dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra(SN) modulate their firing rate in response to rewarding stimuli (Tobler et al., 2005).Although dopamine was originally hypothesised to be a qualitative and quantitative hedonicsignal (Yokel and Wise, 1978; Wise and Rompré, 1989), an aliquot of dopamine is not anintrinsic biological measure of utility, nor is dopamine release universally related topreference. A clear example is seen in genetically engineered rats with no endogenousdopamine synthesis but who still express relative preference for different types of reward(Cannon and Palmiter, 2003). However, dopamine does appear to play a central role in cost-benefit analysis (Phillips et al., 2007). This effect appears to be modality-specific and dictatedby the precise dopaminergic projection target, as dopamine depletion in ventral striatumreduces propensity for physical effort (Salamone et al., 2007), but not for time delay(Wakabayashi et al., 2004). By contrast systemic dopaminergic modulation does influenceinter-temporal decision making (Wade et al., 2000), an influence localised to orbitalprefrontal cortex (and striatum) (Kheramin et al., 2004; Pine et al., 2010). However, thereappear to be multiple dopamine-sensitive decision regions, as for example D1 blockade inACC also reduces preference for expending effort for rats (Schweimer and Hauber, 2006).
Critically, dopamine neurons respond to surprising rewards (Schultz et al., 1997), revealing acentral role in associative learning. Although non-discriminative between reward types,dopaminergic firing in VTA does appear to reflect subjective (action) value with integratedresponses to both delay and reward amount (Roesch et al., 2007). Dopaminergic neuronssend diffuse projections to striatum (nigrostriatal pathway) and prefrontal cortex(mesocortical pathway) and thereby transmit a hedonic value or teaching signal to a varietyof brain regions, for learning, stimulus evaluation, and directed action. Increasing striataldopamine for instance does not elicit reward craving by itself, even in addicts, but doeschange a cocaine addicts’ sensitivity to environmentally salient cues (Volkow et al., 2008).
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Single-unit recording studies have shown that the tonic firing rates of dopaminergicmidbrain neurons scale with reward uncertainty in risk-based decision-making tasks inprimates (Fiorillo et al., 2003), although the interpretation of this finding is subject to dispute(Fiorillo et al., 2005; Niv et al., 2005). These nuclei also receive inputs from areas such as thehabenula (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007), which responds to negatively-valenced stimuliand feedback (Ullsperger and Von Cramon, 2003). Hence, the VTA/SN could act as a hub tocompare predicted action values and obtained outcomes. It is therefore possible that certainpreferences could be engendered at this early stage, perhaps by differential responses tooutcomes and interindividual variability in the effect of precision of predictions ondopaminergic output.
There are substantial hormonal influences on behaviour. For example, circulating hormonessuch as leptin and ghrelin act as satiety and hunger signals, reporting the status of body
Figure 2.5 Midbrain dopaminergic neurons show a phasic and sustained response to
probabilistic reward. A. Population histogram of dopaminergic neuron firing showing a
phasic response to cue and feedback. B. The sustained response exhibits a quadratic
relationship with reward probability (i.e. consistent with a variance or risk signal). C. This
sustained response also scales with spread when reward amounts rather than probabilities
are manipulated. (Adapted from Fiorillo et al., 2003)
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energy reserves (e.g. adipose tissue), energy requirements, and acute nutrient intake tohypothalamic and midbrain targets in the central nervous system that regulate feedingbehavior (Korotkova et al., 2003). They also act on brain regions (in particulardopaminoceptive areas) implicated in human decision-making (Krügel et al., 2003; Hommelet al., 2006). Metabolic state itself may thus directly affect the neural expression ofpreference, an hypothesis I test in Chapter 6.
Other neurochemical systems are implicated in preference, with both serotonergic depletion(Denk et al., 2005) and NMDA antagonism (Floresco et al., 2007) promoting impulsivity.Several neuromodulatory transmitters are purported to play a specific role in risky decision-making, including noradrenaline, serotonin, and dopamine (Rogers et al., 2004; Zeeb et al.,2009). Clinically, Parkinson’s disease, where nigro-striatal dopamine pathways areimpoverished, can lead to disorders of decision-making (Cools et al., 2003). Dopamineagonists, used to treat this disorder, can cause pathological gambling behaviour as a side-effect of therapy (Gallagher et al., 2007). Additionally, manipulation of dopamine levels inrats disrupts decision-making under uncertainty in foraging tasks. Thus, administration ofamphetamine (which augments dopamine release) increases preference for a risky choice,while the effects of amphetamine can be abolished by dopamine receptor blockade (St Ongeand Floresco, 2008).
Finally, genetic polymorphisms affecting receptor function or expression are a suggestedconduit for value and preference. For example, DRD4 polymorphisms modulate the incentivevalue of alcohol in alcoholics (MacKillop et al., 2007), while genetic polymorphisms affectingDRD2 receptor expression alter neuronal responses to food reward (Felsted et al., 2010).Although attributing specific whole-organism behavioural phenotypes or neural responses togenetic polymorphisms is highly contentious with results often contradictory andinconclusive (Hariri et al., 2002; Schinka et al., 2002; Munafo et al., 2003; Kreek et al., 2005),nevertheless it is conceivable that alterations in receptor function in specific neural regionscould bias valuation and action-selection process thereby engendering behaviouralpredilections.
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2.4.4 CHANGE IN NEURAL ACTIVITY COUPLED TO ACTION
Action is supported by multiple brain regions and networks. Saccadic eye movements aredriven by the frontal eye fields via superior colliculus , while limb movements are guided bymotor efferents from Betz cells in primary motor cortex projecting to spinal anterior horncells. Motor cortex receives inputs from thalamus, which in turn receives afferents frommultiple areas including the supplementary motor area in premotor cortex, basal-gangliaand cerebellum (Houk and Wise, 1995), and interparietal sulcus, an associative region ofcortex containing neurons with sensory receptive fields (Shadlen and Newsome, 1996).
This division between action and perception is evident in multiple neural processes.Interestingly, preferences for actions can be dissociated from preferences for stimuli, whichechoes an idea that actions can in themselves create or establish preferences (Ariely and
Figure 2.6 Risk-related activity in inferior frontal gyrus correlates with risk preference and
with choice. A. Inferior frontal gyrus correlates with risk. B. The response to high and low
risk changes direction as an individual’s risk aversion increases. C. The correlation with
risk depends both on the level of risk and on the choice that an individual makes. (Adapted
from Christopoulos et al., 2009)
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Norton, 2008; Sharot et al., 2009a). For instance, OFC is predominantly associated with(learned) valuation of (reinforcing) stimuli, but there is evidence of a distinct process in ACC(which projects anatomically to premotor regions) of value encoding for reinforced actions,and ACC sulcus may be required for learning of action values (Kennerley et al., 2006).Similar regions in ACC have also been shown to encode decision uncertainty (Behrens et al.,2007), and the ACC gyrus is involved is learning social values (Rushworth et al., 2007). Thus,it is possible that interactions between subregions of cingulate cortex might imbue taste foruncertainty or social preferences by differentially weighting action values represented inACC.
ACC is also necessary for an appraisal of the energetic cost versus benefits of actions, and apreference to expend effort to achieve a goal. Take a situation where rats are required tomake a decision between two alternatives, either to climb over a barrier to obtain a largefood reward, or to expend low effort but receive a smaller food reward. ACC lesions alter themodal preference for expending effort to reap reward (Walton et al., 2003), an effect specificfor energetic actions but not for non-effortful costs, such as a delay in obtaining reward (withthe converse true for OFC) (Rudebeck et al., 2006).
Neuroimaging studies have identified areas differentially responding to selected actions (e.g.the selection of risky vs safe options in a gambling task). Christopoulos et al have parsed arisk-sensitive network into (right) IFG, a region whose activity promotes safe choices, fromventral striatum and ACC, engendering risky choice (Christopoulos et al., 2009) (Figure 2.6).Direct disruption of activity in this right lateral prefrontal region by repetitive transcranialmagnetic stimulation biases choice towards risk-seeking (Knoch et al., 2006b), whiletranscrianial anodal direct current stimulation, inducing activation in this area, promotessafer choice (Fecteau et al., 2007). In the domain of intertemporal choice, McClure et al havesuggested an interaction between subcortical and cortical areas push and pull choicestowards impulsivity or patience (McClure et al., 2004).
More recently, studies have examined the interaction between preference and choice-relatedactivity. Superior and inferior frontal gyrus and OFC express greater or less activity prior to arisky choice in a manner that positively correlates with risk aversion (Engelmann and Tamir,2009b). A similar pattern is seen in PPC (Weber and Huettel, 2008b), which has polysynapticlinks to basal ganglia and premotor regions (Tanne-Gariepy et al., 2002) and directconnections with insula (Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1989). These choice-related activationsalso relate to psychological measures such as harm avoidance in both ventral striatum
54
(Matthews et al., 2004), and insula (Paulus et al., 2003b). In itself, this does not distinguishbetween modulation of stimulus evaluation and action selection, as risk-seekers will alwaystend to select a preferred riskier option if the expected values of options are matched.However, this parallels the interaction between brain areas governing preference andcircuitry involved in valuation (i.e. ). Rather than envisaging this influence atvaluation or stimulus encoding, hypothesizing a modulation of choice-related activity bypreference postulates a direct effect of preference on regional activity coupled with motoroutput, without a distillation through a prefrontal or subcortical hedonometer. In otherwords, some preferences could originate within the motor network, where biases ariseduring a translation of sensory inputs into specific actions.
2.4.5 CHANGE IN REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY AND MODULATION OF PREFERENCE
The brain is a non-linear dynamical system, with dense interconnections between and withinbrain areas. There has been an increasing realisation that connectivity between regions is akey component of a functional neural architecture – this connectivity generates macroscopicsynchronisation of neuronal pools (i.e. oscillatory activity) (Sporns et al., 2000), and supportsmetastable representations that change and switch at a behavioural timescale (Oullier andKelso, 2006). This connectivity itself could be the source of preferences in the brain – ifparietal cortex or striatum quantifies specific decision variables, prefrontal cortex integratesthis information with context and incentive salience, and premotor cortex plans actions,perhaps the true instantiation of preference lies in the strength of connections and mutualinfluence between these regions.
Changes in behaviour and associated neural responses in medial prefrontal cortex andstriatum following knowledge acquisition have been shown to be mediated by functionalconnections from dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Li et al., 2011). Right DLPFC is alsoimplicated in rejection of fair offers in the Ultimatum Game (Wright et al., 2011), anddisrupting this region by transcranial magnetic stimuluation induces a reversible increasedtendency to accept normatively ‘unfair’ offers (Knoch et al., 2006a). Dorsomedial prefrontalcortex (DMPFC) has been separately shown to express connectivity (correlation betweentime-series of inferred neuronal activity) with anterior insula and DLPFC during a riskydecision making task, with the relative strength of these functional connections dependentupon individual strategic preferences (Venkatraman et al., 2009). Similarly, aninterconnected network of DLPFC, IFG and VMPFC have been mapped out by functionalconnectivity analyses to highlight how DLPFC mediates restraint in choices about food (Hare
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et al., 2009). These studies indicate a network of regions involved in decision making whoseinteractions, rather than intrinsic activity, dictate preference and choice.
2.5 CONCLUSION
The process of decision making can thus be broken down into constituent parts, eachsupported by different neurobiological mechanisms. Preferences generated at each step areinstantiated at a regional or network level, and controlled by multiple competingmechanisms. Consequently, there are multiple potential sites at which preferences can beendogenously or exogenously influenced. At one end of the spectrum is a demonstration thatin vivo stimulation single neurons in early sensory visual cortex can bias motiondiscrimination decisions in monkeys (Salzman et al., 1990). At the other end, aberrantdecision making with altered behavioural preference is a feature of brain injury (Clark et al.,2008), Parkinson’s disease, (Gallagher et al., 2007), and can even be pharmacologicallyinduced (e.g. by alcohol, amphetamines, and dopamine agonists) (Zeeb et al., 2009).
A coherent framework based upon neurobiological foundations allows arbitration betweencompeting decision theories, and also reveals the sources of systematic biological influenceson behaviour. Neurobiological evidence thus furnishes process-based theories of choice (i.e.theories that describe choices as the product of a series of distinct computations infunctionally or anatomically separable networks), and yields new hypotheses beyond thebounds of traditional economic dictum.
The various conceptual approaches to choice and preference, demonstrations of disparateinfluences on decision making, and interactions between several different types of value,speak to different questions and levels of understanding of choice processes. For a biologicalmodel, we need to define the types of valuation system we are considering, the network orareas involved in the associated computational processing and the synaptic physiology thatmight underlie the process. In the same way that axiomatic economic models place well-defined constraints upon rational choice, biological parameters also place constraints on theplausible mechanisms that mediate the generation of actions and the preferences theyexpress.
In the following chapters, I explore the neurobiological encoding of risk as a paradigmaticexample of an economic variable, examining the anatomical network of areas involved in
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representation of risk as a stimulus variable. I manipulate endogenous physiological state aswell as exogenously administrating dopamine to delineate the extent and direction of thesebehavioural influences. Finally, I also identify where risk preferences are integrated with thisinformation to direct choice and when these effects are expressed.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the methods used in the experiments in this thesis. Iinitially discuss decision theory and computational modelling of behaviour. Economicmodelling of choice forms a cornerstone of each of the studies, and here I discuss theunderlying principles and the statistical methods used both for fitting these models to dataand for model comparison. The subsequent sections review the theory and practice offunctional magnetic resonance imaging and magneto-encephalography, the twoneuroimaging modalities used herein.
3.2 DECISION THEORY AND BEHAVIOURAL MODELLING
3.2.1 DECISION THEORY
Decision theory describes a broad formal framework for describing and quantifyingquestions about behavior in diverse environments, and reflects a wide range of theoreticaland experimental traditions (e.g. Wald, 1950; Savage, 1951; Edwards, 1961; Green andSwets, 1974; Slovic et al., 1977; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Houston and McNamara, 2001;Bellman, 2003; MacKay, 2003; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Decision theory is a critical tool foranalysis of psychological data and its neural substrate, allowing mechanistic questions,hypotheses, and predictions to be posed by alternative models.
Decision theory encompasses many different types of problem, including learning andprediction (e.g. reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998)), detection andclassification (e.g. signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1974)), exploration andexploitation, valuation and choice (e.g. microeconomic theory (Savage, 1951)). In this thesis,I concentrate on the latter, as the experiments endeavour to minimise effects of learning,
ETHODS
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perceptual uncertainty, lack of knowledge, and ambiguity, focusing on how humans evaluateexplicitly presented risks.
There are many different aspects to valuation and choice, and as discussed previously (see
Chapter 2), including risky and intertemporal choice, dynamic and sequential decisionmaking, and model-free versus model-based algorithms. Generally decisions underuncertainty are characterised by three components. Firstly, any action with uncertainoutcomes can be described in terms of the different potential outcomes, or states of theworld that might arise. The chance of these different outcomes can be described as aprobability distribution or likelihood function over these states. Secondly, each of thesestates has potential value or cost, and the description of the value of potential outcomes iscalled the loss or cost function. Thirdly, most relevant in situations of learning andexploration, prior knowledge or assumptions can be integrated with new information toupdate beliefs about the probability of different states of the world occurring. To optimallycombine knowledge of probability and cost entails maximisation of expected utility, asdiscussed in Chapter 2. Prior knowledge can be integrated in an optimal manner using Bayestheory. Approximations of expected utility can be employed to simplify the computationalsituation – rather than representing all possible states of the world and the full probabilitydistribution, an estimate of value can be reached, for example either by summarising theprobability distribution (Parzen, 1962), pruning states to the core essentials (a strategy usedby game-playing chess or backgammon computers) (Tesauro, 1992), or using past estimatesto infer future value as in reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
In this thesis I borrow ideas and models in microeconomics and finance, in particular theconcept of the construction of a utility measure for judging alternative actions, and fortrading off risk and reward. One of the central questions addressed by experimental andbehavioural economics is which utility function people use to construct decisions. Theseideas have in turn heavily influenced thinking in ecology and engineering. Optimal controltheory is founded upon the idea of maximising expected return of future states (Todorov,2006), risk analysis incorporates uncertainty measures into the loss function (Bedford andCooke, 2001), and foraging theory equates utility with reproductive fitness (Stephens et al.,2007).
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3.2.2 BEHAVIOURAL MODELLING
In essence, all behavioural models attempt to predict aspects of behaviour as a function ofsensory input. For the models implemented in this thesis, the relevant behavioural variable ischoice, although one could alternatively desire to fit movements, reaction times, errors, orphysiological measures. As discussed in the previous chapter, one can represent this processas , where choice is a function of both stimulus properties µand individual parameters governing a person’s behavioural attitudes . In other words,models are probability distributions over choices, conditioned on external variables.Neurobiological models attempt to map these functions and variables onto specific neuralprocesses, either at a cellular (biophysical modeling) or systems (behavioural or networkmodeling) level. If a model describes data well, then one can explore how internalcomponents of the model map onto processes in specific neural regions. Moreover, one canask not only if the model predicts choice, but also if the expected profile of neural activitymatches the model components. The use of parametric modulators to model the neuralresponse to complex stimuli with several dimensions is well established (Buchel et al., 1998;Wood et al., 2008), and the correlation of neural data with dynamically changing internalvariables of a computational model has been implemented in several studies of the neuralvaluation system (O'Doherty et al., 2004; Samejima et al., 2005); for review see Corrado andDoya (2007).
3.2.2.1 Generative models of choice
One of the first elements in constructing a behavioural choice model is to decide on the formof the value function. I use value function models derived from economic theory, as describedin the previous chapters, and in more detail subsequently when I consider different modelsin turn. In addition, value functions need to be combined with a generative model of choice.In other words, one needs to describe how stimulus values are translated into discretechoices.
This translation could be deterministic (i.e. a rule where option A is always chosen overoption B if its value is greater). Such normative choice rules form the basis of axiomaticfoundations of economic theory. In practice, they do not describe behaviour well, and onenormally needs to model stochastic preference. The commonest way of doing this is bytranslating value differences through a sigmoidal function (Figure 3.1).
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Thus when the values of options are far apart, the probability of choosing the higher valuedoption is close to certain, whereas when values are closely matched, choices are lesspredictable.
There are several advantages of modelling stochastic choice in such a way. Firstly, thiscaptures behaviour better than a deterministic function. Secondly, this parallels implicitneural noise at various levels of the system (see Chapter 2). This noise can be envisaged aserror at the valuation stage – this error distribution being either Gaussian or the morepeaked double-exponential (Gumbell) form. These error distributions correspond to probit(cumulative normal) or logit responses at the choice level respectively. For multinomialchoice, these can be extended to multinomial probit or logit (softmax) forms. Whilst inperceptual decision making, a probit response function is often used, for value-baseddecision making the logit function is more often employed (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This isboth the tradition in reinforcement learning, but also serves the useful purpose of beingbetter able to capture aberrant choices that deviate greatly from expected (the double-exponential distribution has fatter tails). A third advantage of modelling stochastic choice isthat the resulting prediction is probabilistic (i.e. the probability or likelihood of choosingoption A on each trial). This is very useful when using maximum likelihood (ML) techniquesto estimate best-fitting parameters, as discussed below.
Figure 3.1 Logistic sigmoid. A logistic function, , transforms the value or utility
of different options into a choice probability.
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3.2.2.2 Model estimation and parameter inference
There are two common ways of estimating best-fitting model parameters. These are broadlydivided into classical and Bayesian approaches, or approaches that have minimaldistributional assumptions (although not necessarily entirely non-parametric), and thosethat require a specification of a likelihood function.
3.2.2.2.1 LEAST SQUARES MINIMISATION AND RELATED APPROACHES
The first approach is least-squares minimisation (LSM). Widely used for linear regression,LSM minimises the squared-residual error between data and prediction. It is versatile andstraightforward, and does not require a priori assumptions about the error distribution.Minimising the squared-error (rather than an alternative error term such as absolute errormagnitude) means that an analytical solution can be derived (by calculus or matrix algebra).It can be used to summarise data (sum-of-squares error), and describe model fits(proportion of variance accounted for, r2).
However, LSM does not necessarily yield unbiased or accurate estimates of best fittingparameters, and relies on assumptions of normality. Asymptotically, it can converge to theoptimal solution but this is not generally true. LSM can be extended to multidimensionaldatasets, and knowledge about the precision of data points can be incorporated to improvefitted estimates, such as in robust or weighted LSM. It can be easily used to fit binary choicedata without requiring a model of noise. It is also very valuable in cases where theunderlying distribution is complex or unknown, or if sequential observations are notindependent of one another. I use a closely related method (the method of simulatedmoments) in Chapter 5 to fit multinomial choice data. I save a detailed exposition of thespecific method for this chapter.
3.2.2.2.2 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD (ML) ESTIMATION
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), originally developed by Fisher (Aldrich, 1997), is oneof the most standard approaches used in statistics. It is optimal in the asymptotic case withlarge samples, providing unbiased and efficient best-fitting parameter estimates. Parametersobtained by LSM approximate ML estimators and MLE is at the heart of inference, statisticaltesting, and model comparison. I use MLE extensively to fit models described in this thesis, in
Chapters 4, 6, 7, and 8, and provide an overview of the method here.
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To identify the specific parameter vector
Figure 3.2
The actual converse (inverse) problem to be solved is to calculate the likelihood of any
Figure 3.2
( 3.1 )
Figure 3.2 Illustration of probabilistic data from the binomial problem. The binomial
distribution (A) describes the chance of y successes from n trials, with a success
probability of p. B shows the likelihood distribution over p after observing 5, 7, or 9
successes. C shows the log-likelihood functions for the same y’s. (Based on Myung, 2003).
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thus for binary choice data (i.e. yi ,
( 3.2 )
( 3.3 )
thus:
( 3.4 )
As seen above, one usually maximises the log-likelihood (see Figure 3.2C), which ismonotonically related to the likelihood, as it is computationally easier to deal with sums oflog-probabilities than products of probabilities. While for some problems an analyticalsolution is possible (as it is for the illustrated binomial problem), for the complex non-linearmodels considered in this thesis we use numerical techniques. These come in a variety offorms, most commonly either gradient-ascent algorithms or, as we use here, non-linearoptimisation which does not require derivatives to be taken and which can cope with step-changes in the likelihood surface.
Optimisation algorithms do not guarantee convergence to a global maximum; local maximaare often problematic. As there is no general solution to this, here I typically initialise thealgorithm with a range of starting parameters, choosing the iteration with the highestlikelihood value. At the maximum likelihood value, one can read out the maximum likelihoodparameter estimates to make further inference.
3.2.2.3 Model comparison
Alternative hypotheses about behaviour, and its underlying mechanisms, can thus bemathematically expressed as models. Model parameters can be optimised to best describebehaviour, but how can different hypotheses be compared? One can simply compare a set ofmodels’ maximum likelihood estimates or residual values, which will indicate which modelbest fits the current data. However, this does not take into account model parsimony or
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complexity. An over-parameterised model will inevitably fit the data well but may be a poorout-of-sample predictor compared to a simpler model.
There are a number of ways of accounting for model complexity, including the Akaike andBayesian information criteria (Akaike, 1974; Schwarz, 1978). These take into account modelfit and model complexity (based on the number of parameters) to give a modified likelihood.I describe these further as they are used in subsequent chapters. They approximate the fullBayesian solution, which accounts for model complexity and the covariance between modelparameters (in other words, one parameter may be more powerful in explaining the datathan another, or parameters may not behave independently in likelihood-space).
These modified likelihood values can be compared to work out the best-fitting model. Fixed-effects analyses assume one best-fitting model for the population, which I implement here.An alternative random effects analysis allows for different best-fitting models acrossindividuals.
3.3 FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a powerful, non-invasive method that canbe employed to indirectly measure neural activity during cognitive processing in vivo in thehuman brain. fMRI assays local cerebral blood flow changes over a timescale of seconds,made feasible by the rapid, spatially localised, neurovascular coupling between blood flowand regional neuronal activity. The precise mechanics governing the generation of fMRIsignals is still being elucidated, and the potential applications continue to be extended(Logothetis, 2008). The undoubted power and replicability of fMRI has been underscored byits wide use in cognitive psychology and the consistency between fMRI findings and knownneurophysiological ground truths from decades of research into cortical processes.
One of the main roles of fMRI has been to provide evidence of functional localisation ofspecific cognitive processes, although more recent uses have included the modelling ofinteracting networks of regions (functional integration – e.g. see Penny, Stephan et al(2004a)). Below, I discuss first the theoretical basis for MRI, before describing the specifics offMRI data acquisition, processing and statistical analysis.
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3.3.2 PRINCIPLES OF MRI
3.3.2.1 Nuclear magnetic resonance and relaxation
Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) is a property of atomic nuclei, induced in the presence ofa magnetic field. Nucleons (protons and neutrons) possess a quantum attribute called ‘spin’,and atomic nuclei with unpaired nucleons have a non-zero net spin and consequently can actas magnetic dipoles. In particular, the hydrogen nucleus contains a single proton and is themost abundant element in living organisms, thus measuring the magnetic properties ofcompartmentalised hydrogen nuclei provides a means for anatomical topological mappingaccording to the specific make-up (i.e. the density of mobile hydrogen nuclei – proton
density) of biological tissues.
In the presence of a static magnetic field, B0, proton dipoles align in either a parallel orantiparallel configuration. A fractional excess of protons in the lower energy parallelconfiguration (about 1 in 100000 for 1.5T), imposes a bulk magnetic moment, M0, on thesample. These dipoles also precess around the external field’s axis (Figure 3.3) at a specificangular frequency (ω), given by the Larmor relationship:
( 3.5 )
γ is the isotope-specific gyromagnetic ratio and B is the magnetic field strength in Tesla (T).This is also the proton’s resonant frequency, with energetic absorption (E) given by Planck’sequation, , where h is Planck’s constant (6.626 x 10-34 Js).
Applying a radiofrequency (RF) pulse perpendicular to B0 produces an oscillatory field B1,causing resonant absorption of energy in protons with matching Larmor frequencies.
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Subsequent spin-state transitions from low to high energy levels synchronises precession (phase
coherence) and creates a bulk rotating transverse magnetization moment (Mxy), perpendicular to
B0. Concurrently, the longitudinal magnetization moment (Mz) is reduced as more protons alignin an antiparallel (higher energy) configuration. This tilts the net magnetization vector fromalignment with the B0 z-axis into the transverse xy plane. The degree of tilt is called the flipangle, and an RF pulse sufficient in amplitude and duration can flip the magnetization vectorsideways (a 90° flip angle) or into reverse (a 180° flip angle).
On cessation of the RF pulse, as the nuclei gradual return to equilibrium (relaxation) andprecession continues in the transverse plane, energy is emitted as an oscillating electromagneticfield, which can induce current flow in a receiver RF coil. Detecting this current flow forms thebasis for MRI signal acquisition (Bloch et al., 1946). Relaxation occurs in two ways – longitudinal(T1) and transverse (T2) relaxation.
3.3.2.1.1 T1 RELAXATION
T1 relaxation refers to the reestablishment of Mz as protons release energy and their spinsregain equilibrium along B0. T1 is the time constant of the longitudinal relaxation rate (Figure
3.4):
Figure 3.3 Precession of a nuclear magnetic dipole around an external B0 field.
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( 3.6 )
T1 is governed by intrinsic material properties, and differences in T1 constants between tissuetypes can be utilised to provide contrast in T1-weighted imaging.
3.3.2.1.2 T2 AND T2* RELAXATION
T2 relaxation refers to the gradual loss of phase coherence with and decay of Mxy. This decay isdetermined by two phenomena. Quantum spin-spin interactions induce random field variationsbetween protons desynchronising the precession phase. This rate of transverse magnetisationdecay is described by the time constant T2:
( 3.7 )
Further, local external field inhomogeneities cause an increased rate of phase decoherence (apredominant effect). This more rapid loss of transverse magnetization is governed by the timeconstant T2*, where:
( 3.8 )
1/Tinh is the relaxation rate due to the magnetic field inhomogeneities.
A damped oscillatory RF signal measured immediately after the RF pulse is switched off (free
induction decay) results from T2* effects (Figure 3.4):
( 3.9 )
Fluid has a long T1 and T2, in contrast to the shorter T1 and T2 from tissues with cellularstructure. This is mainly dictated by proton binding, as mobile protons in fluid retain energy fora longer duration.
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3.3.2.2 Image contrast
Image contrast between different tissue types is generated by measuring the decaying signalfollowing an RF pulse at a specific time. Tissue differences in T1, T2 and T2* are reflected indifferent signal constitutions from different tissues at a given time-point (because of thesevarying rates of decay).
Figure 3.4 Relaxation processes. T1, T2, and T2* are the time constants of the exponential
changes in magnetization over time following and RF pulse. The T2* constant dictates the
envelope of free induction decay (FID).
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A train of RF pulses is sent during image acquisition. The time interval between each pulse is theTR (repetition time). For a gradient echo (GE) scan, the MR signal is collected a short timefollowing each 90° RF pulse at the TE (echo time). The image signal intensity (S) thus dependsupon the TR, TE and the number of proton spins within the tissue sample:
( 3.10 )
whereρ is the proton spin density.
Spin echo (SE) sequences include an additional 180° pulse to remove local field inhomogeneityeffects (therefore isolating the T2 contribution).
Thus at a specific TR, different tissue types will generate different signal intensities (Figure 3.5).
A short TR and TE enhances T1 contrast, while a long TR and TE enhances contrasts dependenton T2 (SE sequences) or T2* (GE sequences). A long TR/short TE isolates the proton spin-dependent signal (proton density weighting).
Figure 3.5 Contrast power for T1 and T2. Contrast power is dictated by the difference in signal
intensity over time for T1 and T2 relaxation processes. T1 is enhanced by a shorter TR, T2
enhanced by a longer TE.
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3.3.3 CONSTRUCTING AN MR IMAGE
3.3.3.1 Spatial encoding
To construct an MR image from these received RF signals, the MR signal needs to be imbuedwith spatial information (spatial encoding). This utilises a 3D array of external magnets togenerate fields (gradient fields) in the z (slice-selective), y (read-out or frequency encoding) andx (phase encoding) directions (Lauterbur, 1973), which are switched on with each RF pulse. Thestrength of these gradient fields vary in a linear manner across the volume of interest, thusentraining linear variation in (hydrogen nucleus) proton spin-precessions across the volume,according to the Lamor relationship ( 3.5). A narrow-bandwidth RF pulse will therefore excitecorresponding protons precessing at a specific spatial location. Spatial resolution (slice
thickness) is determined by the RF pulse bandwidth and slice-selective gradient strength.
While the slice-selective gradient is applied simultaneous with each RF pulse, the frequency-encoding gradient is applied during signal measurement, and the phase-encoding gradientapplied between RF pulse onset and measurement. The phase-encoding gradient shifts the phaseof photon precession, and both frequency and phase information can be recovered from theemitted signal by Fourier transform to specify the position in the transverse plane. Phase andfrequency encoding can be repeated multiple times during each TR interval to collect data fromeach xy location (‘k space’, or the frequency-phase map), for a slice at a specific z location. A 3Darray of gradient fields thus allows a partitioning of a volume of interest into cubed elements(voxels).
3.3.3.2 Echo-planar imaging
Conventional MRI records one phase-encoded line of k space for each TR. Echo-planar imaging(EPI) (Mansfield, 1977) affords faster data acquisition, as an entire image volume is acquiredfollowing a single RF excitation pulse by collecting the complete k-space dataset within the shorttime that free induction decay is detectable. A series of refocusing ‘echoes’ are produced bygradient reversals (i.e. 180° RF pulses in the phase and frequency gradient coils) whichresynchronise proton precession and allow collection of further signal. These echoes can beadapted to give T2 or T2* contrast, and rapidly changing the frequency y-gradients allows thesampling of a trajectory through k-space.
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EPI allows for sampling of an entire volume of interest at sub-centimetre spatial resolution in arapid timescale (Stehling et al., 1991) commensurate with cognitive processes (typically 2-4sTR). Fast acquisition is also desirable because the BOLD effect may be confounded by signalinstabilities originating from cardiac and respiratory cycles or head motion.
The rapid signal changes in gradient coils are the main technical limitation to EPI, and also cancause side effects at high field strengths, such as the generation of eddy currents in neural tissuewhich can lead to peripheral nerve stimulation. In addition, artefacts can occur due to magneticfield inhomogeneities or induced eddy currents. These are particularly evident in the phase-encoding direction (Nyquist ghosts), which can be minimised by various correction techniques(Bruder et al., 1992; Buonocore and Gao, 1997). Susceptibility artefacts can also occur, especiallyat air-bone interfaces, which can cause distortions or signal dropout. This can be a particularissue for collection of data from neural tissue abutting, or in the same slice as the sinuses (suchas the orbitofrontal cortex), which can be ameliorated by tilting the direction of the transverseplane during acquisition (Deichmann et al., 2003).
3.3.3.3 Image optimization
Image quality is determined by the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), given by:
( 3.11 )
where FOVx and FOVy are the fields of view in the x and y axis respectively, z is slice thickness,Nx and Ny are the x and y dimensions of each voxel, NEX is the number of phase encodingexcitations (i.e. number of samples per TR over which to average), and BW is the receivingbandwidth. Thus, SNR can be improved by reducing the slice thickness, a tighter voxel samplingor sharper receiving bandwidth, or averaging over repeated measurements.
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3.3.4 FUNCTIONAL MRI
Neuronal activation is tightly coupled to local cerebral haemodynamics. 90% of the brain’senergy supply arises from the aerobic metabolism of glucose, which consumes 20% of bodilyoxygen intake (Siesjo, 1978). Brain activity, coupled to glucose metabolism (Sokoloff, 1977), isproportional to the oxygen consumption rate (CMRO2), and in turn closely related to cerebralblood flow (CBF). MRI can be adapted to detect magnetic field changes induced by the differingparamagnetic properties of oxygenated and deoxygenated haemoglobin, described as the bloodoxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal.
3.3.4.1 The Blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal
Increases in neural activity results in an initial increase in oxygen consumption due to increasedmetabolic demand. This increases the local intravascular deoxyhaemoglobin to oxyhaemoglobinconcentration ratio (Vanzetta et al., 2005). Local CBF increases after a few seconds, with aproportionate rise in glucose consumption. This leads to a relative oversupply ofoxyhaemoglobin delivery (Fox and Raichle, 1986), also the increased CBF causes localvenodilatation and an increase in blood volume (CBV) (Buxton et al., 1998). fMRI is sensitised todetect these BOLD signal changes.
3.3.4.1.1 OXYGEN LIMITATION EFFECTS
Measured brain oxygen consumption depends on blood flow and the oxygen concentrationgradient, which by Fick’s principle gives:
( 3.12 )
[Hb] is the total haemoglobin concentration; Ya and Yv are arterial and venous oxygensaturations ( , where OEF is the oxygen extraction fraction).
Large shifts in CBF are in fact accompanied by only modest changes in CMRO2, originally thoughtto indicate significant anaerobic glucose metabolism in the brain (Fellows et al., 1993). Thesubsequent oxygen limitation model (Buxton and Frank, 1997) attributed this mismatch to
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inefficient capillary oxygen extraction at high blood flow rates (i.e. ). Thisexplains the increase in CBF during neuronal activation, concurrent decrease in oxygenextraction (Hoge et al., 1999), therefore overall increase in blood venous oxygenation (arterialoxygenation remains constant) which can be detected in the BOLD signal.
3.3.4.1.2 MRI CHARACTERISTICS
Deoxyhaemoglobin is paramagnetic due to unbound iron-containing haem groups, as opposed toisomagnetic oxyhaemoglobin (Pauling and Coryell, 1936), therefore induces magneticsusceptibility differences between venous blood and surrounding tissue, leading to smallmagnetic field distortions. These distortions alter T2 and T2* relaxation of mobile water-boundprotons, reducing the equivalent MR signal (Thulborn et al., 1982). Critically, this can bemeasured as BOLD contrast in gradient echo EPI sequences, initially demonstrated in animals(Ogawa et al., 1990), and subsequently shown in humans (Bandettini et al., 1992; Ogawa et al.,1992). There are both intra- and extravascular contributions to the BOLD signal, withapproximately 60% of the BOLD signal arising from the intravascular space at 1.5 Tesla (T) fieldstrengths (Boxerman et al., 1995).
Increased metabolic demand following neuronal activation changes blood oxygenation in acharacteristic manner (the haemodynamic response function (HRF)) (Heeger and Ress, 2002;Buxton et al., 2004).
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Classically, neuronal activity leads initially a transient dip in the HRF, attributed to anincrease in deoxyhaemoglobin, before a rise in CBF, decrease in deoxy- to oxyhaemoglobinratio, and an increase in the BOLD signal, which peaks approximately 6 seconds followingactivity onset. There is usually a post-stimulus undershoot lasting several more seconds,suggested to be due to a transient mismatch in CBF and CBV due to elasticity of the venouscompartment (Buxton et al., 1998). The magnitude of the BOLD response corresponds to a 1-3% signal change in occipital cortex following visual stimulation, and the HRF temporalkernel dictates the temporal resolution of fMRI.
3.3.4.1.3 NEUROPHYSIOLOGY
The BOLD signal is thought to be linearly proportional to summed average local neuronalactivity over time (Boynton et al., 1996; Buckner, 1998; Heeger et al., 2000). Assumingtemporal summation means that predicted haemodynamic responses can be modelled by alinear convolution of stimulus input with the HRF kernel (Figure 3.6). At very short inter-stimulus intervals, this assumption can break down (Friston et al., 1998a; Birn et al., 2001),due to saturation in the neuronal or haemodynamic response.
Figure 3.6 The haemodynamic response function. On left: plot of the HRF (modelled as the
sum of 2 gamma functions) following a single stimulus (modelled as delta function), as
instituted in SPM. The peak is at 6s post stimulus and there is a post-stimulus undershoot.
On right: response to a train of stimuli or boxcar of 18s modelled as the convolution of the
HRF with the stimulus function, leading to a sustained response.
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Simultaneous microelectrode intracortical recordings of neural and fMRI signals followingvisual stimulation in monkeys has delineated the relative contribution of local fieldpotentials (LFPs, correlated with input synaptic activity) and multi-unit activity (MUA,correlated with output spiking) to the BOLD response (Logothetis et al., 2001).
While both have influence, the MUA-attributed signal is transient as opposed to sustainedLFPs, suggesting that the fMRI-detectable signal reflects input, rather than efferent spikingoutput, from a region (Logothetis, 2008). While MUA and LFPs are often coupled, undercertain conditions this is not the case – for example synchronised subthreshold synapticactivity may cause a haemodynamic response without neuronal efferent spikingenhancement (Mathiesen et al., 1998). Moreover, additional effects such as neuronalresponse noise (asynchronous activity) may influence metabolic demand and also contributeto the measured signal (Heeger and Ress, 2002). It is also unclear how BOLD relates to thedifferences between input inhibitory versus excitatory modulation, nor is there consensus asto how signal decrements below baseline should be interpreted (Harel et al., 2002; Shmuel etal., 2006; Schridde et al., 2008).
Figure 3.7 Correlation of BOLD signal with LFPs and MUA. A. Mean LFP (red), MUA (black)
and total (green) neural response (averaged across all frequencies), and BOLD signal
(blue). There is significantly higher LFP activation for both the transient and the sustained
portion of the response, suggesting that this is the main contributor to the BOLD signal.
Error bars show 1 s.d. B. Distribution of r2 values for LFP-BOLD and MUA-BOLD
correlation. Values were significantly higher for LFP than MUA, again suggesting that LFPs
are the principal determinant of the BOLD response. Note that the relationship is frequency
dependent, with high frequency signals above ~16Hz showing a strong positive correlation
with BOLD (r2>0.5), but low frequency signals being uncorrelated or negatively correlated.
(Adapted from Logothetis et al., 2001).
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3.3.4.1.4 BOLD SENSITIVITY
The sensitivity of the BOLD signal is determined by the relative T2*-dependent signal valuesfrom active and resting conditions, measured at a specific TE. Optimal BOLD contrast occurswhen TE ≈ baseline T2*.
BOLD sensitivity is also affected by voxel size, the TR, and the static field strength B0. Largervoxels will increase signal-to-noise but also reduce T2* differences. Short TRs increase thesampling rate and resolution of the HRF, but increase flow-dependent artefacts (althoughthis can be counteracted to an extent (Duyn et al., 1994; Glover et al., 1996). Greater B0increases signal-to-noise and shortens the optimal sampling time, but also causes moresusceptibility-induced artefacts.
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3.3.4.2 FMRI acquisition
3.3.4.2.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
FMRI utilises the relatively high temporal and spatial resolution of EPI to delineate changesin brain activity in response to cognitive tasks or conditions. Multiple designs can beemployed to analyse the statistical contribution of one or many experimentally controlledfactors (and their interactions) to regional neural activation, with factorial and parametric(regression) designs commonplace. Early fMRI designs were epoched, or divided intoseparate blocks of stimulation, with an optimal epoch interval at approximately 16s to matchthe temporal profile of the HRF and minimise the effect of noise (by the matched filtertheorem) (Friston, 2004).
The advent of rapid event-related designs (Burock et al., 1998) has allowed the delineation oftrial-by-trial changes in brain activation. This has considerable advantages for complexcognitive paradigms, as trial order can be randomised and individual trials can beparameterised, meaning that the internal components of computational decision models canbe tested against neural data, as is the case in the studies presented in this thesis. Typicalclassifications such as categorical or parametric (pertaining to levels of a specific factor or asample level drawn from a continuous distribution) can be subsumed by the all-purposegeneral linear model (GLM), discussed below.
3.3.4.2.2 DESIGN EFFICIENCY
BOLD detection power and estimation efficiency depends upon the interstimulus interval(stimulus onset asynchrony – SOA) distribution. While event-related designs have improvedpower to characterise the HRF (estimation efficiency), they have a reduced ability to detectactivation in comparison with epoched designs. Efficiency and detection power can bemaximised by matching the sampling of experimental factors (Birn et al., 2002) and samplingthe HRF in a distributed manner (jittering) by ensuring that the SOA is not an integermultiple of the TR (Henson, 2007). Selecting an appropriate distribution for stimulus onsetsalso increases power, as event-related designs that mimic epochs with clusteredpresentations of stimulus levels are more optimal.
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3.3.5 DATA ANALYSIS
3.3.5.1 Introduction
The statistical analysis techniques used for neuroimaging in this thesis are instantiated withStatistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) software (versions SPM5 and SPM8, Wellcome TrustCentre for Neuroimaging, London, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) . This uses a mass univariateapproach to model activity on a voxel-by-voxel basis, as a linear combination of experimentalvariables in a GLM (Friston et al., 1995a).
Initially, data is preprocessed, both to filter noise and critically to place all data into the samestandardized anatomical format for subsequent statistical model estimation and inference.
Figure 3.8 Processing pathway in SPM. Box diagram of the sequential steps involved in
processing and analysing voxel-based neuroimaging data.
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3.3.5.2 Spatial preprocessing
fMRI images initially require a series of spatial preprocessing steps to render them suitablefor statistical analysis. This processing pathway is illustrated below, and we describe eachstep therein. In addition, the first few acquired volumes in a data series (dummy volumes) arediscarded to allow time for scanner T1-equilibration effects.
3.3.5.2.1 REALIGNMENT AND UNWARPING
Unavoidable head motion during image acquisition causes anatomical misalignment, whichcan be rectified by realigning the image time series using a 6-parameter rigid-bodytransformation to translate and rotate all images into the same orientation and position asthe first image in the series. Additional movement-dependent noise arising from movementsduring the acquisition of a single volume (Grootoonk et al., 2000), and movement-by-inhomogenetity interactions arise due to tiny non-uniformities in B0 causing location-dependent changes in the BOLD signal.
There are two common ways of dealing with this residual unwanted variance, both employedin the studies in this thesis. One can include the estimated movement parameters in the GLMdesign matrix as covariates of no-interest. Unwarping (Hutton et al., 2002) is a model-basedmethod, where additional fieldmap images of the magnetic field and inhomogeneities arecollected, and subsequently used to predict movement-by-inhomogeneity interactions whichcan be inverted to recover the original anatomy.
3.3.5.2.2 NORMALISATION AND CO-REGISTRATION
Standardisation of statistical results and anatomical inferences between subjects and acrossstudies requires the mapping of all acquired MR images to a universal anatomical templatereference. Initially EPI functional images are co-registered with the T1-weighted structuralimage, by minimising the between-image statistical divergence (mutual information). Thisincludes both a linear and non-linear transformation (Friston et al., 1995b).Voxels are thensegregated (segmented) into grey and white matter maps using non-linear deformation fieldsto map voxels onto template tissue probability maps (Klein et al., 2009). Subsequently,normalisation matches these images to a standard template to ensure spatial homology.
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Studies in this thesis use the Montreal Neurological Institute template (Collins et al., 1995),as instituted in SPM.
3.3.5.2.3 SMOOTHING
A smoothing filter is then applied to data, which improves the signal-to-noise ratio andensures that the error terms meet necessary statistical normality assumptions forsubsequent inference using random field theory. A Gaussian convolution kernel is used inSPM, measuring approximately 2-3 times the voxel size (i.e. 6-8 mm) at full-width half-maximum (FWHM). Smoothing also ensures spatial averaging, which also compensates forminor interindividual differences in functional anatomy.
3.3.5.3 Statistical modelling
3.3.5.3.1 THE GENERAL LINEAR MODEL
A GLM is a statistical model where a data matrix Y is estimated as a linear mixture ofpredictors (explanatory variables) in a design matrix X, and a residual error matrix ε, whereerrors are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.e. multivariate normallydistributed, or spherical):
β + ε ( 3.13 )
β is a vector of parameter estimates which specifies the best-fitting linear mixture ofcolumns (regressors) in X, given by:
( 3.14 )
These parameter estimates are estimated in practice in SPM using restricted maximumlikelihood (ReML).
The GLM approach subsumes many common statistical models, such as multiple regression,t- and F-tests, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and covariance (ANCOVA), and multivariateanalysis of variance (MANOVA) and covariance (MANCOVA), all of which are specialinstances of a GLM. The GLM can also be expanded to deal with non-linear couplings between
Y and X (generalised linear models) (Nelder and Wedderburn, 1972). In this thesis, we use
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the mass univariate approach where Y is one column corresponding to a individual voxel’stimeseries, and X models the experimentally imposed conditions as well as measuredcovariates of interest and confounds (e.g. movement regressors).
There are several issues specific to modelling of fMRI data that need to be accounted for inconstructing the statistical model. Low-frequency noise can derive both from the MRIinstrumentation, scanner drift and other sources such as head motion, cardiorespiratoryeffects and global fluctuations in the BOLD signal. These can also be accounted for byintroducing low-frequency drift terms into the design matrix. In addition, the assumption ofsphericity is usually violated, as error terms are non-independent (temporallyautocorrelated) (Woolrich et al., 2001). A pre-whitening correction is performed in SPM,where the temporal autocorrelation structure of the data is first estimated, before beingfiltered from the data and model to render the residuals uncorrelated.
The effects of interest (i.e. an experimentally controlled sequence of events) in the designmatrix X pertain to predicted neural activity (e.g. transient increases in neuronal activity forspecific conditions), which needs to be convolved with a model of the HRF to formpredictions about the BOLD signal in Y (e.g. see Figure 3.6).
3.3.5.3.2 INFERENCE
3.3.5.3.2.1 ContrastsInference is made on parameter estimates by calculating the significance of the effect sizes β.Parameter estimates can be utilised in various ways. Differences in parameter estimates candescribe the difference in the effect of experimentally controlled categorical conditions onneural activation in a voxel. A linear combination of parameter estimates can describe afunctional (e.g. linear or quadratic) relationship between levels of a categorical variable andthe data. Alternatively, if a specific column of X (e.g. X1) corresponds to a parametricregressor, then the corresponding parameter estimate β1 pertains to the slope of the linearrelationship between the predictor X1 and the data at that voxel Y (i.e. a linear regression).Combinations of parameter estimates are termed contrasts, with the simplest contrast vectortesting only one explanatory variable (one column in X). X includes a constant column (i.e.the intercept), which models an implicit baseline (the mean BOLD signal).
The (one-tailed) significance of a contrast can be calculated from the t-statistic:
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( 3.15 )
where c’ is the contrast vector, and the denominator is the standard error.
Combinations of contrasts can also be specified as a matrix of contrast weights (an F-test),for example if one wanted to infer the significance of a one-way ANOVA model with 3 levels,where one simultaneously asks if any of the levels 1, 2 or 3 of the experimental factorcorrelate with changes in the data.
3.3.5.3.2.2 Hypothesis testing and multiple comparisonsA statistical parametric map comprises many thousands of individual tests, of which somewould be expected to be significant by chance. This expected false-positive error rate can bea-priori specified as a statistical threshold (e.g. a p=0.05 significance level sets a 5% errorrate per test). To appropriately control for error across the entire family of tests performed,a family-wise error (FWE) correction can be used, for example the Bonferroni correctionwhich modifies the threshold (α) to achieve a desired false-positive rate (pFWE) according tothe number of statistical tests (n) performed:
( 3.16 )
( 3.17 )
This is a conservative estimation which excessively penalises spatially correlatedneuroimaging data, where neighbouring voxels are more likely than chance to yield the samestatistical result (because of intrinsic functional topography as well as the smoothing step).To increase power, an a priori region of interest (ROI) can be specified (which limits thenumber of voxels under active consideration, therefore the severity of the FWE correction).Alternatively, an independent contrast can validly be used to highlight regions recruited in atask for subsequent use as an ROI (although one must be careful to avoid ascribingerroneously high significance to a pre-identified identified voxel with repeated statisticaltesting (Poldrack and Mumford, 2009; Vul et al., 2009).
Gaussian random field theory (Siegmund and Worsley, 1995; Worsley et al., 1996) can beused instead of Bonferroni correction to obtain a more appropriate correction. This
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calculates the number of independent observations, or resolution elements (resels) in avolume, according to the statistical smoothness of the SPM, and then determines theexpected number of clusters of activation above a given threshold (Euler characteristic). Thisdetermines the appropriate correction to produce a given FWE-corrected rate, but assumesthat the residuals are distributed in accordance with a Gaussian random field (hence asmoothing step is statistically required).
Inference can be made either at the most spatially precise voxel-level (i.e. is there asignificant effect at a specific voxel?), or alternatively at the cluster level (i.e. is the number ofactivated voxels in a particular contiguous cluster greater than would be expected bychance?). Cluster-level inference is often appropriate for spatially extended activations thatone desires to localise to an anatomical region (rather than a specific x,y,z coordinate), butalso requires the specification of a cluster-defining threshold (i.e. at the voxel level to isolateislands of supra-threshold activity). In practice, the underlying statistical assumptions arevalid to at least a cluster-defining threshold of p≈0.05 (Friston et al., 1996), which isemployed in this thesis.
3.3.5.3.2.3 Group inferenceFor inference at the between-subject (2nd) level, a hierarchical procedure is used wherewithin-subject (1st level) contrast estimates are used as a response variable Y in a further 2ndlevel GLM analysis (Penny et al., 2003). Assuming that 1st level parameter estimates aredrawn from a normal distribution in the population, this hierarchical method constitutes arandom effects analysis accounting for between-subject variability. A full mixed effectsanalysis would simultaneously account for within- and between-subject variance, however inpractice if individual subjects’ design matrices are similar, the variances of subjects’estimates will also be similar, and a hierarchical random-effects approach closelyapproximates this full approach.
3.4 MAGNETOENCEPHALOGRAPHY
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION
Magnetoencephalography (MEG) is a neuroimaging technique that employs very sensitivemagnetic flux detectors to measure the magnetic fields produced by changing electrical
activity in the brainover fMRI in studying brain function is the very high temporal resolution afforded, at amillisecond timescale commensurate with synaptic processes (
The principles of MEG are founded on those developed for electroencephalography (EEG)analysis, a technique used for many decadesactivity recorded from scalp sensors. The prime advantage of MEG over EEG is that electricalfields can be heavily distorted by changes in conductance between brain, dura, skull andscalp, while magnetic fields arelocalise (with certain restrictions) intracortical activity with relatively high fidelity. Thusinferences can be made about the generators of neural activity rather than consequent fieldchangeslimited ability to delineate subcortical activity, however especially when used in conjunctionwith anatomical prior knowledge from fMRI, is an extremely powerful tooltemporal sequence of cognitive processing in the brain (as
Figure
neuro
MEG=magneto
magnetic resonance imaging; PET=positron emission tomography.
-investigative methods. Adapted from
at the scalp. MEG is most sensitive to tangential currents in cortical generators with
3.9. Illustration of the spatio
-encephalography; ERP=evoked response potentials; fMRI=functional
(Cohen, 1968)
influenced much less. This renders it possible to accurately
. The principle advantage of electrophysiological methods
-temporal resolution and invasiveness of different
84
(Ship
(Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992)
ton, 1975)
I use it in
Figure
, which measures electrical
3
Chapter 8
.9).
to investigate the).
,
, ,
.
85
3.4.2 PRINCIPLES OF MEG
3.4.2.1 Cellular electrophysiology
Neurons are dynamic generators of electrical activity, mediated by the flow of ions downconcentration gradients (i.e. current) between extra- and intracellular compartmentsthrough membrane-bound channels. Multiple different ion channels yield differentconductance mechanisms, with different temporal properties and contributions to theelectrical signal. Rapid depolarisation is mediated by voltage-gated sodium and potassiumchannels, while several ligand-gated channels (as well as passive ‘leak’ conductances) givingslower timecourses of current change. Action potentials are generated by the synchronisedopening and closing of many ion channels, leading to a propagating wave of electricaldepolarisation through a dendritic tree. At the post-synaptic membrane, the excitatory orinhibitory influence of the afferent neuron depends upon the direction of transmembranecurrent flow, in turn dictated by the selective stimulation of ion channels. Excitatory post-synaptic potentials (EPSPs) are generated by inward cationic flow leading to an active sourceat the synapse, while inhibitory post-synaptic potentials (IPSPs) are caused by inwardanionic or outward cationic flow leading to an active sink.
These active sources/sinks are compensated by opposite passive current flows elsewhereacross the neuronal membrane (there is no accumulation of charge in the volume). Thesesink-source configurations lead to an electromagnetic field propagating through the cellularmedium. If dendrites are aligned parallel (as in pyramidal cortical neurons), the summedeffect of longitudinal current flows generate an orthogonal magnetic field (i.e. a magneticdipole) (Figure 3.10). Critically, only magnetic fields which have a vector componentperpendicular to the scalp will be detectable by extrinsic sensors. This means that thegenerating currents need to be orientated parallel to the head surface. In other words, MEG ismaximally sensitive to dendrites in the sulcal walls rather than in cortical gyri (Figure 3.11).
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3.4.2.2 Biophysics
Current strength diminishes with increasing distance from a synapse according to an inversesquare law, and an individual PSP generates a current strength of approximately 20 fA m.The dipole strength needed to explain measured magnetic fluxes at the scalp isapproximately 10 nA m, therefore one can estimate that 1 x 106 synapses are active during atypical PSP (Hämäläinen et al., 1993). In reality, this number is somewhat higher as this
Figure 3.10 Magnetic field and electrical potential signals from a dipole. The orientation of
the two fields are at right-angles. (Adapted from Hämäläinen et al., 1993).
Figure 3.11 Magnetic and electrical fields from a dipole II. A. Perpendicular magnetric fields
are detected by the MEG gradiometer detector coils. B. Dipoles in the sulcal walls generate
these perpendicular magnetic fields. While some gyral dipoles will contribute to the
magnetic signal because the head is not a perfect sphere, the maximal signal arises from
the sulci.
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corresponds to the detectable PSP with appropriate dipolar orientation. This corresponds toan approximate 40 mm2 cortical area at minimum, which thus sets the limit of spatialresolution of MEG (Chapman et al., 1984).
The physics of electromagnetic fields are governed by Maxwell’s equations, which describehow electric currents and charges produce electrical and magnetic fields. They can be used tosolve the forward problem, which is how to calculate the magnetic field at point r (B(r))outside the head from a distribution of current (current density, J(r)) in the cortex, since:
B ( 3.18 )
where r and r’ are the positions outside and inside the volume respectively, and R is thedisplacement vector between the points.
Although intracerebral anatomy causes some electromagnetic field inhomogeneities (forexample, with conductance higher along the orientation of nerve fibre tracts), the brain canreasonably be viewed as a homogenous volume conductor. To account for the differentconducting compartments of the head, the volume can be treated as a combination of thesehomogeneous conductors corresponding to brain, skull and scalp. Moreover, to make theforward model more realistically approximate the cortical surface, the boundary elementmethod can be used (Barnard et al., 1967; Ferguson and Stroink, 1997), which approximatesa complex surface as a tessellation of triangles rather than assuming a spherically uniformvolume.
The relative sensitivity of a given detector to electromagnetic signals generated within aspatial volume is called the lead field. This projection from current dipoles within the brainto a set of magnetometers outside the brain completes the forward model.
While the forward biophysical model is complex but tractable, the inverse problem whereone attempts to estimate the source locations from the external field is theoreticallyintractable, as a potentially infinite number of current densities inside the head can producethe same external magnetic field. Solutions to the inverse problem thus require puttingappropriate anatomical and functional constraints on the data, as discussed below.
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3.4.2.3 Instrumentation and measurement
The neuromagnetic fields of the brain are typically in the order of 50-500 fT (10-15 Tesla),100 million times weaker than the earth's magnetic field. To detect such small fields requiresthe use of superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUIDs). SQUIDs are based onsuperconducting loops containing a Josephson junction (Josephson, 1962), which is a thinnon-conducting barrier, which can pass a tunnelling current. Phase coherence is a quantummechanical property of superconductors, and any induced current in the superconductingloops due to changes in magnetic flux will lead to a compensatory current flowing across theJosephson junction, governed by:
( 3.19 )
( 3.20 )
where Ic is the critical current for the junction, is the phase-difference across the junction, Vis the voltage and φ0 is the magnetic flux quantum constant ( ).
To maintain superconductance, the SQUIDs need to be housed in a reservoir containingliquid helium, and the necessity for close proximity of the detectors to the head means thatadequate thermal insulation for the equipment is essential.
Significant sources of noise apart from the earth’s magnetic field include within-subjectelectric fields generated by heart or muscle, motion-induced artefacts due to paramagneticmaterial on or within the subject such as dental bridges, or stimulus-locked artefact such asrhythmic movement or eyeblinks. External changing fields also cause disruption, for examplefrom electrical equipment, including power supply frequencies, lifts, stimulus equipment,and nearby MRI scanners. Apart from direct frequency interference, radio-frequency fieldscan alter the SQUID gain, and vibrations can cause degraded performance. To a great extent,external sources of magnetic noise can be nullified by appropriate electromagnetic shielding– the MEG at the Wellcome Trust centre for Neuroimaging, where the study in Chapter 8 wascarried out, houses the MEG gradiometers in a purpose-built ferromagnetically-shieldedroom. In addition, the gradiometers which pick up the voltage in the SQUIDs includecompensation coils such that they are sensitive only to local changes in magnetic flux, ratherthan external homogeneous fields.
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Initial neuromagnetometers were single-channel detectors (Romani et al., 1982).Subsequently, multichannel arrays of magnetometers were developed, to sample the fieldaround the head in a parallel manner to an electroencephalogram (EEG). A spacing of 30-40mm is sufficient to avoid aliasing effects due to insufficient spatial resolution, and in
Chapter 8 we use an MEG with 274 gradiometers.
3.4.2.4 Relationship of fMRI and MEG
Although both fMRI and MEG assess neural activity, they have differential sensitivity tocertain neuronal effects. Most obviously are their respective temporal and spatial resolutions– while fMRI is limited by the timescale of neurovascular coupling, and therefore has at bestpower to resolve events at 3s intervals, MEG can sample at the millisecond timescale.Conversely, fMRI has a spatial resolution at the 3-4mm scale (limited by the smoothingkernel), while MEG is constrained by the proximity of the head sensors to a 10-fold lessspatial grain.
More subtle differences exist between MEG and fMRI. BOLD is thought to reflect presynapticinput firing (Logothetis et al., 2001), and is most sensitive to excitation. MEG, on the otherhand, reflects combined EPSPs and IPSPs. Moreover, MEG can detect oscillatory neuronalactivity, to which fMRI may be blind. Indeed, as was seen in Figure 3.7, there exist strongpositive correlations between BOLD signal and high frequency oscillatory power, with farless correlative strength in the alpha and beta bands (8-32 Hz), and a negative correlationwith low frequencies (Logothetis et al., 2001).
Similarly, MEG is very sensitive to cortical processes, but much less useful at detectingsubcortical activity. For some subcortical structures (e.g. thalamus), the typically closednature of the neuronal architecture means that theoretically external flux changes will beminimal (i.e. there are some brain regions that are essentially invisible to MEG). Conversely,fMRI has been proved excellent at resolving activity in a variety of subcortical structures.Thus MEG and fMRI are broadly complimentary modalities, both proxies for underlyingneural activity but sensitive to different aspects of neuronal architecture and kinetics. Byutilising both, as in this thesis, one can dissect both the anatomy and temporal structure offunctional networks underlying cognitive processes.
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3.4.3 DATA ANALYSIS
3.4.3.1 Preprocessing
Initially the timeseries data are epoched to delineate a time-window of interest. The data isthen usually bandpass filtered, for example between 0.1 and 100 Hz, to remove drift andimprove signal-to-noise ratio (most responses of interest are expressed at frequencies of upto 50Hz. To aid analysis, the data are also downsampled (e.g. to twice the maximal filteredfrequency).
Artefact detection is important to ensure clean data. One major source of these is eyeblinks,which contain frequency components within the domain of interest and therefore are noteliminated by filtering. Fortunately, the power of eyeblink responses tends to be an order ofmagnitude larger than the cortical signal, therefore a pragmatic threshold for trial rejectionis an order of magnitude greater than the root mean square (RMS) trial power. Alternatively,robust averaging techniques can be used where trials are weighted by their variance, orspecialised detection algorithms can be trained to feature-detect artefactual responses. Anadditional step is baseline correction, to adjust for trial by trial variability in the startingpoint of the measured response. To an extent, a low pass filter will also help standardise thebaseline (by removing low frequency DC drift). Finally, the data also may require smoothing,to compensate for intersubject variability in the spatiotemporal location of responses andensure overlap in group level analysis.
3.4.3.2 Sensor-level analysis
Data can be analysed either at the level of the sensors (the measured flux changes in thegradiometer array), or at the level of posited sources (the intracortical generators of themagnetic flux changes). These data can either be considered in the time domain, or, as isparticularly pertinent for changing oscillatory activity in recurrent neural networks, in thefrequency domain.
3.4.3.2.1 TIME DOMAIN
Time domain processing first locks epochs locked to a specific time point. This yieldsaveraged evoked responses in response to stimuli (e.g. visual or somatosensory evokedresponses), or preparatory stimuli (e.g. prior to a motor response). Alternatively, for a
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specific time window of interest, data can be averaged over time to yield a 2D spatial map ofthe relevant response magnitude.
3.4.3.2.2 TIME-FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
Alternatively, the data can be further processed with time-frequency decomposition, toproduce information regarding changes in power in different frequency bands over time.This decomposition is equivalent to a Fourier transform of the data, although in practice avariety of methods are used, such as wavelet decomposition (Morlet et al., 1982). Onceconverted, the 4D-dataset (time, frequency, spatial location (x,y)) can be averaged, either tohighlight a specific time or frequency band. This makes the statistical analysis of the datatractable.
3.4.3.3 Source localisation
3.4.3.3.1 INVERSE PROBLEM
The inverse problem describes the estimation of sources inside the brain for magnetic fieldsdetected by the MEG magnetometers. Though formally an ill-posed problem, there areseveral means of estimating a solution.
One can use a probabilistic generative model to give the likelihood of a current dipole at anyspatial location given the data. Generally, if the forward model can be described as(i.e. the probability of a given magnetic field b given a current distribution parameterised as
x, including assumptions about the error distribution), then the probability density of x(p(x)) is given by Bayes’ theorem:
( 3.21 )
where ψ(x) is the prior probability density.  
The maximum likelihood estimator for x can be found by the same modelling methodsdescribed above for decision theory, for example by LSM or a numerical algorithm dependingon the form of the forward model. The solution is commonly called the equivalent current
dipole (ECD) (Tuomisto et al., 1983).
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The principal extra assumption when modelling multiple simultaneous dipole generators isthat the position (and orientation) of these dipoles will remain the same while theiramplitude will vary over time (Scherg, 1990). The number of estimated dipoles can either bea priori specified, or estimated from the data (Mosher et al., 1992).
The alternative to the ECD technique is to use an ‘imaging solution’ to the inverse problem,where the entire volume is modelled as a set of densely-spaced dipoles, with fixed locationsand orientations given by cortical anatomy. The observation model is then a linearcombination of the lead fields, the solution of which can be estimated by, for example, the
minimum norm technique. This estimates the current distribution J with the minimumoverall amplitude sufficient to explain the data. More recently, alternative Bayesian methodsof source reconstruction have been developed, for example the multiple sparse prior (MSP)technique which imposes constraints upon the topology of source space and has been shownto be superior to the minimum norm method (Friston et al., 2008). We use MSP sourcereconstruction in Chapter 8. Further refinements include using anatomical or functionalpriors derived from (f)MRI in the probabilistic model.
3.4.3.4 Statistical inference
Statistical inference for MEG proceeds in a similar fashion to that for fMRI. One can utilise thesame methods in SPM software, including setting up a statistical model of data in a GLM, andemploying random field theory to correct for multiple comparisons across N-dimensionalspaces. The principles and practice of statistical analysis are therefore identical to that forfMRI data, except that rather than only making inferences about signal amplitude in 3Dspace, there are multiple dimensions in which the data can be considered (sensor vs sourcespace, time vs time-frequency). I therefore will not reiterate the steps here and refer thereader to the above discussion (see section 3.3.5.3).
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
When foraging animals, or humans in a modern economy, make a decision they mustevaluate potential outcomes of a choice and the chance of each outcome occurring. Asdiscussed in Chapter 1, risk is a multi-dimensional property of a distribution of potentialoutcomes, subsuming both the uncertainty or range of potential outcomes, but also the shapeof this distribution.
To dissociate different components of risk, which I quantify here in terms of dispersion(variance) and asymmetry of outcomes (skewness), I designed a novel decision-making taskthat controlled the distribution of outcomes and ensured that variance and skewness of a setof lotteries were manipulated independently by design (see 4.2.2). Hence, as variance andskewness of gambles were orthogonal factors (r2 = 5 x 10-6), I could test whether neuralactivity evoked by variance could be distinguished from that evoked by skewness. In brief, inmy task participants chose between a ‘gamble’ (a lottery with a number of potentialoutcomes) or a ‘sure’ option (a fixed amount of money). I predicted distinct preferences forboth variance and skewness (possibly with different preferences for positive versus negativeskewness).
I hypothesised that variance and positive/negative skewness would have a distinctrepresentation within dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), anterior insula, posteriorparietal cortex (PPC), and ventral striatum, given previous findings of risk-related activationsin these areas (for a meta-analysis see Mohr et al (Mohr et al., 2010a)). A related aim was toestablish the locus of integration of such summary statistics with an individuals’ subjectivetaste for risk. In effect I aimed to map a final common pathway mediating an integration ofobjective (task-based) and subjective (individual disposition to risk) decision variables priorto behavioural output.
ECONSTRUCTING NEURAL RESPONSES TO RISK
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4.2 METHODS
The study was approved by the Institute of Neurology (University College London) EthicsCommittee. 24 subjects (mean age: 24; age range: 19-34; male: 12) participated in theexperiment. 1 (female) subject was excluded because they used a fixed strategy (alwayschose sure amount), hence behavioural preferences could not be estimated. I provided a 5-minute practice tutorial to demonstrate the paradigm. Stimuli were presented and responsesrecorded using Cogent presentation software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging,London) written in MATLAB (version 6.5, MathWork, Natick, MA). Imaging data wereanalysed using Statistical Parametic Mapping software (SPM8; Wellcome Trust Centre forNeuroimaging, UK). Visual cues were projected onto a screen, visible via an angled mirrormounted on the MRI head coil. Choices were indicated by pressing a button box with theright index finger.
4.2.1 TASK
I designed a decision-making task where the variance and skewness of a set of lotteries couldbe independently experimentally manipulated (Figure 4.1A). Hence, I could ensure thatvariance and skewness of gambles were orthogonal factors, thus could test whether neuralactivity evoked by variance could be distinguished from that evoked by skewness.Participants were required to choose between taking a ‘sure’ (fixed) amount of money orelecting to ‘gamble’ (choosing to play a lottery with a number of potential outcomes).Gambles were represented as pie-charts, where variance and skewness of outcomes variedover a range, with expected value kept constant. I predicted distinct preferences for bothvariance and skewness (possibly with different preferences for positive versus negativeskewness).
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4.2.2 INDEPENDENT MANIPULATION OF VARIANCE AND SKEWNESS
I constructed a stimulus set of 60 lotteries where variance and skewness were independentand varied over a range (Appendix A, Figure 4.2). For every level of variance (10 levels), Iindependently varied skewness (6 levels, 3 positively skewed, 3 negatively skewed).Expected value of the lotteries was kept constant (between £1.26 and £1.34), while varianceranged from 0.1 to 0.7 £2, and (standardised) skewness ranged from -1 to 1. Stimuli wereconstrained to have between 3 and 9 outcomes (segments of the pie chart), with outcome
Figure 4.1 Task. A. I represented gambles on-screen as pie-charts, divided into different
segments showing possible outcomes from the lottery. The numbers written in each
segment showed the monetary value of each outcome (in pence) and the angle subtended
by each segment indicated the probability of each outcome occurring. A positively skewed
gamble (left), has a small chance of a better than average outcome (the tail is to the right).
Conversely, a negatively skewed gamble (right) has a small chance of a worse than average
outcome (the tail of the distribution is to the left). Both example gambles have equal
variance and expected value. B. The task consisted of trials, grouped into experimental
blocks of ten. For each trial, a pie chart was shown and after 5.5 seconds, a cue to respond
appeared on screen (for 2 seconds). Subjects indicated by a button press while the cue was
on-screen if they wanted to gamble on the lottery, or alternatively select a fixed, sure
amount of money. To commence a block, the sure amount was written on the screen (3
levels – 90p, 120p, 150p). At the end of each block, one trial from the block was randomly
selected and played out for real. If subjects had elected to gamble, I resolved the lottery by
an on-screen graphic of a red ball spinning around the outside of the pie which stopped at
a randomly selected position. 180 trials were presented in total (60 stimuli at each of 3 sure
levels).
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probabilities varying in minimum 0.1 increments between 0 and 1 to mitigate againstprobability distortion effects at small probabilities. These restrictions allow the generation ofa space of possible lotteries varying in skewness and variance. I pre-specified the desiredlevels of variance and skewness and selected lotteries to give as orthogonal a stimulus set aspossible. The lotteries were also resampled to ensure variance and skewness weredecorrelated from the number of segments in each presented pie chart gamble (variance r2 =0.01; skewness r2 = 0.0004). Where 2 lotteries were equidistant from the desired array ofpoints, a lottery was selected at random. Using multiple outcomes is critical, as for binarygambles, it is impossible to independently manipulate statistical moments across a range ofvalues.
Figure 4.2 Construction of stimulus set. Figure of stimulus set construction, plotted as
variance against skewness of lottery outcomes. Blue dots represent all possible gambles,
constructed with EV = £1.26-£1.34, according to stimulus set constraints. Green dots
represent desired array of stimuli, and red dots are the actual selected stimuli (n=60) for
use in experiment, with independent manipulation of variance and skewness.
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To commence a block, the sure amount was written on the screen (3 levels – 90p, 120p,150p). At the end of each block, one trial from the block was randomly selected and playedout for real. If subjects had elected to gamble, I resolved the lottery by an on-screen graphicof a red ball spinning around the outside of the pie until it stopped at a randomly selectedposition. This procedure was also tested in practice trials, to demonstrate the idea that thesize of each segment of the pie chart represented the chance of that outcome occurring.Resolving one trial per block helped maintain subjects’ task engagement during and thusmaximise sensitivity to detect evoked responses to the experimentally-manipulated stimulusdimensions. Importantly, one does not expect any shifts in individual behaviouralpreferences to change the evoked response to the objective features of the gamble stimulithemselves. In addition, any changes in behaviour can only count against (i.e. reduce thesensitivity of) an analysis of correlations between trial-by-trial choice, individual preference,and neural activity. 180 trials were presented in total (60 stimuli for each of the 3 surelevels). Monetary earnings ranged between £16.10 and £24.30 (mean £19.40).
4.2.3 BEHAVIOURAL MODELLING
4.2.3.1 Mean-risk models
For a given lottery with N potential outcomes ( m1, m2,… mN), with probabilities p = p1, p2, …pn,the statistical moments (expected value (EV), variance (Var), standardised skewness (Skw))of the outcome distribution are defined as follows:
( 4.1 )
( 4.2 )
( 4.3 )
I analysed choice data by fitting a linear mean-variance-skewness model (MVS) whereindividuals are allowed to express different preferences for variance and skewness, andcompared this to a set of reduced models and a standard power utility model commonly usedto model standard expected utility (Camerer, 2003). The reduced models included a modelbased on mean difference (M) alone (where subjects only take account of the difference
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between the sure amount and the expected value of the gamble in selecting actions), a mean-variance model (MV), and a mean-skewness (MS) model.
I then define the subjective value, or utility (U) of each lottery for the models:
Mean model (M)
( 4.4 )
Mean-variance model (MV)
( 4.5 )
Mean-skewness model (MS)
( 4.6 )
Mean-variance-skewness model (MVS)
( 4.7 )
ρ and λ are free parameters reflecting preference for variance and skewness respectively.
I also tested a further set of models, where subjects were allowed to express a preferenceseparately for positive and negatively skewed gambles. These models are specified as:
Mean-variance-positive skewness (MVpS):
( 4.8 )
Mean-variance-negative skewness (MVnS):
( 4.9 )
Mean-positive skewness-negative skewness model (MpSnS):
( 4.10 )
Mean-variance-positive skewness-negative skewness model (MVpSnS):
( 4.11 )
Where Skw+ indictates Skw0 and Skw- indicates Skw<0, and λp and λn reflect preferences forpositive and negative skewness respectively.
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4.2.3.2 Expected Utility models
Expected utility model (EUT)
( 4.12 )
κ reflects the concavity of the utility (power) function, hence the degree of risk-aversion.
A loss aversion (LA) model, which weights the utility of amounts below the expected value of
the lottery by a loss aversion parameter (λ):
( 4.13 )
Where I is an indicator variable (I = 1 when (mn-EV)≥0, and I = 0 when (mn-EV)<0).
I also tested a probability weighting (PW) model, where probabilities are transformedaccording to a one-parameter probability weighting function (Prelec, 1998):
( 4.14 )
I finally tested a cumulative prospect theory (CPT) model (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).For a given lottery with N potential outcomes, we redefine outcomes relative to a referencepoint R, such that the outcomes are m-T, m-T+1,m-T+2…, R,… mN-2, mN-1, mN, with probabilities p =
p-T, p-T+1,p-T+2…, pR,… pN-2, pN-1, pN. Overall utility , is given as:
For m > R:
( 4.15 )
For m < R:
( 4.16 )
For m = R:
( 4.17 )
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where:
( 4.18 )
( 4.19 )
This is a rank-dependent model where small probability extreme outcomes areoverweighted ( ), and outcomes below the reference point have moreinfluence than relative gains (h ). Rather than using the status quo as thereference point, I used a non-zero reference point of £1.20. This enables the model tooverweight small probability events at both extremes of the distribution, a parallel toskewness sensitivity.
4.2.3.3 Heuristics
A max-min (MaxMin) model where only the maximum and minimum amounts in a givenlottery are used to construct a (weighted) expected value:
( 4.20 )
An alpha max-min model (AMaxMin), where these maximum and minimum possibleamounts are weighted by an additional parameter alpha:
( 4.21 )
α = 0 reflects a ‘loss minimising’ heuristic, α = 1 reflects a ‘gain maximising’ heuristic.
For completeness I also tested versions of these models coupled to a power utilitytransformation of amounts (MaxMinp, and AMaxMinp). Lastly I tested an heuristic whereindividuals attend only to the segment with maximum probability (MaxP):
( 4.22 )
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4.2.3.4 Action selection
The models compare the utility of the lottery with the value of the sure amount (S) togenerate a trial-by-trial probability of choosing the lottery over the sure amount, using alogistic/softmax function which allows for noise in action selection (by free parameter β).
( 4.23 )
I estimated best-fitting model parameters using maximum likelihood analysis, withoptimisation implemented with a non-linear Nelder-Mead simplex search algorithm inMatlab (Matlab, Natwick, USA) and compared models using Group Bayes Factors, with theAkaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)(Schwarz, 1978) providing an approximation to the model evidence and penalising modelcomplexity (Penny et al., 2004b).
4.2.4 FMRI
4.2.4.1 Scanning parameters and preprocessing
I acquired gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images (EPI) with blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast, on a 3 Tesla head scanner (Magnetom Allegra, Siemens Medical).Imaging parameters were: 42 oblique transverse slices; slice thickness, 2 mm; gap betweenslices, 1 mm, repetition time TR=3.1s; echo time TE=25ms; field of view FOV=192×192 mm2,matrix size 128 x 64 (RO x PE). I employed an EPI sequence that optimized for BOLDsensitivity in the OFC using a combination of an increased spatial resolution in the read-outdirection and a reduced echo time (Weiskopf et al., 2007). Together with the obliqueorientation of the slice acquisition, this can compensate and recover for potential signal lossin OFC. During the same experimental session, a T1-weighted image was obtained foranatomical reference. To correct for geometric distortions induced in the EPIs at high fieldstrength, I collected fieldmaps based on dual echo-time images (TE1 = 10 ms, TE2 =12.46ms), and processed these using the SPM8 fieldmap toolbox (Hutton et al., 2002) toproduce a voxel displacement map indicating the field distortions. Images were realignedwith the first volume, normalized to a standard EPI template, and smoothed using an 8mmfull-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel. Unwarping was carried out using the routine inSPM8, correcting for distortions in each acquired image by combining the measuredfieldmaps with estimated susceptibility-induced changes due to motion.
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4.2.4.2 Statistical analysis
Data were analyzed with a general linear model (GLM), with BOLD responses to eachstimulus modelled as a box-car of duration 7.5s (duration of stimulus presentation), time-locked to stimulus presentation and convolved with a hemodynamic response function. Iconstructed regressors to identify parametric responses to variance and skewness, whichmodulated the height of the box-car. Each of three runs was modelled separately. Trials weresplit into positively and negatively skewed lotteries, with regressors indicating variance,skewness, and choice (gamble or sure). Sure amount screens, stimulus onsets, keypresses,and resolution of gambles at the end of each block were also modelled to factor out BOLDactivity unrelated to variables of interest. I also included subject-specific realignmentparameters from the image preprocessing to account for motion-related artifacts in theimages that were not eliminated in rigid-body motion correction. Regression parameterestimates of linear contrasts were estimated and entered into t-tests using random-effectsanalysis to provide group statistics. Contrasts of parameter estimates reflect selectiveactivations due to the experimental effects. These contrasts or selective activations werethen used in subsequent (between-subject) tests at the second level. I was largely concernedwith detecting activations using one sample T-tests to show that the contrast wassignificantly greater than zero over subjects. However, I also used these contrasts to look forcorrelations between subject-specific preferences and physiological responses (selectiveactivations). I used a cluster-defining voxel-wise threshold of p<0.01, reporting whole-brainsignificant clusters family-wise error (FWE) corrected for multiple comparisons at p<0.05, orsignificant voxels within a priori regions of interest (small-volume FWE-corrected at p<0.05).Regions of interest based on previous studies comprise anterior insula/inferior frontal gyrus,ventral striatum and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (Preuschoff et al., 2006; Christopoulos etal., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009; Mohr et al., 2010a). Percent signal change within a cluster isestimated with RFXplot (Gläscher, 2009). Figures show second-level SPM-T imagesthresholded at p<0.005 (uncorrected for display purposes only), superimposed upon acanonical image. Stereotactic coordinates are reported in MNI space (Mazziotta, 2001).
4.3 RESULTS
4.3.1 BEHAVIOUR
Subjects (n = 23) distributed their choices between gamble and sure options throughout thecourse of the experiment (mean percentage of gamble choices = 53%, std. 14%). The sureoption changed over the course of the experiment enabling us to decorrelate choice from thestatistical features of interest. Additionally, as I focused on deconstructing risk (i.e. the
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distribution of outcomes), the expected value of the gamble remained constant throughout(between £1.26-£1.34). When the sure amount was greater, subjects therefore opted togamble less often (mean percentage of gamble choices per sure amount level - 90p: 85%, std.13%; 120p: 58%, std. 20%; 150p: 18%, std 14%). There were few error (missed) trials (4 +/-0.5%), which are excluded from analyses. The mean correlation between choice and variancewas -0.009 (std 0.079) and the mean correlation between choice and skewness was 0.0035(std 0.087).
4.3.1.1 Behavioural modelling
I independently manipulated variance and skewness, and predicted that individuals’preferences would be sensitive to both summary statistics. As described, I compared a mean-variance-skewness model (MVS) where individuals are allowed to express preferences forboth variance and skewness, to a set of alternative decision models.
4.3.1.1.1 MODEL FITS
As predicted, a mean-variance-skewness (MVS) model provided a significantly better fit tothe behavioural data than the 4 main alternative models (summed AIC: M: 4139; MV: 3599
MS: 3993 MVS: 3431 EUT: 3760; Group Bayes Factors (log-GBF relative to worst performing
M model): M: 0; MV: 540 MS: 145 MVS: 708 EUT: 378 (Kass and Raftery, 1995; Raftery,1995; Penny et al., 2004b); MVS model posterior probability>0.99 (very strong evidence infavour of MVS) (Figure 4.3A). Similar results were obtained using the Bayesian InformationCriterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978), an approach which penalises model complexity moreseverely than the AIC (log-GBF relative to M model calculated from BIC: M: 0; MV: 466; MS:72; MVS: 561; EUT: 305). Here, I paid subjects for 18/180 trials during the entireexperiment, motivated by a need to keep individuals engaged with the task. While paying formultiple trials has the potential to blunt risk-sensitivity, the fact that the risk-sensitivemodels were clearly superior to the risk-neutral (M) model demonstrates that risk-sensitivity was preserved, and suggests that participants assessed and treated each gambleindividually.
Given the intuition that positive and negative skewness exert separate influences onbehaviour, I also tested whether models with separate parameters for positively andnegatively skewed gambles (i.e. one extra parameter than the MVS model) fit participants’choices better than the three-parameter MVS model, and also whether models withpreferences for variance and either positive or negative skewness fitted choice as well as thefull MVS model. Again, the MVS model proved superior to these other models (Figure 4.4).
104
4.3.1.1.2 PROBABILITY DISTORTION AND LOSS AVERSION EFFECTS
Although I mitigated severe probability distortion by constraining the gambles such that thesmallest probability used was 0.1, it nevertheless is possible that behaviour attributed toskewness preference could be caused by probability weighting effects. To outrule thispossibility, I fit an additional model with probability weighting to the behavioural data, usingthe same specification as Hsu and colleagues (Hsu et al, 2009), with power utility and a 1-parameter (Prelec) probability weighting function. Although this outperformed a powerutility model without probability weighting, it was vastly inferior to the mean-variance-
Figure 4.3 Behavioural modelling. A. Relative log-evidence for each of 5 models: mean only
(M), mean-variance (MV), mean-skewness (MS), mean-variance-skewness (MVS) and power
utility (EUT). Relative log-evidence (log-Group Bayes Factor) calculated as summed
difference in log-evidence for each model relative to worst performing M model, across
subjects. Model evidence is approximated by the Akaike information criterion (AIC),
calculated as AIC = 2.k – 2.ln(L), where L is the maximum likelihood estimate of the model
and k is the number of free parameters. A higher score indicates a better model fit (higher
model likelihood). There was strong evidence in favour of the MVS model in a fixed effects
analysis of Group Bayes Factors (model posterior probability >0.99 in favour of MVS). B.
Parameter estimates from the MVS model reveal a range of preferences for variance (negative
coefficent reflects variance aversion), and skewness (negative coefficient reflects aversion to
positive versus negative skewness).
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skewness model (probability weighting model AIC: 3674, log Group Bayes factor MVS vsprobability weighting = 243). I also fit a loss aversion (LA), and full cumulative prospecttheory (CPT) model, with the reference point set at the £1.20 sure amount rather than thestatus quo of £0. This allows for potential overweighting of small probability outcomes atboth extremes of the distribution, similar to skewness preference. The MVS modeloutperformed the CPT and LA models (log Group Bayes factor MVS vs CPT: 236; MVS vs LA:131; Figure 4.4).
4.3.1.1.3 HEURISTIC MODELS
I also examined whether individuals are using a heuristic, such as attending to thesmallest/largest outcome or some weighting of the two by comparing a series of models ofdifferent possible heuristics (see Methods). None of these models explained the data well andall were inferior to both the MV and MVS models (Figure 4.5). This provides strong evidencethat subjects use the entire lottery distribution to guide choice rather than reducing theprocess to a simpler heuristic.
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Figure 4.4 Comparison of mean-risk and expected utility models including: mean only (M),
mean-variance (MV), mean-skewness (MS), mean-variance-skewness (MVS), power utility
(EUT), mean-variance-positive skewness (MVpS), mean-variance-negative skewness
(MVnS), mean-positve skewness-negative skewness (MpSnS), mean-variance-positive
skewness-negative skewness (MVpSnS), loss aversion (LA), probability weighting (PW) and
cumulative prospect theory (CPT). Relative log-evidence, with model evidence
approximated by either AIC or BIC to penalise for model complexity, calculated against
worst performing M model, across subjects, and are given above each model. A higher
relative log-evidence indicates a better model fit (higher model likelihood).
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4.3.1.1.4 PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR RISK PREFERENCES
I next used the winning MVS model to provide subject-specific preferences for variance andskewness. Parameter estimates from the MVS model showed that 16/23 subjects wereaverse to variance (average variance preference: -0.20; s.e.m. 0.07), and 15/23 were averseto positive skewness (average skewness preference: -0.09; s.e.m. 0.03) (Figure 4.3B). β(temperature) values for the logistic function were low, indicating that choices were wellpartitioned by the linear model (average beta = 0.14; s.e.m. 0.01). Some subjects had strongskewness preference but were insensitive to variance, other subjects were indifferent toskewness. 8/23 showed a negative variance and skewness parameter, which corresponds toa (locally) sigmoid utility function. There was a weak negative correlation between varianceand skew-preference (r2 = 0.17; p = 0.05). No individuals in the sample were both varianceand positive-skew-seeking. The MVS model was at least as good as the MV and MSalternatives in the majority of individual cases, outperforming the MS model in 19/23subjects and the MV model in 17/23 subjects.
4.3.1.1.5 CHANGES IN PREFERENCE OVER TIME
It is possible that subjects might switch their behavioural preferences from preferringpositive to preferring negative skewness over the course of the experiment. I checked thispossibility by separately fitting the MVS model per subject to the first and second half of thedata. I found no evidence that individuals reverse their preference for skewness during the
Figure 4.5 Comparison of heuristic models. The heuristic models (AMaxMinp, MaxP,
MaxMinp, AMaxMin, MaxMin) proved inferior to the mean model in a comparison of relative
log evidence (more negative number indicates a worse model fit).
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experiment, with 15 subjects starting and finishing with preference for negative skewness, 5subjects starting and finishing with preference for positive skewness, and only 3 subjectsreversing preference from negative to positive skew seeking (20/23 subjects with no switchin preference, binomial test = n.s.). I explored this question further, and tested if there wasany systematic shift in preference at all. There was no significant change in the estimatedvariance preference parameters from the 1st to the 2nd half of the session across subjects(paired t-test, p = .75). However there was a change in skew-preference (paired t-test, p =0.005). Consequently, for the imaging analysis, I use individuals’ average behaviouralpreferences estimated across the experimental session. Note that any change in preferenceover time will count against the analysis by introducing noise into the data, rendering it lesslikely to detect a significant result, and also mean that I may underestimate the true effectsize of some reported correlations.
4.3.2 FUNCTIONAL IMAGING
4.3.2.1 Responses to variance and skewness
Having established that a MVS model best explained participants’ choice behaviour, I nextasked whether statistical components of this model have a distinct neural representation. Inline with the predictions, brain activity in right posterior parietal cortex (PPC) (peak MNIcoord: 32, -60, 50; p = 0.003, cluster extent = 1318 voxels) showed a significant correlationwith lottery variance on each trial, irrespective of choice (Figure 4.6A&B, Table 4.1). Nobrain activity negatively correlating with variance survived family-wise error-correction.
In contrast to a segregated representation of variance, I observed a distributed encoding ofskewness. Using the pair of regressors representing stimulus-evoked BOLD activitymodulated by the degree (magnitude) of lottery skewness, for positive and negativelyskewed trials respectively, I tested both whether there were regions encoding the full rangeof skewness on a linear scale, and whether there were regions whose activation dependedsolely on the degree of positive or negative skewness. No single area linearly correlated withthe full range of skewness (i.e. both increasing activation for greater positive skewness, anddecreasing activation for greater negative skewness), which I assessed using a conjunctionbetween activity for positive and negative skewness (at p<0.01 voxelwise threshold).Instead, I found dissociable cortical and subcortical regions correlating with positive andnegative skewness respectively. As positive skewness increased (a small chance of a betterthan average outcome) so too did BOLD signal in ventral striatum (peak voxel MNI coord: -10, 4, -14; p = 0.033 (small volume corrected), cluster extent =228 voxels), and right anteriorinsula extending into inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (on right: peak voxel MNI coord: 30,16,-14;
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p = 0.021 (small volume corrected), cluster extent = 234 voxels; on left: peak voxel MNIcoord: -40,24,-16; p = 0.017 (small volume corrected), cluster extent = 67 voxels.) (Figure
4.6C-F, Table 4.1), a priori regions of interest where risk-related activity has been seen inprevious studies (Schultz et al., 2008). In contrast, negative skewness correlated with activityin medial prefrontal cortex (peak voxel MNI coord: 4, 44, 36; p< 0.001, cluster extent =1673voxels)(Figure 4.6G&H, Table 4.1). There were no areas surviving correction thatcorrelated with decreasing positive or decreasing negative skewness (i.e. greater BOLDsignal for less skewed lotteries). Ventral striatum, insula, and prefrontal cortex expresseddissociated responses to positive and negative skewness (Figure 4.6D,F,H). No areascorrelating with increasing magnitude of skewness irrespective of sign (i.e. more active forskewed than symmetrical lotteries, irrespective of whether the outliers were better or worsethan the average) survived correction.
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Figure 4.6 Responses to summary statistics. Figure shows second-level SPM-T images
thresholded at p<0.005, superimposed upon a canonical image. A. Linear correlation
between PPC activity and variance (peak coord: 32, -60, 50; p = 0.003, whole-brain
corrected). B. Estimated percent signal change, averaged activity over all voxels within PPC
cluster. C. Correlation between increasing positive skewness and BOLD signal in ventral
striatum (peak coord: -10, 4, -14; p = 0.033, small volume corrected). D. Estimated percent
signal change, averaged activity over all voxels within ventral striatum cluster, for positive
and negative skewed gambles. E. There was also positive correlation seen in bilateral
anterior insula (peak coords: right - 30,16,-14, p = 0.021; left - -40,24,-16, p=0.017; small
volume corrected). F. Estimated percent signal change for positive and negatively skewed
gambles, averaged activity over all voxels within right and left anterior insula clusters
(plotted separately). G. Correlation between increasing negative skewness and BOLD signal
in DMPFC (peak coord: 4, 44, 36; p< 0.001, whole-brain corrected). H. Estimated percent
signal change, averaged activity over all voxels within ventral striatum cluster. Error bars
on correlation plots show standard error. All statistical inference performed in SPM
(reported in the main text and supplementary tables), thus separate correlation strength
and effect size not re-calculated from plotted correlations, with relationships shown for
illustrative purposes.
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4.3.2.2 Regional encoding of utility
Given that the MVS model specifies value as a linear mixture of variance and skewness, Iwould expect that regions expressing activity correlating with gamble utility would also beexpected to show a partial correlation with both variance and skewness. Conversely, the factthat I do not see common regions correlating with variance and skewness argues against aunitary representation of lottery value. However, this may be due to reduced detectionpower in an additive mixture of random variables, thus I also tested directly for arepresentation of value. I ran separate GLMs to identify regions correlating with the trial-by-trial utility of the lottery (stimulus value; MVS model), the difference in utility of lottery vs.sure amount (relative stimulus value), and utility of the chosen - utility of the unchosenoption (relative action value). No areas correlated with stimulus value, even within regionsof interest (variance and skew-sensitive areas, or prefrontal cortex) at an uncorrected
Area L/R
MNI coordinates
Z score P value
Cluster
Extentx y z
A. Response to Variance
Posterior Parietal Cortex R
32 -60 50 3.71
0.003† 131828 -46 46 3.66
16 -62 48 3.59
B. Response to Positive Skewness
Anterior insula / inferior frontal
gyrus R 30 16 -14 3.59 0.021†† 117
Anterior insula / inferior frontal
gyrus
L -40 24 -16 3.59 0.017†† 67
Ventral Striatum L
-10 4 -14 3.36 0.033††
228
-16 8 -8 3.20 0.050††
C. Response to Negative Skewness
Dorsal medial prefrontal cortex /
medial frontal gyrus
R 4 44 36 4.76
<0.001† 1673
L
-8 32 34 3.93
-2 48 18 3.38
Table 4.1 Response to Risk Dimensions. A. Anatomical locations of regions positively
correlating with the lottery variance on each trial. B. Anatomical locations of regions
correlating with increasing positive skewness on each trial. C. Anatomical locations of
regions correlating with increasing negative skewness on each trial. I report significant
clusters surviving correction at p≤0.05 († = cluster-level family-wise error whole-brain
corrected p-value), or significant voxels at p≤0.05 within regions of interest (†† = voxel-level
family-wise error region-of-interest corrected p-value). Peak voxel MNI coordinates within
significant clusters are given, with corresponding voxel-level Z scores. I define anatomical
ROIs by 2cm-diameter spheres centred upon MNI coordinates for anterior insula, ventral
striatum, and anterior cingulate/dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, where risk-related
activation has previously been reported.
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(p<0.001) threshold. For relative stimulus value, I observed a 5-voxel cluster at uncorrectedsignificance (p<0.001, voxel-level) in right ventromedial OFC. Relative action values werereflected in robust activation in a network of regions comprising bilateral precentral sulcusextending into supplementary motor area, and bilateral inferior parietal lobe (p<0.001,corrected). As might be expected, these regions form a typical motor/motor preparatorynetwork (Cunnington et al., 2002).
4.3.2.3 Integration with variance and skewness preferences
I considered whether regions encoding the statistics of lottery outcomes also integrated thisinformation with individuals’ tastes for risk. These variance or skewness-encoding regionscould express different sensitivities to these statistics depending upon an individual’s riskpreferences, as discussed in Chapter 2. Thus I tested whether areas expressing variance andskewness-related activity altered in sensitivity (correlation effect size) to these statistics in amanner that correlated with subjects’ preferences, as estimated from the MVS model. Iidentified a significant interaction between BOLD activation for positive skewness andsubject-specific skew-preference (peak voxel MNI coord: -36, 24, -16; p = 0.007, clusterextent = 80 voxels) in anterior insula. Thus the greater the activation reflecting skewness inthis area the stronger the behavioural preference for positive over negative skewness(Figure 4.7). There was no significant correlation surviving correction between behaviouralpreference and skewness-evoked activation in other regions. By contrast, the posteriorparietal area correlating with variance did not express any differential activation that co-varied with subject-specific variance preference (masked for voxels expressing variance-related activation, no significant voxels at mask threshold 0.05 uncorrected). Note that these(very) significant correlations between skew preference and activations over subjects werecompletely orthogonal to the statistical tests for the activations per se (both within andbetween subjects). The fact that these two orthogonal (skewness related and preferencerelated) effects co-localise lends further validity to the assertion that this insular regionresponds selectively to skewness.
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Area L/R MNI coordinates Z score P value
Cluster
Extent
x y z
Anterior insula / inferior frontal
gyrus
L -36 24 -16 4.36 0.007 80
Anterior insula / inferior frontal
gyrus / BA45
L -56 18 6 4.09 0.018 38
4.3.2.4 Choice-related activation
Information about the summary statistics of a decision informs individuals’ choices, hence toidentify areas showing a coupling with action (i.e. reflecting gamble or sure choices), I nextasked whether activation specifically within regions responsive to variance and skewnesscorrelated with choice. There was a significant effect of choice within variance-sensitiveposterior parietal cortex (gamble>sure choice; peak voxel MNI coord: 26, -60, 54; p = 0.008,cluster extent = 547 voxels, small volume-corrected for variance-related areas of activity)
Figure 4.7 Correlation of skew-evoked activity with individual preferences. A. Within the
anterior insula regions showing a correlation in signal with positive skewness, the left
anterior insula shows a significant positive correlation with individual skew-preference
(peak coord: -36, 24, -16; p = 0.007, small-volume corrected). B. Plot of behavioural model
(MVS) skewness parameter estimate against neural contrast estimate for positive-skew
related activity.
Table 4.2 Correlation of skew-related activity with skew-preference. 2nd-level analysis of
anatomical locations of regions where the strength of the skewness response correlated
with subject-specific skew-preferences (estimated from MVS model). I restrict the analysis
to, and perform family-wise error correction for multiple comparisons within all voxels
sensitive to skewness (identified at p<0.01 uncorrected). Voxels reported at p<0.05
corrected.
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(Figure 4.8), in skew-sensitive ventral striatum (peak voxel MNI coord: -8, 4, -10; p = 0.016,small volume-corrected for skewness-related areas of activity) and medial prefrontal region(peak voxel MNI coord: 6,44,18; p = 0.049, small-volume corrected for skewness-relatedareas of activity) (Table 4.3). In addition to these areas, across the whole-brain, a network ofregions showed greater BOLD signal for gamble than sure choices (Table 4.4), includingventral striatum, prefrontal, occipital and bilateral posterior parietal cortex. No areasshowed the opposite pattern (sure>gamble signal).
Area L/R MNI coordinates Z score P value Cluster Extent
x y z
Posterior parietal cortex
(variance-sensitive voxels)
R
26 -60 54 4.03 0.008
54730 -68 30 3.97 0.010
18 -62 30 3.70 0.023
Ventral Striatum
(skew-sensitive voxels)
L
-8 4 -10 3.11 0.016
39
-16 4 -15 2.83 0.033
Medial Prefrontal cortex
(skew-sensitive voxels)
R 6 44 18 3.53 0.049 525
Figure 4.8 Choice-related activity. Both ventral striatum and posterior parietal cortex (PPC)
show significantly greater BOLD signal for gamble versus sure choices (ventral striatum
peak coord: -8, 4, -10; p = 0.016, small-volume corrected; PPC peak coord: 26, -60, 54; p =
0.008, small-volume corrected).
Table 4.3 Choice-related activity I. BOLD signal correlating with choice within variance- and
skew-sensitive regions of interest. We report significant voxels at p<0.05, family-wise error
corrected for regions of interest.
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Area L/R MNI coordinates Z score P value Cluster Extent
x y z
Ventral Striatum L -6 8 -4 4.59
<0.001 2614Ventral Striatum R 18 22 -2 4.40
Middle Frontal Gyrus R 20 40 -14 4.43
Occipital Lobe/BA17
L
-14 -94 -8 4.34
<0.001 1742Occipital Lobe -26 -84 -8 4.30
Occipital Lobe/BA18 -8 -78 -4 4.02
Superior Parietal Lobe
L
-12 -70 40 4.20
0.001 785Superior Parietal Lobe -20 -60 52 3.42
Precuneus -16 -60 26 3.03
Superior Parietal Lobe
R
26 -60 54 4.03
<0.001 1248Parietal Lobe/Precuneus 20 -62 32 4.02
Parietal Lobe/Mid-occipital gyrus 30 -68 30 3.97
If activation correlating with choice within risk-sensitive regions influences action selection,a strong expectation is that this choice-coupled neural activity should also be modulated byindividual risk-preferences. This provides an alternative mechanism for risk-preferences toinfluence decisions, rather than only by altering neural sensitivity to the stimulus dimensionsof variance and skewness., as I highlighted in Chapter 2. For example, in regions sensitive tovariance one might predict an enhanced correlation of BOLD signal with choice(gamble>sure) in more variance-averse individuals. Within the variance-sensitive posteriorparietal cortex region, I observed just such an effect (peak voxel MNI coord: 36, -58, 42;p=0.035, cluster extent =656 voxels). Thus, for subjects with strong variance aversion therewas greater activation for a gamble choice than a sure choice (Figure 4.9A&B). Clusters inright supplementary motor area (SMA), posterior cingulate, and occipital lobe also showed asimilar relationship (Table 4.5). Performing the same analysis for skewness revealed thatleft anterior insula and right mid-insula express a positive correlation between choice andskew-preference (peak voxel MNI coord: -24, 22, -6; p = 0.033, small-volume corrected,cluster extent = 666 voxels) (Figure 4.9C&D, Table 4.6). Moreover, the same right insularegion showing an interaction between choice activity and skew-preference also showed a
Table 4.4 Choice-related activity II: Anatomical locations of regions expressing greater
BOLD signal for gamble versus sure choices. We report significant clusters surviving
correction at p<0.05 (cluster-level family-wise error corrected). Peak voxel MNI coordinates
within significant clusters are given, with corresponding voxel-level Z scores.
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positive correlation with variance-preference (at voxel MNI coord: 46, -4, -14; p=0.040 smallvolume corrected for skew-sensitive voxels), suggesting that right anterior insula activityintegrates both variance- and skew-preferences to influence choice.
Figure 4.9 Coupling of choice and neural activity in PPC and anterior insula depends upon
subject-specific risk-preferences. A. Correlation between PPC activity for choice
(gamble>sure) and individual variance-aversion (peak coord: 36, -58, 42; p=0.035, whole-
brain corrected). B. Contrast estimate (for gamble>sure choice), from peak coordinate
(indicated by cross-hairs), correlated with behavioural variance preference parameter, with
greater activity for gamble vs sure choices in variance-averse individuals, but greater
activity for sure vs gamble choices in variance-seeking individuals. C. Correlation between
anterior insula activity for choice (gamble>sure) and individual skew-preference (peak
coord: 36, -58, 42; p=0.035, small-volume corrected). D. Contrast estimate (for gamble>sure
choice), from peak coordinate (indicated by cross-hairs), correlated with behavioural
skewness-preference parameter, with greater activity for gamble vs sure choices in positive
skew-seeking individuals. Within this cluster, there was also a significant correlation
between variance-seeking and choice-related activity (at coord: 46, -4, -14; p=0.040, small
volume corrected for skew-sensitive voxels).
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Area L/R MNI coordinates Z score P value
Cluster
Extent
x y z
Superior Frontal Gyrus /
Supplementary Motor Area
R
6 20 58 4.10
0.014 7906 34 38 3.28
8 24 36 3.73
Posterior Cingulate / BA29 L -2 -38 20 3.76
0.026 699Occipital Lobe / Lingual Gyrus R 20 -72 0 3.43
Occipital Lobe - Cuneus R 12 -70 6 3.36
Posterior Parietal Cortex /
BA40
R 38 -58 42 3.67
0.035 656R 48 -58 40 3.14
R 30 -66 34 3.13
Anterior insula / inferior frontal
gyrus
R 46 -4 -14 3.31 0.040† 57
Area L/R MNI coordinates Z score P value
Cluster
Extent
x y z
Anterior Insula / Inferior
Frontal Gyrus
L
-24 22 -6 3.78
0.033 666-10 12 -12 3.29
-38 4 -4 3.11
Insula / Superior
Temporal Gyrus
R
54 -4 -12 3.60
0.039 64352 2 -2 3.59
46 -8 -14 3.53
4.4 DISCUSSION
This study demonstrates that during choice individuals have behaviourally distinct tastes forboth the spread of possible outcomes (variance), and also the shape and asymmetry of the
Table 4.5 Interaction between choice and variance-preference. Regions where neural
response to choice (gamble>sure) correlated with individual variance-preference. I report
significant clusters at p<0.05 family-wise error whole-brain corrected. Peak voxel MNI
coordinates within significant clusters are given, with corresponding voxel-level Z scores.
Table 4.6 Interaction between choice and skew-preference. Regions where neural response
to choice (gamble>sure) correlated with individual skew preference. I report significant
clusters at p<0.05 family-wise error corrected within regions of interest. Peak voxel MNI
coordinates within significant clusters are given, with corresponding voxel-level Z scores.
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outcome distribution (skewness). Moreover, the finding that these different risk dimensionshave a distinct neural representation provides strong evidence that the brain adopts a‘summary statistic’ approach to outcome evaluation (Rangel et al., 2008b).
4.4.1 RISK AND RISK PREFERENCES
Risk has typically been approximated by variance in previous studies (McCoy and Platt,2005; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al.,2009). This measure neglects other psychologically salient features, such as choices yieldinga small chance of either a much better (positive skewness) or much worse (negativeskewness) than average outcome (Coombs and Bowen, 1971; Harvey and Siddique, 2000;Jullien and Salanie, 2000). In contrast to alternative risk-measures focusing only on thechance of a poor outcome (e.g. downside risk (Bawa, 1975), probable loss (Fishburn, 1984)) Ifound that participants are influenced by both negative and positive skewness in addition tovariance.
Skewness-preference permits individuals to express simultaneously a desire to gamble in acasino (‘risk-seeking’) and buy insurance (‘risk-aversion’) (Garrett and Sobel, 1999), whichcannot be explained by a sensitivity to variance alone, and has been invoked to explainbehaviour inconsistent with classical theory (e.g. gambling on a long-shot at the races, orbuying a ticket for the National Lottery) (Golec and Tamarkin, 1998; Wang et al., 2006). Thus,I quantify a dimension not captured by variance, showing that the overall shape of adistribution of outcomes significantly drives choices and that ‘risk-preference’ is not aunitary measure.
On average, I find relative negative skew preference and variance aversion in the sample ofparticipants. Here I systematically examine these separate influences by experimentaldesign, both showing that the overall shape of the outcome distribution drives choice andindependently evokes neural activity. Together this supports the idea that ‘risk-preference’ isnot a unitary measure, either of behaviour or in terms of activity it is likely to evoke in thebrain.
4.4.2 NEURAL ENCODING OF RISK
4.4.2.1 Variance
In line with the behavioural finding of sensitivity to different elements of risk, I also find adistributed representation of risk dimensions in the brain. Variance is linearly encoded in
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posterior parietal cortex (PPC), consistent with single unit data and fMRI studies showingenhanced activity in PPC during risky decision-making (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Huettel etal., 2005; Mohr et al., 2010a). Parietal cortex represents numerical range (Piazza et al., 2007)and expresses an interaction between number and space (Hubbard et al., 2005), whichsuggests that variance representation in PPC reflects an intuitively spatial evocation of thespread of an outcome distribution. This may well explain the absence of PPC activity instudies where risk is varied by altering the probability of a win, rather than presenting arange of possible outcome amounts (Preuschoff et al., 2006). While it is possible that PPCexpresses an effect consequent upon psychological effects of increasing risk, such asenhanced attention (Behrmann et al., 2004), I find this effect is specific for variance ratherthan skewness, despite both influencing risk perception.
4.4.2.2 Skewness
The finding of skewness-related activity in prefrontal cortex, insula, and striatum, in effectencoding a stimulus dimension entirely independent of variance, emphasises that risk is notsynonymous with variance alone. Anterior insula and dorso-medial prefrontal cortex(DMPFC) have consistently been implicated in the detection and evaluation of risk,probability, uncertainty and volatility (Critchley et al., 2001; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;Preuschoff et al., 2006; Behrens et al., 2007; Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007; Tobler et al., 2007;Bach et al., 2009; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Engelmann and Tamir, 2009a; Smith et al., 2009;St Onge and Floresco, 2009; Tobler et al., 2009; Bossaerts, 2010; Mohr et al., 2010b; Xue etal., 2010), and ventral striatum manifests immediate and delayed, linear and non-linearresponses to probability (Preuschoff et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2009) and a positive correlationwith reward magnitude (Knutson et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2007; Yacubian et al., 2007).Hence, previous observations on the neural basis of risk may have tapped into a combinationof risk elements, while here I dissociate responses to variance and skewness.
I identify neural responses to positive skewness in ventral striatum, anterior insula, and IFG,but to negative skewness in DMPFC. This distinction parallels related findings that DMPFCencodes the probability of loss (Smith et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2010), and suggests that DMPFCmay encode features of below-average outcomes in contrast to ventral striatum tracking ofbetter than average outcomes. This finding can also explain why risk-correlation has notbeen reported in ventral striatum in studies where skewness has been controlled(Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009). The finding of separable anatomic regionscorrelating with positive and negative skewness does not predict that subjects would havedistinct attitudes toward positive and negative skewness. While this is a plausible predictionI found no evidence for a separate expression of preference in these regions. The skewness
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parameter from the MVS model reflects how much subjects value positive relative tonegative skewness in a gamble. Given that I can approximate subjects’ behaviour with asingle skew parameter, it is equally likely that skew-preference arises from an interactionbetween brain areas. In order for the MVpSnS model to win (in terms of predicting choice),the participants would need to have very different sensitivities for positive and negativeskewness, or express skewness intransitivities such as liking symmetric above any skewedgamble. It is possible that within a larger behavioural sample I would have sufficient data todemonstrate such different sensitivities for positive and negative skewness.
4.4.2.3 Integration with risk preferences
4.4.2.3.1 CHANGE IN REGIONAL SENSITIVITY TO RISK
Medial PFC and striatum are reciprocally connected (Sesack et al., 1989; Croxson et al.,2005), project to prefrontal and pre-motor areas involved in action planning and execution(Haber, 2003), as well as to insular cortex (Guldin and Markowitsch, 1983; Shi and Cassell,1998). These connections can meditate information transmission between areas translatingdifferent features of the outcome distribution into summary statistics, and areas integratingthis information with context and individual risk-preferences. This distributed network forrisk evaluation echoes, for example, distributed neural processing in vision, where discretevisual dimensions (colour, motion, form), are processed in segregated networks (Courtneyand Ungerleider, 1997).
Anterior insula and IFG activity is modulated by individual taste for risk, expressing greateractivity for positively skewed gambles in individuals who prefer positive skewness, andshowing a correlation with choice also dependent upon individual skewness and variance-preference. This suggests that anterior insula and IFG perform a risk-valuation andsubsequently promote or inhibit risk-taking, consistent with previous observations(Christopoulos et al., 2009; Engelmann and Tamir, 2009a; Xue et al., 2010). I also observedgreater loading for skewness than variance in anterior insula, generated by a wide range ofskewness-preference in my participants, as opposed to previous studies where skewnesswas fixed (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009). I also decorrelated choice fromrisk, whereas previous studies may have detected risk anticipation contingent on choicerather than the process of quantifying decision statistics (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;Preuschoff et al., 2006; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2010).Anticipation of chosen risk could recruit insula activity, explaining consistent reports of(risk-attitude dependent) activity in this region.
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4.4.2.3.2 MODULATION OF CHOICE-RELATED ACTIVATION
PPC and ventral striatum activity also correlated with choice, with activation in PPCdependent upon the degree of variance-aversion, corroborating previous findings (Weberand Huettel, 2008a). Striatum responded to both positive skewness and gamble choice,although subjects mostly avoided positively skewed gambles. One possibility here is thatstriatum could encode statistical properties of a gamble and independently engender actionfollowing integration of risk-preferences and statistical information. Note that variancepreferences are also significant in driving choice, hence could also influence striatal activity.Alternatively, striatum could exert a negative influence on the choice to gamble. The patternof activity I observed would be expected in a region inhibiting risky choice, as the strongestcoupling occurs in individuals who are most variance-averse. This region overlaps the medialintraparietal area, integral to motor intention (Grefkes et al., 2004; Andersen and Cui, 2009),thus parietal cortex might promote safe choices via polysynaptic links to basal ganglia andpremotor regions (Tanne-Gariepy et al., 2002; Clower et al., 2005). The PPC has directconnections with insula (Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1989), thus may also directly passquantitative information about variance to anterior insula for integration with otherstatistics and an emotional response.
4.4.3 SUMMARY
In this study, I considered two plausible ways in which individual preferences couldmodulate neural activity. I first find preferences modulating stimulus-evoked activity, withindividuals with stronger preference for skewness demonstrating increased insulasensitivity to skewness. Secondly, I show variance and skewness preferences modulateaction-related neural activation, as individuals with stronger preferences have greatercoupling between neural activity and choice within risk-sensitive regions. Overall, thisprovides evidence that preferences modulate both stimulus-evoked and choice-relatedactivity.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 4, I provided behavioural and neural evidence to support the idea that keycomponents of an outcome distribution, such as variance and skewness, are explicitlyencoded in the brain. However, this study and previous experiments focus on immediatereturns from single choices (Knutson et al., 2005; Abler et al., 2006; Yacubian et al., 2006;Elliott et al., 2008; De Martino et al., 2009) leaving a relative dearth of knowledge aboutsequential choice. Many everyday situations require agents to generate a chain of actions (apath through a decision-tree), leading to a distribution of outcomes, which engendersuncertainty. This is a focus in ecology, where animals forage to ensure intake exceedsminimal need constraints (Stephens et al., 2007), and in finance where traders reap bonusesby exceeding a target return from sequential tranactions (Panageas and Westerfield, 2009).Common to these examples is that the distribution of possible outcomes (energy, money)differs for each available series of choices.
Selecting serial actions from a set of strategies thus requires integration of immediatedecisions with overarching goals, and poses two separate problems. Firstly, do humansevaluate the distribution of outcomes when planning choice? Secondly, do individualsassume ‘optimal’ future choices when making sequential decisions? These are closely linkedin the decision process, as the anticipated distribution of outcomes will depend upon (i.e. becontingent upon) anticipated future choices.
In game theory and classical dynamic programming, decision-makers’ strategies under everycontingency are described by a set of actions which maximize subjective value (‘utility’). Insequential choice these utilities are called continuation values, as action-values arecontingent upon following a future strategy. Thus, in assigning continuation values, decision-
ROSPECTIVE DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK
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makers must make assumptions about the type of future choices they will make. Standarddynamic programming constrains decision-makers to invoke only optimal choices in thefuture (optimal continuation value: OCV). Critically, an optimal strategy can be planned inadvance, implying that "online" updating is irrelevant or irrational (dynamicallyinconsistent) in the absence of new information (Dekel et al., 1998; Epstein and Schneider,2003). An OCV decision-maker, when presented with decision 1 followed by decision 2,makes the same set of choices even if the order is reversed (as long as no new information ispresented until after choices are made).
However, decision-makers can assign utilities to options assuming that they might not takethe optimal choice in the future. This might occur if choices became unexpectedlyconstrained, when planned strategies would no longer be available. All available strategies(rather than just the pre-planned ‘optimal’ strategy) are taken into account before eachchoice, for example by assuming that future choices are distributed randomly (averagecontinuation value: ACV). This entails that strategies are dynamically re-evaluated andaction-values recalculated depending on which strategies are available. This scenario allowsfor dynamic inconsistency, where future choices can depend upon the order in which optionsare presented.
Here, I tested different models of strategy valuation and planning, simultaneously acquiringneural data (using fMRI). I hypothesised that neural activity evoked in single-shot decisionparadigms would also support decision variables mediating sequential choice.
5.2 METHODS
5.2.1 BEHAVIOURAL EXPERIMENT
The study was approved by the Institute of Neurology (University College London) EthicsCommittee. 17 subjects (age range 22-36; 7 male) participated; one dropped out fromscanning because of claustrophobia and was excluded from analysis. Monetary earningswere between £18 and £28, including a fixed £10 participation fee. Stimuli were presentedon a standard PC using Cogent presentation software (Wellcome Trust Centre forNeuroimaging, London) run in MATLAB (version 6.5, MathWork, Natick, MA). Choices weremade by keypress selections on the computer keyboard of a standard personal computer.
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5.2.1.1 Task
I implemented a simple computerized sequential gambling task, where subjects wererequired to make serial choices between a sure or risky alternative (Figure 5.1).
Lotteries were shown as 4-card arrays. Subjects chose to gamble, or alternatively select afixed, sure amount of £2 on each of 5 trials in a block. Card numbers (0, 1, 2, 3, 4), indicatemonetary values (£). I used 5 different card combinations, generating 5 lotteries with equaland matched expected value of £2, but with different variance. Five lotteries were offered ineach block and the sure amount was fixed throughout. On each block, the same 5 lotteries were
presented once, using a randomised order of presentation, necessary if one is to detect dynamically
Figure 5.1 Task structure and timings. Trials were grouped into blocks of five. To
commence each block, a financial target appeared on the screen for 3.7s (Four levels for
behavioural experiment outside scanner – 5, 9, 11, 13; Two levels inside scanner – 7, 12). A
fixation cross was shown at the beginning of each trial for 1-5s (jittered). A lottery then
appeared on the screen, and subjects had up to 3.7s to indicate by button press their
choice (gamble or £2 for sure). Lotteries were represented by four red cards, with numbers
(0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) indicating monetary values in pounds, each with a probability of 0.25 of
being selected. A computerised random number generator was used for selection;
subjects were shown the selected trial and block outcomes. Total earnings were the
summed total return from the 10 selected trials.
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inconsistent choices. Subjects were paid based upon 10 randomly selected individual trials,contingent upon reaching the target amount in the block.
I imposed different financial targets per block, to alter the distribution of outcomes. Note thatthe outcome or value of each block is quantitatively determined by the target level, in thatrewards were withheld if the target level was not attained. This has a profound effect onvaluation and allowed us to manipulate the outcome distribution in a simple experimentalway. No feedback on trial-by-trial outcomes was given. Eliminating feedback enabled us todistinguish whether individuals adhere to a predetermined strategy, irrespective of theparticular sequence in which the options are presented (consistent with classical dynamicprogramming models where choices are made based upon the optimal continuation value),or if they continuously re-evaluate, taking into account a range of available strategies on eachtrial.
I provided instructions with a 15 minute verbal tutorial and a practice run of 5 blocks (withfull feedback, but only for the practice session), to ensure that subjects understood theparadigm. Subjects were told that 10 trials would be randomly selected at the end of theexperiment from all sessions (inside and outside scanner) where all trials had an equalchance of being picked. For selected trials, if the required target had been reached in thatblock, the outcome of that trial would be paid out (i.e. 10 trials are chosen to determine pay,contingent on whether the target was reached at the end of each block). This would be £2 ifthey had picked the certain fixed amount or whatever the outcome of the lottery(determined by a random selection of one of the four cards), if they had chosen to gamble. Ifthe target had not been reached, then no money would be won from the trial irrespective ofchoice.
5.2.1.2 Analysis
I initially categorised trials by two factors, current target level and the variance (risk) oflottery presented. These data were assessed by analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) and multipleregression implemented in SPSS (SPSS for Windows, Rel. 12.0.1. 2001. Chicago: SPSS Inc.).
I then analysed choices by block. There are 25 = 32 possible combinations of choices in eachblock, and I refer to each of these combinations or trajectories of choices, as a strategy s, (s =1…S), where S indexes the total possible number of choice combinations (S = 32 on trial 1, S =
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16 on trial 2 etc.). The frequency with which each strategy was chosen was compared to
simulated strategy choice frequencies by χ2-test.
I fit stochastic choice, prospective (continuation value) utility models to behaviour with themethod of simulated moments (McFadden, 1989), comparing non-nested models withHansen’s statistic (Hansen, 1982). This estimation is based on comparing observedfrequencies of choices with simulated frequencies, derived from an underlying structuralmodel. Free parameters were optimised with a non-linear simplex search algorithm inMATLAB 7.0. I selected the best-fitting model and assessed relative model performances by acomparison of criterion values on an individual subject basis.
5.2.1.3 Behavioural modelling
The behavioural models have two components - a model of valuation and a model of howfuture choices are incorporated. These models specify how strategies are compared, andwhich strategies impact upon the value of the current choice (to gamble or not to gamble).
On the first trial in a block, there are 16 possible strategies given a choice to gamble, and 16possible strategies given a choice of the sure amount. This reflects the fact that there are fiveordered binary choices between a lottery and a certain payout, so 32 (25) possible sets ofchoices are available in any given block. Each of these strategies has its own outcomedistribution. Note that the set of available strategies reduces as sequential choices are made,such that by the fifth trial in a block only two possible alternative strategies are available (togamble or opt for the sure outcome). In other words, the set of possible strategies at anygiven trial is contingent upon previous choices in the block, and the order in which thegamble options have been presented.
5.2.1.3.1 VALUATION MODEL
I implemented a mean-variance-skewness model, assigning values (utilities), , toavailable strategies s = 1...S, on each trial t = 1…T, for every target level h = 1...H. The set ofstrategies evaluated are contingent upon previous choices in each block m = 1...M. Forexample, on trial t=4, there will be four possible available strategies to evaluate, given acertain sequence of simulated or actual choices for trials t =1,2,3. Each of these strategieswill generate their own distribution of possible numerical outcomes. The probabilitydistribution of outcomes for each strategy will alter dependent upon target level h.
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Let comprise the set of discrete outcomes given strategy s on trial t, where indexesthe jth outcome from this set, and indicates the probability of the jth outcome.
With this formulation, strategy value on trial t is specified as:
( 5.1 )
denotes the expected (mean) value of the distribution of outcomes from strategy s:
( 5.2 )
denotes the variance of the outcome distribution:
( 5.3 )
and denotes the (unstandardised) skewness of the outcome distribution:
( 5.4 )
As in Chapter 4, ρ is a coefficient reflecting aversion to variance in outcomes and λ reflects the degree of positive skew seeking behaviour.
The main results focus on the mean-variance-skewness valuation model. For completeness, Ialso tested alternative utility models paralleling those in Chapter 4, although it is importantto note that here these models are not directly statistically comparable as they are non-nested with a different number of parameters.
An expected utility model (EUT) was specified as:
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( 5.5 )
ρ reflects the curvature of the power utility function, and hence risk aversion.
Prospectic utility (PT) was specified as :
( 5.6 )
Where Δ{A}c is a step function (=1 if A is true, = -1 if A is false), R is the reference point (I set R
= 10, the summed expected value of the five lottery proposals within a block), and ρ reflects the curvature of the utility function. In this simplified version of prospect theory, I have noprobability weighting and risk seeking for losses is of the same level as risk aversion forgains.
Here I did not implement more complex variants of prospect theory with differentialweighting of relative losses and gains, or other variants of decision models, as MVS modelincorporates aspects of this behaviour while being much easier to fit (because it is linear inits arguments).
5.2.1.3.2 CONTINUATION VALUE MODELS
To simulate choice, the continuation value models perform a tree-search of all possiblechoice (action) and outcome (state) combinations from current trial t to the end of eachsimulated block. This search is contingent on (i.e. constrained by) previous choices. Irecalculate the value of available strategies on each trial, and as the block proceeds, thenumber of possible strategies available reduces such that by trial t, there will be 26-t possiblestrategies remaining.
For a given target, several strategies can lead to similar distributions of outcomes. However,strategies will differ in their outcomes depending upon the target level. Moreover, a criticalfeature for all these decision rules is that subjects’ previous choices within a block determinethe remaining available strategies to be evaluated. These models assume that the full spaceof possible actions and outcomes is known. I make this simplifying assumption in order to
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render model estimation tractable (i.e. specifically I do not incorporate uncertainty aboutfuture options). This is not unreasonable, given that the task has a simple repeating structurewith the same five lotteries being presented on each block throughout practice, behavioural,and scanning sessions.
5.2.1.3.2.1 Optimal continuation value (OCV)Agents pre-determine a specific policy, representing the outcome distribution from theiroptimal strategy on each trial (i.e. a prospective decision-maker making choices consistentwith a classical dynamic programming model). Thus, OCV prescribes the choices for aprospective decision-maker who acts in accordance with classical dynamic programmingprinciples, and is oblivious to the order in which options are presented.
I assign action values (Q) to the binary options (gamble (specified as Q1) or sure (specified asQ0)), calculated on every trial, as the decision-maker progresses through the decision tree.These two action values are then compared to determine a simulated choice.
( 5.7 )
( 5.8 )
s indexes the possible continuation trajectories (available strategies), or branches of thedecision tree. Note that the OCV will remain the same on every trial within a block when asubject adheres to the strategy selected at block outset. In the case of a deviation from anoptimal trajectory, the next best (utility maximising) strategy is taken from the remainingoptions available. Importantly, in the case of these deviations, the OCV model prescribes thatappropriate correction is taken based on always trying to follow the utility-maximisingstrategy.
5.2.1.3.2.2 Average continuation value (ACV)This model entails that agents calculate the average value or utility of each of the twoalternative choices on each trial (i.e. choosing to gamble or take the sure amount), ratherthan forecasting with respect to optimal continuation trajectories. This model does notrequire that agents have an explicit plan of future choices, and is akin to a model where thecurrent choice is made under an assumption that choices are made randomly for the rest of
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the block. Every possible strategy impacts upon current continuation values. As such, thedecision maker can be thought of as myopic.
( 5.9 )
( 5.10 )
5.2.1.3.2.3 Sure continuation value (SCV)This model assumes agents weigh up the current choice against a benchmark of taking thesure option for the remainder of the block. This implements a simple heuristic where thechoice to gamble or take the sure amount is made given a fixed benchmark.
( 5.11 )
( 5.12 )
where t indexes the current trial in the block.
5.2.1.3.3 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
I provide a simple numerical example of how these models work in practice (Figure 5.2).Imagine you are faced with a 2-stage sequential decision between a gamble (g) and a sureamount (s) of money fixed at £2. The first decision (decision X) is whether to accept a 50:50gamble giving either £4 or £1. The second decision (decision Y) is whether to accept agamble giving a 75:25 percent chance of winning £3 or £0, or again opting for a sure amountof £2. There are 4 possible strategies to consider (ss, sg, gs, gg combinations, which I refer toas strategies A, B, C, D), each giving a different distribution of outcomes. In these models,these distributions are evaluated according to a utility function (U), to give 4 separatenumbers, or utilities, one per strategy.
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I now assign numbers to these utilities for illustrative purposes: U(ss) = 10; U(sg) = 8; U(gs)= 4; U(gg) = 7. Imagine now having to choose a current action. If you were an ‘optimal’decision maker you would compare the highest utilities given each choice (in this case U(ss)for a sure choice, U(gg) for a gamble choice). As U(ss)>U(sg)>U(gg)>U(gs), you prefer tomake a sure choice on the current trial. For the next decision, you again make a sure choice,now comparing U(ss) = 10 vs U(sg) = 8. Thus, you have selected strategy A. What if you are adecision-maker conforming to an average continuation value model? In this case, you weighup the average utility of outcomes from each current choice (i.e. you compare (U(ss) +U(sg))/2 = 9 to (U(gs) + U(gg))/2 = 5.5). In this example, you also prefer to make a surechoice (as U(s, ·) > U(g, ·)). For the subsequent decision, you compare U(ss) = 10 and U(sg) =8, and again make a sure choice, following strategy A.
Now let us consider a situation where the order of decisions is reversed (Figure 5.3). Thereremain 4 strategies, but their order has changed such that we have: U(ss) = 10; U(sg) = 4;
Figure 5.2 A two-stage decision example I. Numerical example of a two-stage decision.
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U(gs) = 8; U(gg) = 7. If you are an optimal continuation value decision maker you choose thesure option as U(ss)>U(sg)>U(gg)>U(gs), followed by another sure option (as U(ss)>U(sg)).The order has no effect upon the ranking of the strategies and you make a dynamicallyconsistent choice by following strategy A again. If you are an average continuation valuedecision maker you will compare (U(ss) + U(sg))/2 = 7 to (U(gs) + U(gg))/2 = 7.5, and pickthe gamble choice initially. On the next decision, you make a sure choice, as U(gs)>U(gg),such that now you follow strategy B, and have made a dynamically inconsistent choice as theorder in which the options are presented has affected choices.
A sure continuation value decision maker would make a consistent choice in this example,where the ‘sure, sure’ strategy A has the highest utility, but also can make dynamically
Figure 5.3 A two-stage decision example II. Numerical example of a two-stage decision in
reversed presentation order.
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inconsistent choices if this is not the case. The actions actually selected (and whether theywill be dynamically consistent) will depend in practice upon the specific utilities assigned tothe available choices by the decision-maker.
Note that in these models, order-independence (dynamic consistency) only holds if there isno new information arriving, which is the case in this experiment in which no trial-by-trialfeedback is given. Also that these models reflect different methods of valuation and planning(i.e. an anticipated selection of choices), rather than testing execution of a pre-formed plan(i.e. self-consistency).
5.2.1.3.4 ACTION SELECTION
I account for randomness in choice by the addition of noise at action selection (modelled by alogistic choice function (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). In other words, I add simulation-specific noise ε, on each valuation. Choice is then determined as:
( 5.13 )
In fact, subjects do not choose neatly in accordance with either logit or probit (i.e. Gaussian)noise, the two most commonly used functions, as these require that suboptimal choices arechosen in proportion to how far their values are away from the optimum. Generally, subjectsare less diversified in their exploration of alternative strategies than predicted by either logitor probit, although their aberrant choices can deviate widely from the optimum. However,this is better approximated by a logistic function, where noise follows the Gumbell or doubleexponential distribution,, than a probit function where noise is normally distributed, as theformer has fatter tails and therefore can accommodate more deviant choices. Within thismodel-space, by always using the same noise distribution, I can compare relative fittingbehaviour. Any deviation from this noise model will count against our ability to discriminateneural activity correlating with these model components.
5.2.1.3.5 MODEL ESTIMATION
I based the model estimation on a comparison of the observed frequencies of block-by-blockchoices (i.e. strategies) with simulated frequencies, derived from each of the underlyingstructural models outlined above. The models generate a choice per trial per simulated block
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(using the probabilistic action selection rule), from which I calculate the simulatedfrequencies (φ) with which each strategy is chosen. I ran 1200 simulated blocks per model,across all 6 target levels, with a randomised trial order per block. These simulatedfrequencies are then compared to actual observed choices (z), using the method of simulatedmoments (McFadden, 1989). z(i) is a vector of choices over available strategies on block i,with its elements taking the value 1 for the chosen strategy, and 0 otherwise.
( 5.14 )
( 5.15 )
Where yi is a vector of observations from one block i (observed – simulated frequencies), Ω isa weighting matrix, and D, the criterion function, is the weighted sum-of-squares differencebetween the observed and simulated frequencies across all blocks (i = 1, …, N). Optimisationof D (which finds the best fitting set of parameters θ), is carried out in a two-step procedure.Initial unweighted estimates are derived with Ω = I (identity matrix). A weightedoptimisation is then performed. To estimate the precision of the observations, I calculate thecovariance matrix (Ω) of the differences between simulated and observed frequencies thatcome out of an unweighted optimisation.
( 5.16 )
In order to make Ω invertible, it is necessary to aggregate unchosen strategies, otherwise theweighting matrix is rank-deficient. The estimated precision is then the inverse of thiscovariance matrix (Ω-1). I weight observations according to this precision in performing theweighted optimisation to calculate an unbiased estimator. This method of moments criterionfunction D is not differentiable in the parameters (there are step changes in the value of thefunction as the parameters vary), hence this necessitates the use of a non-linear method tooptimize the parameters with respect to the criterion function D (by using the Nelder-Meadsimplex algorithm implemented in Matlab). I use the method of simulated moments tooptimize the models because the problem of multinomial sequential choice is high-dimensional and computationally difficult to integrate. This means that we cannot easily useBayesian methods to get a measure such as the Bayesian information criterion. In these
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circumstances, the method of simulated moments provides a robust way of optimizingmodels, and the criterion function acts as a likelihood estimate that allows comparison of themodel-space.
The optimized criterion value D is a direct measure of the residual sum of squared error ofeach model. D (multiplied by the number of observations) is χ2-distributed (Hansen’s Jstatistic) (Hansen, 1982). Relative model likelihoods calculated from χ2 statistics are notcomparable for non-nested models. However, to the extent that the number of parametersare equal (for a given utility and noisy choice model), criterion values can be directlycompared. Hence inverse criterion values (D-1), reflecting relative goodness-of-fit, weredirectly compared for best fitting models on an individual subject basis.
5.2.2 FUNCTIONAL MRI
All subjects had previously completed the behavioural experiment, and understood that thetask structure and presented lotteries were identical. I used two target levels duringscanning (7 and 12). Visual cues were projected onto a screen, visible via an angled mirrormounted on the MRI head coil. Choices were indicated by pressing a button box with theright index finger, and responses recorded using Cogent presentation software.
5.2.2.1 FMRI - scanning parameters and preprocessing
The general procedure and imaging sequence was identical to Chapter 4. The imagingparameters were: 48 oblique transverse slices; slice thickness, 2 mm; gap between slices, 1mm, repetition time TR=3.1s; echo time TE=30ms; field of view FOV=192×192 mm2.
I employed a slightly different model of neural responses to Chapter 4. To capture allvariance of interest (i.e. the modulation of neural response preceding each choice), δfunctions were placed half-way between the onset of the presentation screen and thesubsequent keypress response, and I include first order temporal derivatives to ensure thatcoupled neural activity within a +/-2s window should be captured by the canonical HRF(Friston et al., 1998b). This also avoids the need to constrain the model by makingpredictions concerning the timing of the neural responses to the different regressors.
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The contrasts of interest purely concern responses parametrically modulated by specificstimulus dimensions, reflecting activity independent of the regressors modeling non-specificresponses to stimulus presentation. Covariates of no interest comprised the onsets of thetarget screens and subject-specific realignment parameters from the image preprocessing toaccount for motion-related artifacts in the images that were not eliminated in rigid-bodymotion correction. BOLD data from blocks in which a response had been missed werefactored out by explicitly including a regressor for these error trials. All data were analysedusing Statistical Parametic Mapping software (SPM5; Wellcome Trust Centre forNeuroimaging, UK). Trial-type specific beta values of linear contrasts were estimated, andthese were entered into t-tests using random-effects analysis to provide group statistics.
I report results with small volume correction for regions of interest dictated by prior studiesat p<0.05 (svc: a 6mm radius sphere centered upon a priori coordinates) and at a thresholdof p≤0.001 uncorrected (unc).
5.3 RESULTS
5.3.1 BEHAVIOURAL
5.3.1.1 Trial-by-trial choices
I first analysed subjects’ choices in terms of a decision to gamble or opt for the sure amount,on a trial-by-trial basis, across all sessions (inside and outside scanner). I observed a linearrelationship between risk (variance) of an individual gamble, and the percentage of time thatsubjects chose the gamble over the sure alternative (Figure 5.4). A repeated-measuresanalysis of variance demonstrated a significant main effect of both riskiness of each gamble,F(2.86,42.95) = 2.88, P = 0.049, (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom, ε = 0.72;
Mauchly’s test for sphericity: χ2(9) = 19.49, p<0.05), and target level, F(5,75)= 16.32, P <0.001 (within-subjects contrasts; negative linear effect of risk – F(1,15) = 9.64, P = 0.007, r =0.63; linear effect of target – F(1,15) = 42.37, P < 0.001, r = 0.86; Fig. 2). There was also asignificant interaction between risk and target level, F(20,300) = 2.72, P < 0.001), such that athigher target levels the slope of the linear relationship was reduced. There was no tendencyfor subjects to be more risk seeking at the beginning or end of the blocks, with neither alinear or quadratic effect of time-point within a block on the probability of choosing togamble (risk x target level x time ANOVA; linear contrast: beta = -0.023, r2 = 0.001, p = 0.679,quadratic contrast: p = 0.42).
5.3.1.2
Descriptively, subjects switched strategy in a systematic manner as the(Figuregambles. However, for higher targets, as the chance of getting nothing increased, subjectschose strategies involving more lottery gambles, therebywas considerable heterogeneity in strategy selectAnalysing group data across all subjects demonstrated that choices wereagainst random choice, d.f. = 155, p<0.001).
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5.3.1.3 Model results
A comparison of each of the continuation value decision making models is illustrated inFigure 5.6A. An ACV model obtained the lowest optimised weighted criterion value (ACV:mean D = 6.3, s.e.m. 1.5; OCV: mean D = 11.9, s.e.m. 3.0; SCV: mean D = 29.5, s.e.m. 7.4). I alsocompared models to random choice (where all strategies are selected with equal frequency)to give an absolute measure of accuracy. A random model obtains a mean criterion value of78.3. The average distance (i.e. summed least-squares error) between the array of observedfrequencies and the array of model-simulated frequencies is 6.3 for ACV and 78.3 for therandom model. Therefore, the summed least-squares error for ACV is 92% less than is thecase for the random model. According to the ACV model, all 16 subjects were averse tovariance (variance coefficient = 0.21, std. 0.03), and were positive skew-seeking (skewnesscoefficient = 1.2 x 10-3, std. 0.6 x 10-3). The value of the sigma parameter (temperatureparameter of the softmax/logistic function used to account for noisy choice) were low(average sigma = 0.31, std. 0.62). This indicates that the valuation model performs well atexplaining choice without modelling a large degree of additional randomness in actionselection. It is important to note that although on average the ACV model was superior, therewas heterogeneity in the best-fitting model on a subject-by-subject basis (Figure 5.6B). TheACV model was superior to the SCV model in 13/16 subjects (Figure 5.6C). Both parametricand non-parametric tests of the criterion value statistics at the group level revealed that ACVobtained a significantly better fit than SCV (paired t-test: p = 0.001; binomial test: p = 0.002),but was indistinguishable from OCV on these behavioural data alone (paired t-test, p = 0.294;binomial test, p = 0.402).
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Continuation value models coupled with alternative utility models (PT and EUT) did notperform as well as the MVS utility model (Figure 5.7), therefore for subsequent analysis I usethe latter.
Figure 5.6 Comparison of Models. A. There were 3 types of continuation value model,
indicating different decision-making processes – optimal, where only the relative optimal
outcomes (of gambling or not gambling on each trial) are evaluated, average, where the
relative average of possible outcomes are evaluated (so all possible choice trajectories
considered), and sure, where the choice to gamble is evaluated with respect to the
alternative of taking the sure option for the remainder of the block. To illustrate the relative
superiority of the different models, I plot the inverse of the average criterion function
((mean D)-1 , where D is the criterion value (the distance between simulated and actual
choice frequencies)). Larger values for D-1 indicate a better model fit. B&C. For each subject
(n=16), the criterion value, D, from the mean-variance skewness, average continuation value
model, is compared to the optimal continuation value and sure continuation value models.
Points above the red line indicate that the mean variance skewness model with average
continuation value provides the better fit. Values are plotted on logarithmic axis for
illustration; the red line indicates equality between models. The ACV model and OCV model
are comparable in their behavioural fits across subjects. The ACV model outperforms the
SCV model for most subjects (4C). I also plot the residual values (differences) in D-1 per
subject in the bottom corner.
5.3.2
I analysed fMRI data initially using the average continuation value model.modulated the magnitude of the neural response on every trial with four regresindicating target level (high or low), expected value, variance and skewness of the expected(i.e.choiceaccount for evoked activity differences solely due to changes ievoked by a difference between a low and high target, and activity due to explicit tracking ofthe target or context. In addition, this removes correlations between the regressors inducedby the fact that at high targets, the expeis always positive (high chance of failing to reach target and receiving nothing).
I then performed a directed stepwise linear regression to analyse the contribution of eachvariable in turn to the BOLD
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account for as much neural activity as possible with the expected value regressor, and thenexplain residual activity with the variance regressor, and finally explain activity with theskewness regressor. Any residual activity correlating with skewness is thereforeindependent of expected value and variance. In addition, orthogonalisation is necessarybecause correlations remain between the statistical moments even having accounted forgross differences due to the target level (correlation coefficients: expected value vs variance,0.57; expected value vs skewness, 0.50; variance vs skewness, 0.01). It is important to notethat including the target regressor changes the inference about activity tracking thepredicted outcome statistics – I analyse activity tracking the conditional moments (i.e.expected value, variance, and skewness changes with respect to the current target level),rather than the raw unconditional statistics. This analysis conditional on current target issimilar to previous studies investigating the tracking of value in different frames orconditions (De Martino et al., 2006; Elliott et al., 2008; Plassmann et al., 2008; De Martino etal., 2009), and asks if expected outcomes are encoded relative to context. These statistics arealso conditional upon choice, unlike Chapter 4 where I endeavoured by experimental designto examine stimulus-bound responses to risk independent of choice.
One key idea here, and elsewhere in this thesis, is the principle of using neurophysiologicaldata to arbitrate between models of decision making that are difficult to distinguish usingchoice data alone. If future trials were not considered at all (i.e. participants were obliviousto the task structure, and the need to attain a target), and instead if each lottery is comparedto the sure amount in isolation (i.e. a single-shot evaluation akin to that discussed in Chapter
4), one would not expect to observe neural signals correlating with expected value orskewness (since all gambles were symmetric and had the same expected value) i.e. the nullhypothesis. This hypothesis in itself is fairly trivial to refute using just behavioural data, asclearly the participants’ choices are sensitive to the target level. On the other hand, ifindividuals anticipate future outcomes in a strategic manner (using either of the two mostlikely strategies according to choice data, of OCV where a specific set of choices are weighted,or ACV where all possible future choices are weighted), the presence of such correlatedsignals can be interpreted as providing evidence that such strategies are taken into accountand that the observed pattern of neural response tracks the anticipated distribution ofoutcomes (specifically in brain regions previously implicated in representing statisticalmoments of choice in single choice paradigms). I aim to discriminate specifically betweenOCV and ACV models using neural data, given that these models were indistinguishablesolely from the behavioural analysis of sequential choice. I use the fact that these modelspredict different anticipated outcome distributions on a trial-by-trial basis, together with
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fine-grained neural signal changes (as opposed to categorical choice data), to give additionalpower to arbitrate between these models.
5.3.2.1 Average continuation value model
Fluctuations in expected value for each choice correlated with activity in right medialorbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) (MNI co-ordinates: 6, 50, -14; t=4.16, p=0.032, svc) and nucleusaccumbens (MNI co-ordinate: right nucleus accumbens: 4, 10, -6; t=3.74, p=0.036, svc). Note,this regressor is linearly independent of that tracking the target level (Figure 5.8B, Table
5.1). The target regressor itself correlated with activity in areas including right middlefrontal gyrus (MNI coordinate 46, -2, 54, t=5.76, p<0.001 unc), anterior cingulate cortex (MNIcoordinate 6, 44, 14; t=5.08, p<0.001 unc), and paracentral lobule/supplementary motorarea (MNI coordinate -6, -24, 56; t=4.66, p<0.001 unc) (Figure 5.8B, Table 5.2). I also testedthe alternative ACV model that did not explicitly model the target separately (i.e. we ask ifthere is BOLD signal that correlates with the unconditional statistics of the outcomedistribution, not adapted to target level). In this model, no brain activity positively correlatedwith the overall expected value of a choice, even at a liberal threshold of p<0.005uncorrected significance.
I next examined neural activity accountable by changes in the average variance of possiblefuture outcomes given each choice, having accounted for activity attributable to target andexpected value. The orthogonalised component of variance-related activity correlated withBOLD in anterior insula (right anterior insula, MNI coordinates: 40, 20, -6; t = 3.64, p = 0.028svc ;left anterior insula, MNI coordinate -38, 20, 4; t =3.84, p=0.001 unc), also right putamen(MNI coordinate 26,28,-8; t = 6.42, p<0.001, unc), and right ACC (MNI coordinate 8, 44, 16;p<0.001 unc) (Figure 5.8C, Table 5.3).
Having accounted for neural activity due to target, expected value, and variance ofanticipated outcomes, I next sought to explain residual activity in terms of the(orthogonalised component of) skewness of the expected outcome distribution, observingcorrelated activity in medial frontal pole, left superior parietal cortex and postcentral gyrus,and left inferior frontal gyrus (p<0.001 unc) (Figure 5.8D, Table 5.4).
As an additional analysis, I estimated a separate general linear model where I modelledneural responses covarying with subject-specific expected utility on a trial by-trial-basis,calculated according to the behavioural parameters estimated from subjects’ parameters
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from the ACV model. As might be expected, the largest cluster of significant activitycorrelating with expected utility was found in medial prefrontal cortex (peak voxel MNIcoordinate: -8, 56, -2; t = 3.87; extent = 66 voxels; Table 5.5).
5.3.2.2 Optimal continuation value model
Given that the OCV model was statistically indistinguishable from ACV on the behaviouraldata alone, I implemented an analysis based upon predictions from the alternative OCVmodel for each subject, to investigate whether neural activity correlated with the internalparameters of this model. In essence we are asking whether brain activity can adjudicatebetween models. I formulated the fMRI design matrix in an identical manner, and found nosignificant activity in a priori regions of interest correlating with the regressors tracking theoutcome distribution, at a threshold of p<0.001 unc significance. For completeness, I testedthe alternative OCV model not explicitly modelling the target separately and also found nobrain activity correlated with the overall expected value of a choice (at p<0.005 unc). Thissuggests that neural activity in brain regions previously associated with economic decisionmaking is better captured by an ACV model, with online trial-by-trial updating rather thanthe OCV model with a fixed pre-set strategy.
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Figure 5.8 Responses to Target Value, Expected Value, Variance, and Skewness. A. Main effect of target level. SMA – supplementary motor area;
ACC – anterior cingulated cortex; SFG – superior frontal gyrus. B. Main effect of parametric response to expected value given by ACV model.
mVS/NAcc – medial ventral striatum/nucleus accumbens, VmOFC – ventromedial orbitofrontal cortex. C. Parametric response to expected
variance (risk) of each choice. PUT – putamen. AINS – anterior insula. D. Parametric response increasing with (positive) skewness in medial
frontal pole. SPMt thresholded at p<0.005 superimposed upon a canonical structural template. Colour bars show t value scales for voxel
colourmaps.
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Area L/R
MNI
coordinates
T value Extent
x y z (voxels)mid-orbital gyrus - ventromedialorbitofrontal cortex R 6 50 -14 4.16 22fusiform gyrus L -36 -46 -8 3.84 25ventral striatum - nucleusaccumbens R 4 10 -6 3.74 13superior medial gyrus L -10 58 0 3.58 9
Area L/R MNI coordinates T value Extent
x y zmiddle frontal gyrus, BA6 R 46 -2 54 5.76 12anterior cingulate cortex R 6 44 14 5.08 41middle occipital gyrus L -28 -84 36 4.75 9superior frontal gyrus L -16 60 16 4.67 8paracentral lobule/supplementary motor area, BA6 L -6 -24 56 4.66 67L -2 -16 58 4.27precentral gyrus L -32 -30 60 4.50 22postcentral gyrs L -44 -20 58 4.28 38middle occipital gyrus R 32 -86 24 4.23 9
Table 5.1 Response to Expected Value: Anatomical locations of regions correlating with the
expected value on each trial, having accounted for mean changes in activity due to the
target level. Data are thresholded at p<0.005, uncorrected. I report areas reaching a peak
voxel-level significance p≤0.001 and cluster size of >5 voxels only.
Table 5.2 Response to Target Level: Anatomical locations of regions correlating with the
target level. I report areas reaching a peak voxel-level significance p≤0.001 and cluster size
of >5 voxels.
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Area L/R MNI coordinates T value Extent
x y zPutamen R 26 18 -8 6.42 23middle frontal gyrus R 42 46 0 4.91 94inferior frontal gyrus R 42 42 -10 3.15superior orbital gyrus R 24 30 -18 4.87 29inferior parietal lobe L -62 -46 38 4.52 25inferior temporal gyrus R 52 -58 -20 4.17 10ventral striatum L -8 -2 -8 4.00 14postcentral gyrus, BA6 R 62 0 30 3.97 16anterior cingulate cortex R 8 44 6 3.92 34anterior insula L -38 20 4 3.84 29anterior insula R 40 20 -8 3.64 33middle frontal gyrus L -44 48 6 3.61 12inferior frontal gyrus / anteriorinsula R 30 26 -8 3.61 9
Table 5.3 Response to Variance: Anatomical locations of regions correlating with the
expected variance on each trial, having accounted for mean changes in activity due to the
target level and expected value. Data are thresholded at p<=0.005, uncorrected. I report
areas reaching a peak voxel-level significance p≤0.001 and cluster size of >5 voxels only.
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Area L/R MNI coordinates T value Extent
x y zpostcentral gyrus, BA 1 L -30 -44 62 5.44 175superior parietal lobe, BA2 L -20 -54 62 3.93 80mid-orbital gyrus, medialorbitofrontal cortex L -2 62 -12 5.27inferior frontal gyrus L -46 24 -10 4.82 20
medial temporal pole L -26 18 -22 4.08 8R 40 14 -36 4.51 52superior frontal gyrus L -14 14 46 4.33 6middle temporal gyrus L -66 -40 -10 4.13 19precentral gyrus, BA 6 R 18 -20 64 4.10 100
Table 5.4 Response to Skewness: Regions correlating with the expected skewness on
each trial, having accounted for mean changes in activity due to the target level, expected
value, and variance. Data are thresholded at p<0.005, uncorrected. I report areas reaching
a peak voxel-level significance p≤0.001 and cluster size of >5 voxels only.
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Area L/R MNI coordinates T value Extent
x y z
corpus callosum /
mid-cingulate gyrus
R 4 2 24 4.18 27
primary somatosensory cortex R 22 -26 46 4.04 8
prmary motor cortex L -12 12 62 4.02 41
medial prefrontal cortex
L -8 56 -2 3.87
66
R 2 62 -12 3.83
Thalamus L -20 -20 16 3.83 13
Thalamus L -22 -12 16 3.76 7
pre-supplementary motor area L -22 22 34 3.67 24
anterior insula L -52 20 0 3.65 10
5.4 DISCUSSION
5.4.1 REPRESENTING OUTCOME DISTRIBUTIONS IN PROSPECTIVE DECISIONS
In this study, I first asked how humans evaluate outcome distributions from differentstrategies in a sequential choice task. Using a mean-variance-skewness model, I find thesubjects in this task are variance-averse and positive-skew-seeking. Positive skew-seekingmanifests when participants excessively opt for the sure rather than risky option even withlow targets (where the chance of failing to reach the target is small). This implies anattraction of small chances of above-average outcomes, and dislike of small-probabilitybelow-average outcomes.
As discussed in Chapter 4, previous investigations of risky decisions have segregated(chosen) risk and value-related activity in regions such as cingulate and insula cortices (risk)and ventral striatal and medial orbitofrontal areas (valuation) (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;
Table 5.5 Response to Integrated Utility: Anatomical locations of regions correlating with
the overall utility of choice on each trial. I report areas reaching a peak voxel-level
significance p≤0.001 and cluster size of >5 voxels only.
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Lee, 2005; Huettel et al., 2006; Rangel et al., 2008a). Finding separable areas of brain activityparametrically varying with the anticipated mean, variance and skewness of chosen actionsagain supports predictions from an MVS model, although unlike Chapter 4 here I cannotindependently vary these statistics (hence some of the expected value related activity Iobserve in ventral striatum, for example, could also be tracking positive skewness, althoughconversely the observed skewness-related activity cannot reflect a tracking of expectedvalue).
5.4.1.1 Target level
The analysis includes a regressor accounting for the target (high/low), controlling for target-induced changes in attention, concentration, or effort, and means that OFC responses trackthe moments of the outcome distribution conditional upon target level. In effect, the mOFCBOLD signal tracks relative rather than absolute changes in expected value (as I did not seesimilar activity without controlling for target level). This suggests adaptive value-encoding,similar to findings from direct neuronal recordings in monkeys where a proportion of OFCneurons adapt to condition, manifesting similar ranges of response under different scales ofoutcomes (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009; Kobayashi and deCarvalho, 2010). This adaptation potentially can overcome the limited dynamic range of neuronal
signalling, implying that responses to expected value are integrated with information about the
target in generating action values.
5.4.1.2 Skewness
The skewness response identified comprises superior parietal and medial prefrontal cortex(a region overlapping with findings from Chapter 4), also shown to reflect subjective valuein tasks with stochastic outcomes (Peters and Buchel, 2009). It is unlikely that this simplyreflects cognitive demand or planning, as I see a parametric response even having separatelyaccounted for the target level. I detect a signal reflecting expected utility of each choice(incorporating the target, relative expected value, and risk), calculated as the subject-specificcombination of these statistical moments, also in medial prefrontal cortex. This locus ofactivity overlaps with areas where activity correlates with subjective utility (Daw et al.,2006). However, computations for sequential decision making, where outcomes arestochastic and forecast several trials into the future, are represented in a more anteriorlocation to that found when decision utilities represent deterministic outcomes from single-shot choices (Plassmann et al., 2007a).
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5.4.2 ACCOUNTING FOR FUTURE CHOICES
5.4.2.1 Dynamic consistency
The second question related to how individuals account for their possible future choiceswhen selecting actions. Behaviourally, I found individuals re-evaluate on each trial (ACV)rather than comparing choices to the risk-free alternative (SCV). Furthermore, neural activitydistinguished between behaviourally equivalent OCV and ACV models, with correlations ofkey variables from the latter rather than the former. However, classical dynamicprogramming models are based upon OCV, where decision-makers assume a specific optimalseries of future planned choices. These models insist upon dynamic consistency (choices areindependent of the order in which options are presented), and have been used to describechoice in computational (Sutton and Barto, 1998), ecological (Houston et al., 1988) andeconomic (Samuelson, 1969) settings. ACV implies that potential outcomes from a number ofstrategies influence current choice in the decision-making process (as ACV decision-makersassume future choices are made randomly).
5.4.2.2 Optimal strategic decision making
The likelihood that decision makers represent or weight outcomes of alternative strategiesrelates to the possibility that future actions may deviate from an optimal trajectory. This canbe either intentional (due to exploration or future constraints on available choices) or byaccident (lapses or mistakes). In reality, we are unlikely to follow a predetermined path inour strategic decisions. If we ignored alternative outcomes altogether, then deviations froman optimal strategy would lead to unpredicted and possibly far worse outcomes thanoriginally envisaged. Indeed, there is good evidence that weighting of even potentiallyirrelevant alternative outcomes plays a role in paradoxes of choice (Allais, 1953; Loomes andSugden, 1982; Birnbaum, 2008), with counterfactual outcomes being represented inprefrontal cortex (Ursu and Carter, 2005) and striatum (Lohrenz et al., 2007). An alternativereason why an ‘average plan’ rather than an optimal strategy might be employed is becauseof additional mental effort required in planning future actions. Predicted outcomes couldinstead be sampled from the whole range of possible alternatives to build up an averagepicture of what might transpire given current choice. It is possible that the ACV strategy infact represents the Bayes optimal policy under constraints of bounded rationality. In otherwords, if there was a bound or limit to the depth of the decision tree that could be processed,
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ACV might capture this limitation better than OCV. ACV far outperforms random choice,which would be an alternative best heuristic if decision-makers were completely ignorant offuture options. Instead, ACV explicitly models the assumption that all future options areknown, but that despite this the decision-maker does not have a specific plan of their futurechoices.
5.4.2.3 Weighting alternative outcomes
Although using a fixed strategy model is possible in the task, it is likely to dramatically fail insituations where an individual errs or if some planned alternatives are no longer available.An ACV decision-maker considering all possible future outcomes is myopic (i.e. does notdeterministically plan choices in advance). However, such a decision-maker can mitigatefuture errors or constraints by weighting all possible action-outcome combinations, enablingrecovery from error by selecting the best set of remaining choices without needing to assumea fixed strategy. In other words, it makes sense dynamic programming should account for adecision-maker’s awareness that deviations from a specific policy may occur in the future.One method of implementing this is to optimise the average continuation value. ACV can alsopartly capture decision processes where a proportion of (but not necessarily all) possibleoutcomes in a decision-tree are considered – in other words, a mixture between ACV andOCV models. Thus a more informed version of the ACV model might weight strategiesaccording to the proportion of time that they are expected to be chosen either according toprevious experience (i.e. a learning model), or based on a rational expectations model similarto quantal response equilibria (QRE) models of choice (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998) (theasymptotic case where subjects are assumed to make trial-by-trial choices knowing theiroverall response and error distribution).
I therefore further tested a QRE model, implementing this by calculating for each subjecttheir response distribution from actual trial-by-trial choices for the whole experiment. I thenused this response distribution to calculate decision weights for each choice. The new QREcontinuation value model then used these decision weights rather than either a uniformdistribution (ACV) or deterministic choice (OCV).
The results from this new model gave an average optimized criterion value of 6.6 (comparedto the ACV model value of 6.3). On a subject by subject comparison, the new model gave alower (better) criterion value in 7 subjects, worse in 7 subjects, and almost equivalent in 2subjects.
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Thus, the new ‘weighted-average’ continuation value model was virtually equivalent to theold average continuation value model on direct comparison for the group. In most subjects(12/16), the new model gave criterion values between those obtained for the ACV and OCVmodels, consistent with the expectation that this model is a hybrid between these twomodels. For 4 subjects the least-squares error (i.e. criterion function) was less than for allother models. Most often, the results were broadly similar to the ACV model. Also, theestimated parameters of this weighted average model were very similar to those estimatedby the old ACV model (new model, average variance parameter = 0.22; average skewnessparameter = 1.26 x 10-3), probably due to the average model approximating the weightedaverage model. The similarity between the QRE and ACV models suggests that the ACV modelwell approximates the evaluation process by assuming equal weighting of all strategies. It isan important avenue for future work to distinguish if certain strategies are indeed moreheavily weighted, and if this weighting distribution is implicit or learnt.
5.4.3 PROSPECTIVE EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES - CONCLUSION
I necessarily test the joint hypothesis (that both MVS and ACV models are true), because thecontinuation value models are coupled to a valuation model. Thus while the neural datasupport ACV over OCV contingent upon MVS, it is possible that this could be bettered by acombination with an alternative utility model. I cannot draw direct statistical comparisonsbetween utility models in the current framework (as the models are non-nested withdifferent numbers of parameters), and these further model variants remain to be tested infuture work. It is possible that I do not see neural responses corresponding to an OCV modeleven in individuals who actually do follow this strategy purely because there is norequirement for a trial-by-trial tracking of the outcome distribution if you have pre-planneda trajectory of choices. However, the fact that we see responses corresponding to the ACVmodel suggests, that at least in some subjects, these average continuation values are beingcontinuously tracked and re-evaluated.
The design assumes a fixed best-fitting strategy across subjects, and cannot rule out variationin strategies both between and within-subjects (i.e. switching strategies through theexperimental session). However, such heterogeneity would have the effect of obscuring theability to differentiate between models. Rather than conforming to standard models ofsequential decision-making, these data suggest that a set of possible strategies are neurallyrepresented and drive choices. More generally, these findings indicate that strategic
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outcomes are evaluated by similar neural metrics as in single-shot choice, where abehavioural preference for higher-order features of outcome distributions is mirrored byneural sensitivity to expected value, variance and skewness.
155
6.1 INTRODUCTION
6.1.1 RISK PREFERENCE AND REFERENCE POINTS
Prospect Theory, one of the most influential descriptive theories of decision-making underrisk, emphasises that risk-attitude in humans is reference-dependent (Kahneman andTversky, 1979). When choosing between options yielding gains, humans are on averagerisk-averse (i.e. avoiding options with a higher uncertainty or variance), while whenchoosing between options yielding losses below a reference point, humans make riskierchoices. This finding is paralleled by observations in animals, where a pervasive sensitivityto risk is systematically influenced by a metabolic reference point (Real et al., 1982; Barnardand Brown, 1985; Wunderle et al., 1987; Croy and Hughes, 1991; Kacelnik and Bateson,1996). For example, animals become more risk-seeking following a reduction in energylevels by fasting, or increase in basal energy requirements through change in ambienttemperature (Caraco, 1981; Caraco et al., 1990).
6.1.2 NEURAL REGULATION OF FOOD INTAKE
Circulating hormones report the status of body energy reserves (e.g. adipose tissue), energyrequirements, and acute nutrient intake to targets in the central nervous system thatregulate feeding behaviour. Much early work focused on the homeostatic pathwayinfluencing the hypothalamus (Morton et al., 2006; Lenard and Berthoud, 2008), howevermore recently there has been an increasing realisation that these signals can act directly on
HE EFFECT OF METABOLIC STATE ON DECISION
MAKING UNDER RISK
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brainstem, limbic and prefrontal regions (via the so-called ‘non-homeostatic’ pathway),including brain regions implicated in human decision-making (Grill and Kaplan, 2002;Krügel et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2006; Figlewicz et al., 2007; Chaudhri et al., 2008). Thereis therefore a potential for changes in metabolic state, and induced changes in hormonelevels, to directly influence decisions in the economic domain.
Here, I sought to characterise whether changes in metabolic state systematically influencehuman risk-attitude in financial decisions. Do we observe consistent changes in risk-preference in the economic domain after feeding (i.e. a transfer of effect from the metabolicto the cognitive domain)? Hormones including oxytocin and testosterone levels have beenshown to have an influence on economic behaviour (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Apicella et al.,2008). However, physiological state-dependent influences play no part in traditionaleconomic theory, in contrast to ecological theory with its emphasis on a dependence offoraging behaviour on metabolic state (Houston and McNamara, 1999).
6.1.3 RISK SENSITIVE FORAGING THEORY
Stephens suggested that when an animal chooses between two foraging options givingnormally-distributed energetic returns with equal means but different variance, anorganism aiming to maximise ‘fitness’ (i.e. survival probability) prefers safer (lowervariance) options when above a metabolic reference point (e.g. energetic requirement overthe day) but riskier (higher variance) options when below a metabolic reference point(Stephens, 1981). Alternative models predict that risk-preference will dynamically adjustdepending upon metabolic state, energy reserves, and intake rate (Houston and McNamara,1982; McNamara, 1992). If energy intake rate is below a reference point, this inducesgreater risk-seeking. Above a reference point, there is a change toward greater risk-aversion. The metabolic reference point is often taken in ecology as the intake rate requiredto reach a survival threshold, but in principle can be any homeostatic marker. These modelsalso predict that baseline risk-attitude will depend upon baseline energy reserves, withincreased baseline risk-aversion as energy reserves exceed a threshold. Finally, at repletion,marginal changes in energy are not predicted to have significant impact on ecologicalfitness, and organisms will become insensitive to risk (risk-neutral). This relationshipbetween energy intake, energy reserves, and attitude toward risk closely mirrors Prospect
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Theory’s account of the relationship between risk-attitude for money, economic referencepoints, and the effect of changes in wealth (see Figure 6.1 for illustration). Indeed, a directlink between these conceptual frameworks from psychology and ecology is suggested byobservations that human monetary decisions under risk are systematically influenced by an‘earnings budget’ (i.e. an experimental manipulation of the reference point) (Pietras et al.,2008).
6.1.4 AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
I tested risky decision-making in healthy men over three sessions, one week apart, using awithin-subjects randomised design. I employed a controlled feeding manipulation, and
Figure 6.1 Schematic of risk-attitude changes in relation to a reference point (either for
money or for food/energy). Risk-attitude equates to the curvature of this relationship.
Below reference point, risk-seeking behaviour is seen. Near the reference point,
decisions are risk-neutral (insensitive to risk). As energy or wealth increases,
increasing risk-aversion is seen. At very high levels (e.g. repletion or satiation), this
relation saturates and we again see risk-neutral behaviour.
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assayed the same individual’s decision-making preferences across different metabolicstates; post-14 hr fast, immediately following and one hour post-ingestion of a 2066 kcalmeal. I assessed the effect of the feeding paradigm on subjective measures of appetite aswell as circulating levels of acyl-ghrelin, with percentage body fat and circulating leptinlevels providing an assay of energy reserves.
Leptin is a peptide hormone produced by fat cells, which modulates satiety and indexesadiposity (Seeley and Woods, 2003). Leptin provides negative feedback to hypothalamiccentres to help maintain energy homeostasis (Morton et al., 2006), but also has been shownto influence feeding behaviour and food preference (Figlewicz et al., 2007), acting forexample on ventral tegmetal area neurons to reduce spiking rate (Fulton et al., 2006).
Prandial suppression of circulating acyl-ghrelin, the primary centrally-acting orexigenichormone, is a humoral signal of acute nutrient intake highly sensitive to short-term changesin metabolic state, correlating with subjective indices of hunger (Cummings, 2006). Ghrelinis secreted by the stomach, and entrains to a diurnal rhythm, peaking prior to meals (Mulleret al., 2002). Post-prandial suppression of plasma ghrelin is proportional to calorific load(Callahan et al., 2004), and also acts as a modulator on hypothalamic and brainstemdopaminergic neurons to enhance firing rate (Palmiter, 2007).
I predicted that individuals making monetary decisions would become more risk-averseafter feeding if the meal had a larger impact on metabolic state (i.e. a larger fall in ghrelin).This effect should only occur at the time when ghrelin levels fall, as there is a time-lagbefore the calorific impact of a meal is registered in terms of changes in plasma hormoneconcentrations. I hypothesised that there might also be an immediate shift towards risk-neutrality due to satiation (a non-humoural, rapid effect), as ecological models predict ashift towards a risk-neutral attitude with repletion.
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6.2 METHODS
6.2.1 PARTICIPANTS
Twenty four, healthy, normal-weight, male volunteers were recruited (mean age: 257years; BMI: 22.61.7 kg/m2; Table 6.1). Subjects were weight-stable for three months priorto recruitment.
Age (yrs)
BMI
(kg/m2)
Body fat
(%)
Glucose
(mmol/L)22 24.5 14.0 4.920 22.2 12.5 4.922 20.7 10.5 4.532 21.2 11.0 5.220 24.7 16.5 4.920 21.6 12.5 4.525 21.2 11.5 4.822 22.8 13.0 4.722 20.3 8.5 4.822 20.4 9.5 4.727 25.0 16.0 4.722 20.3 10.0 4.921 21.9 15.5 4.622 23.1 15.0 4.923 25.0 14.5 4.534 24.8 19.0 4.546 23.3 11.5 5.120 22.9 12.0 4.8
One subject was excluded because of baseline fasting hyperglycaemia, another dropped outafter the first week, and three excluded because of technical problems. Thus, 19 subjects’data were included in the final behavioural analysis. From these, one subject hadhaemolysed blood samples for a relevant timepoint, which renders hormonal assayinaccurate, and is excluded from the endocrine analyses.
Table 6.1 Baseline anthropometric and glucose results for included subjects.
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Baseline measures of reward and food-related behaviour were normal (BIS: 17.3  2.8; BASdrive: 10.0  2.3; BAS reward responsiveness: 16.5  1.4; BAS fun seeking: 11.4  2.3; n =19). Volunteers provided informed consent and this study was approved by the UniversityCollege London Research Ethics Committee.
6.2.2 STUDY PROTOCOL
6.2.2.1 Prior to testing day
Participants attended a preliminary session, where anthropometric measurements weretaken (height with a stadiometer, weight and percentage body fat with Tanita scales (Tanita,Hoofdrrop, Netherlands), and subjects received verbal and written informationfamiliarizing them with the experimental procedure and visual analogue scores (VAS). VASassessed hunger, fullness, prospective food consumption, sickness and anxiety (Flint et al.,2000; Batterham, 2007), and were 100mm long with positive and negative text ratingsanchored at each end. The day before testing sessions, subjects followed a standardizationprotocol (Chandarana et al., 2009), involving refraining from alcohol and strenuous exerciseand consuming an 774 kcal meal between 19:30 and 20:30. Subjects then fasted and drankonly water until attending our clinical facility the following morning.
6.2.2.2 Testing day
On each study day subjects arrived at 9:00 and an ante-cubital arm vein was cannulated (t=-60 min) for subsequent blood sampling. After relaxing for one hour post-cannulation,baseline blood samples were taken and subjects completed visual analogue scores (VAS)(t=0 min). Blood samples were drawn and subjects completed VAS, every 30 minutes fromt=0 until t=210 min. At t=60 min subjects consumed a standardized 2066 kcal meal within30 mins (Figure 6.2).
6.2.2.2.1
Blood was collected into EDTA tubes containing 5000 kallikrein inhibitor unitsaprotonin (Bayer, Newbury, Berks, UK). Plasma was separated immediately bycentrifugation at 4 °C. Samples for analysis of acylof 1N hydrochloric acid (HCl) per ml and 4h80
For all assays samples were measured in duplicate. Fasting plasma leptin concentrationswere measured using a commercially available ELISA (Milliposamples were run on one plate and the sensitivity was 0.125 ng/ml and the intravariation 3.5%. Plasma acylradioimmunoassay (Millipore UK Ltd., Watford, UK). The assay sthe intra
6.2.2.2.2
Testing was undertaken in three different feeding states: fasted (t=0 to t=60immediately post
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min). Subjects performed one of three different decision-making tasks within each hour toensure that cognitive demand was the same throughout the experimental session. Each taskwas performed once in each week, in randomised order. These comprised a risk-preferenceelicitation task using paired lotteries, and two additional control tasks. Each task tookapproximately 30 +/-5 mins to complete. Importantly, behavioural measures werecorrelated with hormone levels and VAS from the nearest 30 min sampling point, ensuringthat assay titres corresponded with an accurate reflection of hormonal status whilstperforming the cognitive task.
6.2.3 PARADIGM
6.2.3.1 Risk preference paradigm
I employed a multiple paired lottery choice task, presenting a sequence of 200 pairedlotteries (Figure 6.3; Appendix B), with subjects required to select one preferred optionper pair (Hey and Orme, 1994). Lotteries were constructed by varying the probabilities oversix fixed monetary prizes (£0, £20, £40, £60, £80, £100), represented as four cards with oneof these amounts displayed upon each card. Thus, the probability of each prize could bevaried in 0.25 increments (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1). Each week, subjects were exposed to thesame set of lotteries. The left-right on-screen position of the lotteries, and position of the 4cards within each lottery were randomised, to ensure attention to the task, and to avoidresponse habituation. On debriefing, no subject reported realising that the lotterysequences were the same across the three weeks. The lottery list was constructed on theassumption that individuals are on average risk-averse – hence most offers were between asafer lottery with lower expected value (EV), and a riskier (higher variance) lottery withhigher EV, allowing us to maximise power for discriminating small but consistent state-dependent differences in risk-preference within-subjects while maintaining the samelottery set across subjects. Lotteries were presented on a laptop computer screen, andkeypress responses recorded using Cogent 2000 software (Wellcome Trust Centre forNeuroimaging, London).
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6.2.3.2 Control paradigms
I used two additional cognitive paradigms in each week, controlling for cognitive loadwithin each session. These comprised an intertemporal choice and a learning task. In theintertemporal choice task, subjects were required to make sequential choices betweendifferent amounts of money with different waiting times to payment. Subjects werepresented with 200 choice pairs on a computer screen; 180 were between a smaller amountof money sooner and a larger amount of money after a delay, with the remaining 20 trialsbeing the converse. Amounts ranged from £3-£100, and delays from 3 weeks-1 year. In thelearning task, subjects had to learn about the likelihood of being rewarded from a set of 8fractal stimuli, each giving 50p or 0p reward per trial with probability of either 0.8 or 0.2.This was repeated with a new set of fractal stimuli in week 2, and in week 3 subjects wereshown paired stimuli from the first two sessions and asked to pick their preferential option,
Figure 6.3 Risk preference task. A. On every trial, a choice between two lotteries was
presented on-screen, and subjects were required to select their preferred option from each
pair. Lotteries were represented as four cards, with a numerical display of one of six fixed
monetary prizes (£0, £20, £40, £60, £80, £100). Each card had an equal chance of being
picked. B. The same set of 200 sequential paired lotteries were presented on each visit.
Subjects had unlimited time to make a button-press response – the selected lottery was
then highlighted on screen with a blue border, before the next trial ensued. No feedback
was given about lottery outcomes during the task.
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with additional monetary reward generated according the probabilistic contingencies oftheir chosen stimuli. All tasks were of approximately the same duration (30+/-5 mins), andin intervening periods subjects were able to rest or read while remaining in the study room.
6.2.3.3 Payment
Payout was determined by a random lottery incentive mechanism, with one choice, selectedrandomly across all 3 weeks, played out for real to determine winnings. A similarmechanism was used for the intertemporal choice task, with a provision that one of eitherthe risk or the intertemporal choice task would be played out (chosen by random numbergeneration on a computer). Winnings from the risk preference task ranged from £0-80, inaddition to a baseline payment of £40/week for participation (generated from the rewardsaccrued in the cue learning task).
6.2.4 BEHAVIOURAL ANALYSIS
My primary measure was the percentage of riskier vs less risky choices made in each weekby every subject. Risk was quantified by the variance of lottery prizes about the mean value(Sharpe, 1964; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1971). This percentage measure provides anindication of any consistent changes between metabolic states across subjects. As the sets ofpaired lotteries are identical across subjects and sessions, any differences between statesreflect changes in decision criteria. I also implemented a logistic regression model toseparately analyse changes in sensitivity to EV and variance across states. This enabled usto describe changes in risk-return tradeoff, estimate absolute risk-preferences, and thedegree of choice noisiness. Statistical analysis was implemented in MATLAB (version 6.5,MathWork, Natick, MA), and SPSS (SPSS for Windows, Rel. 12.0.1. 2001. Chicago: SPSS Inc.).For one subject, an extended list of 360 paired lotteries was used for the first two sessions,and the reduced list of 200 lotteries used on session three. I excluded this subject whenanalysing choice percentages (as these will depend upon the set of choices), but includedthese data in model based analyses (as model parameter estimation is possible for eitherchoice set).
165
6.2.5 DECISION-MAKING MODEL
In addition to the summary percentage of risky choice, to obtain an absolute measure ofrisk-preference, I applied a mean-variance logistic regression model to each subject’schoices. This is formulated in an identical fashion to Chapter 4, to reiterate:
( 6.1 )where
( 6.2 )
Δσ2 is the difference in variance of the lotteries, Δμ is the difference in EV of the lotteries,and ρ is a free parameter (risk coefficient) that indicates the EV-risk trade-off for thatsubject. β is a free parameter indicating choice randomness, or sensitivity to the stimulusdimension (i.e. utility difference, ΔU).
Here the risk coefficient indicates the increase in mean value difference (in pounds sterling)required to offset a one [pound sterling]2 increment in variance difference of an option. Irestricted the analysis to this first order approximation of risk, as here the aim was simplyto quantify changes in percentage risky choice in monetary terms. This model partitionschoices into riskier/less risky choices and enables separate inferences regarding the noiseand risk-return parameters. Model parameters were estimated with maximum-likelihoodanalysis, again using a non-linear Nelder-Mead simplex search algorithm.
6.3 RESULTS
6.3.1 METABOLIC STATE MEASURES
The paradigm was effective at manipulating subjective ratings of hunger and inducingsignificant concurrent changes in acyl-ghrelin levels (Figure 6.4A).
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6.3.1.1 Hunger
There was a highly significant change in self-reported visual analogue scores (VAS) forhunger over the eight measured timepoints, before and after the meal, and across subjects(two-way repeated measures ANOVA (week, timepoint), main effect of timepoint: F(7,126)= 266, p<0.001). This effect was consistent across weeks (main effect of week: F(2,36) =0.75, p = 0.48), although there was highly significant heterogeneity in the effect of the mealbetween subjects (F(1,18) = 571, p<0.001). Hunger VAS increased from baseline toadministration of the meal (increase in hunger VAS from t = 0 to t = 60 min: 8.2  1.4, post-hoc contrast, t = 0 vs t = 60, F(1,18) = 36.9 , p <0.001), then fell immediately post-meal,reaching a nadir at t = 120 min (decrease in hunger VAS from t=0 to t=120 min: 52.0  2.4,post-hoc contrast, t = 0 vs t = 120, F(1,18) = 462, p <0.001).
6.3.1.2 Other visual analogue measures
There was a highly significant concomitant change in prospective food consumption ratingsover the course of each session (two-way repeated measures ANOVA (week, timepoint),main effect of timepoint: F(7,126) = 106, p<0.001; increase in prospective feeding VAS fromt = 0 to t = 60 min: 9  1.5, post-hoc contrast, t = 0 vs. t = 60, F(1,18) = 34.0, p <0.01;decrease in prospective feeding VAS from t = 0 to t = 120 min: 49.4  4.2, post-hoc contrast,t = 0 vs t = 120, F(1,18) = 137, p < 0.001; average correlation between acyl-ghrelin andprospective food consumption VAS: Pearson’s R = 0.76).
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6.3.1.3 Acyl-ghrelin changes
I calculated within-week changes in acyl-ghrelin from the t=0 min timepoint (Δ-ghrelin),which controls for small variations in fasting acyl-ghrelin levels between weeks, for each30-minute interval throughout a session. Differences in Δ-ghrelin between weeks,calculated from the end of the 30 min interval in which each subject performed the task(t=30/60 min; t=120/150 min; t=180/210 min), indicate the relative difference inorexigenic drive between the three timepoints at which subjects performed the risk task.
Meal consumption caused a significant drop in acyl-ghrelin levels (two-way repeated-measures ANOVA, main effect of timepoint: F(7,119) = 28.5, p <0.001), commensurate withthe change in hunger ratings (average correlation between mean ghrelin and mean hungerVAS: Pearson’s R = 0.79, see Figure 6.4A), which also peaked just before the meal (increasein plasma acyl-ghrelin from t = 0 to t = 60 min: 63.1  16.9 pmol/L, post-hoc contrast, t = 0vs t = 60, F(1,17) = 14.0, p = 0.02), falling to trough level at t = 120 min (decrease in plasmaacyl-ghrelin from t=0 to t=120 min: 98.7  16.5 pmol/L, post-hoc contrast, t = 0 vs t = 120,F(1,17) = 35.9, p < 0.001). There was highly significant variation in the effect of the meal onacyl-ghrelin level changes (between-subjects effect: F(1,17) = 110.5, p<0.001). However,there was no significant within-subjects difference in hormonal profiles across weeks (maineffect of week: F(34,2) = 0.50, p = 0.61), nor an interaction between week and timepoint(F(14,238) = 1.17, p = 0.30)
Acyl-ghrelin levels significantly differed from the fasted state across subjects in the specific30 min window when risk-preference was assessed, (one-way repeated measures ANOVA,F(2, 34) = 17.7, p<0.001). Pairwise comparisons reveal that this difference only becamesignificant one hour post-prandially (within-subjects contrasts: immediately post-eating vsfasted, F(1, 17) = 0.228, p = 0.64; one-hour post-eating vs fasted, F(1,17) = 16.09, p = 0.001).
6.3.2 EFFECT ON RISK-SENSITIVE CHOICE
Metabolic state significantly affected choice (one-way repeated-measures ANOVA, F(2,34)=3.22; p=0.05 (sphericity assumed, Mauchly’s W=0.86, p=0.30)), with a significant fall in
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risk-aversion immediately after eating (baseline fasted percentage risky choice = 37.4%,s.e.m. = 3.0; within-subject increase in risky choice just after meal = 2.8%, s.e.m. = 0.9%;F(1,17)=9.50, p=0.007; Figure 6.5 & Figure 6.6A). This overall difference was no longersignificant one hour post-feeding (F(1,17)=2.48, p=0.134). The difference between fastingand immediate post-meal was highly significant, irrespective of whether the lotteries wereclassified by variance (as above), standard deviation (paired t(17)=3.08, p=0.007),coefficient of variation (paired t(17)=3.04, p=0.007), or variance-to-mean ratio (pairedt(17)=3.00, p=0.008).
6.3.2.1 Baseline metabolic state measures
The immediate impact of nutrient intake on risky choice showed a dependence uponbaseline indices of body mass index (BMI), percentage body fat and circulating leptinconcentrations. Higher baseline leptin correlated with an increase in riskier choices (i.e. agreater fall in risk-aversion) immediately after eating compared to the fasted state(F(1,17)=4.75, p=0.046, r2=0.24; Figure 6.6B). There was also a significant linearrelationship between this change in risk attitude and both BMI (F(1,17)=4.74, p=0.046,r2=0.24), and percentage body fat (F(1,17)=3.71, p=0.073, r2=0.20).
6.3.2.2 Change in metabolic state
The effect of the meal one hour post-feeding (measured by Δ-ghrelin, the within-weekchange in acyl-ghrelin from t=0 min), significantly correlated with difference in risk attitudecompared to baseline (F(1,17)=6.56, p=0.022, r2=0.22; Figure 6.4B). Greater prandialsuppression of acyl-ghrelin concentrations, reflecting a larger impact of the meal onreducing a signal of hunger, led to a shift towards less risky choices. By contrast, a smalleffect correlated with a shift towards more risky choices. Crucially, this effect was onlyevident an hour after feeding once ghrelin levels had fallen (i.e. once the calorific impact ofthe meal had registered) (fasting vs just after eating: F(1,17)=0.17; p=0.69).
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6.3.2.3 Further leptin analyses
As leptin is produced by adipose tissue, one can expect a correlation between body fat andleptin levels, while BMI can be affected additionally by lean (muscle) mass. There wassignificant positive correlation between circulating plasma leptin concentrations and thebody fat percentage measure (Pearson R = 0.55, p = 0.01, one-tailed), and a trend toward acorrelation of BMI and leptin levels in the participants (Pearson R = 0.37, p = 0.06, one-tailed). There was also highly significant correlation between BMI and body fat percentage(Pearson R = 0.83, p <0.001). Given this, the addition of BMI to leptin as a predictive variablein a multiple linear regression explained an extra 9% variance in the change in risk attitude,although this was not significant (r2 change = 0.09, p = 0.20), while the addition of body fatpercentage did not contribute further due to colinearity (r2 change < 0.01, p = 0.78). Therewas no correlation between baseline acyl-ghrelin and leptin levels (p = 0.15). Additionally,there was no correlation between leptin, body mass index, or body fat percentage and meanrisk attitude across session (p>0.6 for all correlations).
The absence of a significant interaction between the baseline effect of leptin and the effect ofan acyl-ghrelin change on risk aversion (2-way categorical ANOVA, leptin x acyl-ghrelin:F(1,13) = 0.88, p = 0.36), may indicate separate effects at different timescales (immediate vsdelayed effect of feeding), although this sample is not powered to detect this interactiongiven that all the subjects were of normal weight.
6.3.3 DECISION-MAKING MODEL
To quantify changes in risk-sensitivity, and demonstrate a selective effect of metabolic stateon risk attitude, I fit individual subject behaviour to an economic decision-making model (seeMethods). Risk significantly influenced choice over and above EV, as the full model withmean and variance terms was greatly superior to a reduced model based upon EV alone
(likelihood ratio test, mean χ2(1)=58, p<0.001). Subjects were all risk-averse at baseline(mean risk coefficient=1.26 x 10-2; std=0.96 x 10-2). The risk coefficient decreasedsignificantly (indicating reduced risk-aversion) between fasting and one hour post-feeding(paired t(18)=2.15; p=0.039, one-tailed). I saw no difference in choice randomness in anystate (fasted vs just fed: paired t(18)=0.94, p=0.35; fasted vs 1 hr: paired t(18)=0.18, p=0.86),indicating that feeding does not make choices more ‘noisy’. Change in risk coefficient across
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states significantly correlated with hormonal indices of baseline metabolic state and themeal-effect on hunger.
Confirming my initial analysis, leptin correlated with reduced risk-aversion immediatelyafter eating compared to the fasted state (F(1,18)=5.90, p=0.027, r2=0.27). I also observed asignificant correlation between this change in risk attitude and percentage body fat(F(1,18)=4.59, p=0.048, r2=0.22), and a trend in relation to BMI (F(1,18)=4.23, p=0.057,r2=0.21). Prandial suppression of acyl-ghrelin (t=0 min to one hour post-feeding) correlatedwith a difference in the risk coefficient compared to baseline (F(1,18)=6.62, p=0.020,r2=0.29). Translating this effect size into financial terms indicates that, when fasted, subjectsare predicted to be indifferent between a 50:50 gamble of winning £30 or £0, and a sureamount of £8.45, giving a risk premium of £15-£8.64=£6.55 . Immediately after eating, forthe same gamble, subjects are now indifferent to a sure amount of £9.40, a risk-premium of£5.50. Quantitatively, this indicates a decrease of £0.95 in risk premium for this lottery afterfeeding.
6.4 DISCUSSION
6.4.1 EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN METABOLIC STATE ON RISK PREFERENCE
Changes in metabolic state systematically altered economic decision making. Individualsbecame more risk-averse with a greater post-prandial fall in acyl-ghrelin (i.e. larger signal ofnutrient intake). A smaller effect, indicating a lower than anticipated impact of the meal,correlated with greater risk-seeking. This effect was only present an hour after eating, onceghrelin levels changed. This observation of an homeostatic dependence of choice uponmetabolic state is consistent with ecological perspectives on risk (McNamara, 1992),however a transfer of effect from the metabolic to the monetary domain has not beendemonstrated previously. Importantly, these effects are therefore independent of baseline(economic) risk-attitude.
A direct comparison can be made with Prospect Theory, where changes in wealth below areference point induce risk-seeking behaviour, while earnings above a reference point leadto risk-aversion behaviour (Pietras and Hackenberg, 2001). Critically, this suggests thatchanges in acyl-ghrelin signal the effects of a caloric load (i.e. calorie intake rate) that arerelative, or adapted to, metabolic requirements. In other words, the degree to which acyl-
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ghrelin changes after a meal could act as a hormonal signal for the adequacy of the currentrate of calorific intake, and act centrally to modify behaviour. Mechanistically, ghrelin-receptors are expressed in neurons in hypothalamus, ventral tegmental area, and substantianigra, which project to dopaminoceptive regions implicated in economic decision makingunder risk in humans (Zigman et al., 2006). These include amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex,regions implicated in reference-dependent valuation of losses and gains and the framingeffect (De Martino et al., 2006; De Martino et al., 2009).
6.4.2 IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF EATING ON RISK PREFERENCE
We also see an immediate effect of a calorific load, with a fall in risk-aversion dependentupon baseline leptin levels. This immediate, rapid impact of the meal cannot be mediated byhormonal changes, and instead must be induced through non-hormonal mechanisms. Thereare a number of possible explanations, one being that when food becomes available after aperiod of starvation or hunger, there is a drive to harvest food, which in nature often entailsincreased risk-taking.
It is also possible to explain the effect directly in terms of reference point effects on riskaversion via changes in the shape of an implicit utility function. The immediate impact of themeal induces satiation, where further calorific intake is assessed to carry mimimal additionalvalue. This in itself induces risk-neutral behaviour. The predicted degree and direction of
change in risk aversion depends upon baseline energy reserves. At reserve levels close to thereference point there is baseline risk-neutral behaviour (for food). As baseline energyreserves rise above the reference point, the status quo is risk-aversion, because therelationship between fitness and energy is more concave (see Figure 6.1 for schematicillustration). As observed, there is hardly any change in risk-aversion at lower energyreserves (adiposity), but a fall in risk-aversion if energy reserves are higher. Consistent withprevious findings, adiposity is not correlated with baseline risk-attitude for money(Rasmussen et al., 2009). Instead, we find that it predicts change in risk-attitude from thefasted state to immediately after eating.
This effect occurs before the impact of the calorie load is perceived. Once the energeticimpact of the meal registers as a change in ghrelin levels, the shift in risk-attitude is linked toendocrine feedback. The magnitude of these effects for an individual will depend upon anumber of factors, in particular the precise shape of the relationship between the utility of
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food and baseline energy reserves in different metabolic states, which is also likely to besubject to considerable inter-individual variation.
6.4.3 EFFECTS OF EXTREME METABOLIC STATES
Prandial ghrelin suppression is reduced in obesity (English et al., 2002). Thus, one predictsgreater risk-seeking in obese individuals following feeding, augmented by larger immediatepost-prandial effects on risk-taking due to higher baseline adiposity. This mechanism mayunderpin a component of the aberrant decision-making seen in obese individuals, includingimpulsivity and reward-seeking behaviour (Nasser et al., 2004; Nederkoorn et al., 2006). Onealso predicts profound effects on decision-making for individuals operating at very lowbaseline energy reserves, and note such an explanation has been invoked to explainincreased impulsivity in anorexia nervosa (Fessler, 2002). Finally, it is of interest thatmanipulations affecting hormonal responses to feeding, such as dieting (where circulatingacyl-ghrelin increases), or bariatric surgery, may well have cognitive effects, including effectson decision making, beyond the metabolic domain (Cummings et al., 2002).
6.4.4 CONCLUSION
This demonstration that metabolic state influences human risky economic decisions ispredicted by biological models accounting for metabolic reference points, but not bynormative economic theory. It is tempting to speculate that maladaptive decision making inaberrant metabolic states may arise out hard-wired imperatives driving strategic decision-making adapted to deal with feeding decisions within a normal biological range. In thecontext of our study, biology would seem to inform economic theory, not only in providingexplanations of psychological phenomena such as loss aversion, but also in highlightingsubstantive effects of state changes on economic decisions, perhaps reflecting sharedevolutionarily conserved neurobiological mechanisms.
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7.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 4 and 5, I identified a network of brain regions involved in processing andintegrating risk with personal preferences, findings commensurate with previous studies(McCoy and Platt, 2005; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Christopoulos et al.,2009). In addition choice, conceived as one’s personal trade-off between risk and reward, canbe dynamically altered, both by exogenous targets or goals (c.f. Chapter 5), or endogenouschanges in state (c.f. Chapter 6). As discussed in Chapter 2, systemic neuromodulatoryinfluences are one potential mechanism mediating preference and changes in preferences.
7.1.1 NEUROMODULATORS AND DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK
Several neuromodulatory transmitters are purported to play a role in risky decision-making,including dopamine, serotonin, and noradrenaline (Rogers et al., 2003; Rogers et al., 2004;Long et al., 2009; Zeeb et al., 2009). Often, several decision-making processes are conflated inthese assessments, with risk, impulsivity, learning, and novelty-seeking all potentially beinginfluenced by pharmacological modulation. An economic approach offers a more accurateway of distinguishing pure effects on risk, where risk can be explicitly defined by thesummary statistics of a distribution of outcomes. Monetary decision-making tasks wherechoices are made between actions with different distributions of outcomes thus permit anassessment of risk-reward trade-offs independent of other effects such as delay-discountingor exploration.
FFECTS OF DOPAMINE ON DECISION MAKING
UNDER RISK
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7.1.1.1 Dopamine
Several lines of evidence suggest that the dopaminergic system plays a central role indecision-making under risk. A number of neuroimaging studies have found that dopaminerich regions (including striatum, orbitofrontal cortex and anterior insula) are involved in therepresentation of risk and execution of risk-taking choices (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;Abler et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007). Additionally, single-unitrecording studies have shown that the tonic firing rates of dopaminergic midbrain neuronsscale with uncertainty in risk-based decision-making tasks in primates (Fiorillo et al., 2003),although there is debate about whether this signal in fact represents prediction errors duringlearning (Fiorillo et al., 2005; Niv et al., 2005), a signal known to be dopaminergicallyencoded both at the time of reward receipt and following learning at the time of reward-predictive signals (Schultz et al., 1997).
Clinically, Parkinson’s disease (PD), where nigro-striatal dopamine pathways areimpoverished, can be associated with disrupted decision-making (Cools et al., 2003; Torta etal., 2009). Dopamine agonists, used to treat this disease, can lead to impulse-controldisorders and cause pathological gambling behaviour as a psychological side-effect oftherapy, a side-effect reported with levodopa monotherapy (Molina et al., 2000; Gallagher etal., 2007), and amplified with both dopamine agonist and levodopa dual therapy (Imamura etal., 2006). Additionally, manipulation of dopamine levels in rats disrupts decision-makingunder uncertainty in foraging tasks. Administration of amphetamine (which augmentsdopamine release), D1-, or D2-receptor agonists can increase preference for a risky choice,and the effects of amphetamine can be abolished by dopamine receptor blockade (St Ongeand Floresco, 2008). This picture is mixed, with other studies reporting that amphetaminecan both increase and decrease risky choice in rats dependent on baseline preference(Kaminski and Ator, 2001), with some studies reporting no effect of dopamine augmentationtherapy on decision making in PD patients (Czernecki et al., 2002).
However, whether dopamine influences decision-making under risk in healthy humans hasnot been well established. The majority of studies have used tasks where continual rewardfeedback is given, either in the context of learning or in gambling tasks where risk is explicit.It is possible that part of dopamine’s influence relates to the response to reward feedbackrather than risk evaluation itself. Dopamine release is strongly associated with rewardfeedback and the anticipation of imminent reward (Tobler et al., 2005), with dopamineagonists systematically altering both choice and neural activity following better than average
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(i.e. unexpectedly good) rewards (Riba et al., 2008). Furthermore, reported performanceimpariments by dopaminergic depletion in tasks involving risk assessment, such as the IowaGambling Task (IGT) (Sevy et al., 2006), may equally be interpreted in terms of dopamine’srole in learning and the integration of evidence, rather than reflecting any objectiveassessment of the statistical risk inherent in a decision itself. Thus, the IGT recruitsnumerous processes involved in working memory, learning, set-shifting, attention as well asdecision-making, all of which are influenced by dopamine.
More generally, dopamine has been proposed to act as a generic neuromodulatory signalencoding precision or uncertainty (risk) of predictions, in terms of setting the post-synapticgain of error prediction units (Friston, 2010). Risk is thus an important computationalvariable in setting a learning rate, which can be construed as an expression of the precisionof predictions in hierarchical models, which subjects use to make sequential choices in anuncertain changing environment. There is therefore a direct link between theneuromodulatory effects of dopamine, risk and precision which may transcendreinforcement learning and value learning and may coherently explain the diverse gamut ofdopamine’s biological roles.
7.1.2 AIMS
Here I aimed to assess the effect of dopamine administration on decision-making under riskin healthy subjects performing two different economic gambling tasks. To test whetherdopamine influences the processing of (expected) reward, or of variance (uncertainty orspread of outcomes), or of relative gains and losses (skewness), I used a task where Iindependently manipulatde both expected value-variance and variance-skewness. Critically,we can distinguish in this paradigm between the effects of dopamine on decision processingfrom an effect on learning or due to feedback, as all choices are based on explicitpresentations of risky gambles (therefore no learning), and no feedback is given during thetask. Additionally, we can detect whether dopamine simply makes choices more random(which can often appear as a tendency towards risk-neutrality). By employing a randomised,double blinded, placebo controlled administration of L-dopa (which increases vesiculardopamine release in the central nervous system) (Pothos, 2002), I hypothesized a systematiceffect of dopamine augmentation upon individual’s risk-reward trade-off.
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7.2 METHODS
7.2.1 SETUP
The study was approved by the Institute of Neurology (University College London) EthicsCommittee. Forty healthy participants were recruited (14 male, 26 female; mean age 22.7, SD= 3.84 range = 18-33), and attended on two separate occasions one week apart. All subjectsgave full informed consent for participation. On each week, subjects received either a 100 mgdose of L-dopa (Madopar - levodopa/benserazide, 100/25mg, Roche) dissolved in fruitsquash or an indistinguishable fruit juice placebo, administered 50 minutes beforebehavioural testing to allow dopamine to reach peak plasma and neural concentration(Crevoisier et al., 1987). Stimuli were presented, and responses recorded, using Cogentpresentation software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London) written inMATLAB (version 6.5, MathWork, Natick, MA). The task was performed on a standard PC,and choices were indicated using a keyboard. I provided a 5-minute practice tutorial todemonstrate the paradigm. Data were analysed using MATLAB and SPSS (SPSS for Windows,Rel. 12.0.1. 2003. Chicago: SPSS Inc.).
7.2.2 PARADIGMS
To dissociate preferences for different components of risk, in terms of dispersion (variance)and asymmetry of outcomes (skewness), I implemented a very similar decision-making taskas used in Chapter 4, that controlled the distribution of outcomes to ensure that theexpected value, variance and skewness of a set of lotteries could be manipulatedindependently. Using this task, I then tested whether dopamine administration influencedthe impact of average return, uncertainty (spread of outcomes, measured as variance) orrelative loss and gain (asymmetry of outcomes, measured as skewness). On each trial,participants were required to choose (5s decision time) between taking a ‘sure’ (fixed)amount of money or electing to ‘gamble’ (choosing to play a lottery with a number ofpotential outcomes). All gambles were represented as 4-segment pie-charts (Figure 1). Twoseparate experiments were conducted, each with 20 subjects. Both were set-up identically,apart from the specific stimulus sets employed.
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Figure 7.1 Experimental Paradigm. A. The gambles were presented as in Chapter 4, with pie
charts divided into different segments showing possible monetary outcomes from the
lottery (in pounds sterling) where the angle subtended by each segment indicated the
probability of each outcome occurring. A negatively skewed gamble (left) and positively
skewed gamble (right) are again shown, with corresponding probability distributions below.
Here both example gambles have identical expected value (£6) variance (5£2), but opposite
skewness (+/-7.2£3). B. Each task consisted of 252 trials. For each trial, a pie chart was
shown, and after 5 seconds, a cue to respond appeared on screen (for 1 second). Subjects
indicated by a button press while the cue was on-screen if they wanted to gamble on the
lottery, or alternatively select a fixed, sure amount of money (of £4.50 throughout). At the
end of the experiment on their second visit, four trials were randomly selected and played
out for real. If subjects had elected to gamble, I resolved the lottery by an on-screen graphic
of a red ball spinning around the outside of the pie which stopped at a randomly selected
position.
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7.2.2.1 Experiment 1: Independent manipulation of expected value and variance
I constructed a stimulus set of 252 lotteries where expected value and variance wereindependent and varied over a range (Appendix C1). Expected value of the lotteries rangedfrom £3.25 to £8.00, while variance ranged from 0.47 to 24.05 £2. All stimuli were symmetric(i.e. had zero skewness). Stimuli were constrained to have 4 outcomes (segments of the piechart), with outcome probabilities varying in minimum 0.1 increments between 0 and 1 tomitigate against probability distortion effects at small probabilities. These restrictions allowthe generation of a space of possible lotteries varying in expected value and variance. EV andvariance were orthogonal by design (correlation coefficient: r = 0.07).
7.2.2.2 Experiment 2: Independent manipulation of variance and skewness
Here, I constructed a stimulus set of 252 lotteries where variance and skewness wereindependent and varied over a range (Appendix C2). Expected value of the lotteries wasconstant (£5.95 - £6.05). Variance ranged from 1.7 to 30.9 £2. Skewness ranged from -38.6 to38.6 £3. Variance and skewness were orthogonal (correlation coefficient: r <0.01). As inexperiment 1, stimuli were constrained to have 4 outcomes (segments of the pie chart), withoutcome probabilities varying in minimum 0.1 increments between 0 and 1.
7.2.3 AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
If dopamine solely impacts on the evaluation of anticipated (mean) reward, I would expect toobserve a shift in a risk-reward tradeoff in experiment 1 but not in experiment 2 whereexpected value is constant. Alternatively, if dopamine affects just the evaluation of relativelosses and gains in a gamble (which I operationalise here as skewness), then I would expectto observe an effect in experiment 2 alone. If dopamine affects the encoding of uncertainty(variance), I would expect effects in both experiment 1 and in experiment 2. The nullhypothesis is that dopamine does not influence risk-return tradeoffs, in which case I wouldnot expect to see a drug-dependent change in systematic tradeoffs between these decisionvariables.
On each occasion, the participant made decisions about the same set of 252 choices. Using adiverse spread of lotteries enables us to map out responses (choices) to stimuli representingan entire array of risk and value combinations. Consistent tradeoffs between differentdimensions of value, variance, and skewness can then be explored and tested by comparing
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the performance of different decision-making models where subjects express preferences foreach of these components. In addition, utilising a large range of possible gambles is akin topsychophysical methods (Pelli and Farell, 2009), and means that any specific biasesengendered by the configuration of a particular gamble will have a minor influence on anoverall decision making metric. On each occasion, choices were presented in a randomisedorder, and the orientation and ordering of pie chart segments was also randomised on eachtrial. Stimulus sets were constructed and the sure amount alternative was fixed at £4.50,such that participants would choose to gamble approximately 50% of the time on average(based on pilot studies). This meant that the stimulus sets had the greatest power todistinguish subtle effects on changes in EV-variance and variance-skewness tradeoffs.
7.2.4 PAYMENT
To ensure that subjects chose in accordance with their genuine preferences, payment wasincentive compatible. Four trials were selected randomly (two from participants’ firstsession and two from their second session) and played out for real at the end of the secondvisit. For each selected trial, if subjects chose the sure amount, they won £4.50, whereas ifthey elected to gamble, the lottery was resolved with an animated ‘roulette wheel’ graphic ofa red ball spinning around the pie chart, before coming to rest at a randomly selectedposition which determined their winnings from that trial. Winnings ranged from £20.00 to£42.50 (mean £32.23), including a baseline participation fee of £12.
7.2.5 PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONNAIRES
Participants completed two questionnaires assessing baseline attitudes to risk on firstattendance at the centre. These comprised the revised Domain Specific Risk-Taking scale(DOSPERT) (Weber et al., 2002), which assesses attitudes on two scales of risk-taking andrisk-perception in five domains of financial, health and safety, recreational, ethical and socialdecisions, and the Behavioural Inhibition System and Behavioural Activation System(BIS/BAS) (Carver and White, 1994), assessing individual differences in sensitivities onsubscales of drive, reward and fun seeking.
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7.2.6 BEHAVIOURAL MODELLING
For a given lottery with 4 potential outcomes (m1, m2,… mN), with probabilities p = p1, p2, …pn,I define the raw statistical moments similar to previous chapters, with ,, and .
I analysed choice data by fitting a linear mean-variance-skewness model (MVS) whereindividuals are allowed to express different preferences for variance and skewness. Toestablish whether individuals are indeed responding to risk, I test this MVS model against aseries of reduced models, where decisions are based on mean difference (M) alone (wheresubjects only take account of the difference between the sure amount and the expected valueof the gamble in selecting actions), a mean-variance model (MV), and a mean-skewness (MS)model. These utility functions are parameterised identically to those in Chapter 4; I refer thereader to this chapter.
I also test a further model able to account for different preferences for positive and negativeskewness (MVS2), again as previously implemented.
The models again use a logistic choice function, and reported parameters are the maximumlikelihood estimates, with an identical optimisation algorithm to previous chapters. Modelcomparison uses the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978).
7.3 RESULTS
7.3.1 BEHAVIOUR
7.3.1.1 Experiment 1: Expected value versus variance trade-off
Subjects distributed their choices between gamble and sure options throughout the course ofthe experiment, choosing to gamble in on average 43.1% (SD ± 17.23%) of trials on placebo,and 40.6% (SD ± 17.15%) on L-dopa. There was no significant difference between theseproportions (paired t-test, t19 = 1.20, p = 0.24) (Figure 7.2A). Even accounting for the effectof order in a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA (drug/placebo x drug week 1/drug week 2),there was no overall effect of drug administration (F1,9 = 0.05, p = 0.95), although the order
183
effect reached trend significance (F1,9 = 4.38, p = 0.06), with an average -5.7 +/- 8.0% changein percentage gambling from week 1 to week 2.
7.3.1.2 Experiment 2: Variance versus skewness trade-off
Here, subjects also distributed their choices between gamble and sure options throughoutthe course of this experiment, choosing to gamble in on average 47.8% (SD ± 19.5%) of trialson placebo, and 48.4% (SD ± 19.3%) on L-dopa. There was no significant difference betweenthese proportions (paired t-test, t19 = 0.15, p = 0.88) (Figure 7.2B). As above, I also entereddata into a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, which confirmed no overall effect of drugadministration (F1,9 = 0.03, p = 0.87), although the order effect again approached significance(F1,9 = 3.83, p = 0.07), with an average -8.1 +/- 17.9% change in percentage gambling fromweek 1 to week 2.
I further examined for any effects on risk in specific sub-domains (e.g. only for positivelyskewed gambles with a small chance of high rewards). Choice data were partitioned into 4domains - high/low variance and positive/negative skewness decisions - and entered into arepeated measures ANOVA. This again revealed no significant effect of drug (F1,9 = 0.01, p =0.91), with no significant interaction between drug and domain (F3,9 = 0.11, p = 0.96).
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7.3.1.3 Reaction time
For analysis, reaction times (RT = time from stimulus presentation to keypress response)were normalised by an inverse transformation (response speed = 1/RT). There was nosignificant difference in response speed between placebo and L-dopa, either in Experiment 1(t19 = 0.644, p = 0.528), or in Experiment 2 (t19 = 1.334, p = 0.198).
7.3.1.4 Correlation with questionnaire measures of risk attitudes
Baseline measures of risk-taking were taken from all participants using the BehaviouralInhibition/ Behavioural activation scales (BIS/BAS) and Domain Specific Risk-Taking(DOSPERT) scale. We asked whether sensitivity to drug-induced changes in risk attitude
Figure 7.2 Behavioural results. On left, scatterplots of percentage gambling choices on
levodopa and placebo (n=20). On right, percentage differences in gambling choice between
placebo and levodopa conditions plotted per subject with average effect size (ns = non-
significant, error bars show standard error). A. Experiment 1 – Expected value – variance
manipulation. B Experiment 2 – Variance – skewness manipulation.
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were dependent on these measures. No significant correlations were found with either ofthese scores.
7.3.2 BEHAVIOURAL MODELLING
I also performed a model-based analysis of participants’ choices, where I estimatedparameters for variance- and skewness-aversion from an economic decision model. Thismodel based analysis was designed to test whether subjects’ made consistent choices,trading risk and reward in a coherent manner (as opposed to being insensitive to risk). Alack of drug effect could be purely due to a baseline indifference to risk in these subjects.Secondly, parameters estimated from a behavioural model have greater sensitivity to detectsmall systematic changes in risk-preferences that a simple summary analysis of percentagegambling. Thirdly, I could test specific behavioural hypotheses by comparing theperformance of different models in explaining the data. Dopamine may induce a change inrisk-preference (i.e. the trade-off between risk and potential reward) or may simply induce ageneral bias in choice that leads to an increased predilection for gambling, without alteringrisk-sensitivity. Finally, I can also test whether dopamine significantly changed choicerandomness or noise as I explicitly model this as a free parameter that determines the slopeof the logistic (softmax) function.
7.3.2.1 Sensitivity to risk
I independently manipulated variance and skewness, and predicted that individuals’preferences would be sensitive to both aspects of risk. To test this, I compared a set ofmodels which predict choice on the basis of either the mean value of sure vs lottery optionsalone (model M, risk-insensitive), the mean and lottery variance (model MV), and forexperiment 2, the mean variance and skewness (model MVS).
Risk-sensitive models far outperformed the risk-insensitive model, demonstrating thatsubjects’ choices were significantly influenced by decision risk (Figure 7.3A). Moreover, the
MVS model was superior to the MV model in predicting choice in experiment 2 (Figure
7.3B), showing that individuals are influenced by both risk dimensions of variance andskewness (experiment 1: BICM = 11827, BICMV = 5964, MV model posterior probability>0.99(very strong evidence in favour of MV model); experiment 2: BICM = 12999, BICMV = 8708,
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BICMVS = 8352, MVS model posterior probability>0.99 (very strong evidence in favour of MVSmodel)).
I estimated parameters corresponding to tastes for these 2 independent risk domains,
variance (ρ) and skewness (λ), as well as choice randomness (β), for each subject and each condition (drug/placebo) independently. I entered individually estimated parameters intogroup-level analysis to test for differences. Participants were on average averse to variance
in both experiment 1 (ρPLACEBO = -0.13, SD +/- 0.08; ρLDOPA = -0.15, SD +/- 0.10) and
experiment 2 (ρPLACEBO = -0.11, SD +/- 0.07; ρLDOPA = -0.12, SD +/- 0.10), and preferred
positively skewed lotteries (λPLACEBO = 0.0039, SD +/- 0.0253; λLDOPA = 0.0011, SD +/- 0.0169).While 19/20 subjects here were variance averse, skew preferences were heterogeneous,with 8/20 positive skew-seeking individuals (on placebo). β values were low (experiment 1:
βPLACEBO = 0.52 SD +/- 0.17, βLDOPA = 0.49 SD +/- 0.13; experiment 2: βPLACEBO = 0.53 SD +/-0.18, βLDOPA = 0.53 SD +/- 0.24), indicating that choices were well partitioned by thebehavioural models and that choice noise was low.
7.3.2.2 Drug-induced changes in preference
There were no significant differences in ρ, λ, or β parameters between drug and placebo sessions, either in experiment 1 (paired t-tests, ρ: t19 = 1.63, p = 0.12; β: t19 = 0.35, p = 0.96;
Figure 7.3C) or in experiment 2 (paired t-tests, ρ: t19 = 0.29, p = 0.78; λ: t19 = 0.62, p = 0.54; β:t19 = 0.01, p = 0.99, Figure 7.3D). This indicates that L-dopa had no effect on altering risk-return tradeoffs, either in terms of the impact of uncertainty or spread of outcomes, or onrelative losses and gains. Moreover, there was no effect on choice randomness – choices wereequally noisy in both sessions.
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Finally, I checked for evidence of skewness intransitivity in experiment 2 by fitting adifferent model (MVS2) where subjects can express different sensitivities for positive andnegatively skewed lotteries. If individuals prefer or dislike both positive and negative skew,this will not be well captured by the MVS model, hence lowering the power to detect drug-induced changes in preference. Indeed, the MVS2 model was significantly better than thesimpler MVS model at explaining choice, even accounting for its extra parameter
Figure 7.3 Behavioural modelling. A. Experiment 1: Log-evidence, approximated by the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC), for mean only (M) and mean-variance (MV) models.
Fixed effects analysis of Group Bayes Factors shows MV highly significantly superior to M
model (likelihood ratio test: p<10-5). B. Experiment 2: BIC scores for mean-variance (MV)
and mean-variance-skewness (MVS) models. MVS highly significantly superior to MV model
(likelihood ratio test: p<10-5). BIC=k.ln(n) – 2ln(L), where L is the model likelihood, n is the
number of observations and k is the number of free parameters. Lower BIC indicates better
model fit. C. Experiment 1: Differences in (standardised) model parameters for choice noise
(β) and variance preference (ρ) between placebo and levodopa sessions. Error bars show
standard deviation. D. Experiment 2: Differences in (standardised) model parameters for
choice noise (β), variance (ρ), and skewness (λ) preference between placebo and levodopa 
sessions. Error bars show standard deviation.
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(BICMVS=8352, BICMVS2=7914), and revealed that 9/20 participants disliked both positive andnegative skew compared to symmetric gambles, while 3/20 preferred both positive andnegative skew. However, even in this more sensitive model, I detected no difference in
preference (or choice noise) between drug and placebo (average parameter values: ρPLACEBO =-0.12, SD +/- 0.08, ρLDOPA = -0.12, SD +/- 0.10; λ+PLACEBO = 0.0052, SD +/- 0.0207; λ+LDOPA =0.0073, SD +/- 0.0246; λ-PLACEBO = -0.0027, SD +/- 0.0241; λ-LDOPA = -0.0002, SD +/- 0.0339;
βPLACEBO = 0.55 SD +/- 0.23, βLDOPA = 0.53 SD +/- 0.23. Paired t-tests, ρ: t19 = 0.21, p = 0.84; λ+:t19 = 0.50, p = 0.62; λ-: t19 = 0.35, p = 0.73; β: t19 = 0.30, p = 0.77).
7.4 DISCUSSION
Here, I explored the effect of L-dopa administration on evaluation of different aspects of risk,and the impact on decision making, in healthy humans. To control for possible drug-inducedchanges in learning and response to reward, the paradigm was specifically designed toisolate effects on risk evaluation. Moreover, by using an economic task and behaviouralmodelling, I could empirically quantify changes in risk preferences.
7.4.1 RISK SENSITIVITY
All subjects were clearly sensitive to risk, being generally averse to increasing variance(spread of outcomes), and with a range of preferences for skewed gambles (asymmetricaldistribution of outcomes). The behavioural modelling revealed the importance of both ofthese risk dimensions, as simpler models based only on the average anticipated reward(expected value) failed to explain behaviour as well as the MV and MVS models. Crucially, Ifind that L-dopa administration does not affect preferences for either variance or forskewness. Moreover, the fact that I observe no changes in experiment 1 means that neitheraverage value, variance, or the trade-off between them is influenced by L-dopa.
This paradigm substantially differs from previous psychopharmacological studies of risk, ashere I assess choice preferences for independent statistical features of a distribution ofoutcomes. This economic quantification of risk preference lends power and precision overprevious diverse paradigms that have been used to assess risk-taking (e.g. Cups task (Levinet al., 2007), Game of Dice Task (Brand et al., 2005), Risk Task (Rogers et al., 1999)). In thesetasks risk is explicitly described for participants, as opposed to less specific alternatives suchas the IGT and Ballon Analogue Risk Task (BART) (Lejuez et al., 2002), where participants
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are uncertain about the real probability of rewards. Summary measures of percentagegambling are used to delineate risk-taking, however these measures are specific to the set ofstimuli used - stimulus sets in which different features, such as expected value, variance, andskewness, are often correlated. This renders it difficult to quantify precise effects, to mapthese on to specific psychological or neural processes, and to determine the true effect size ofchoice shifts.
The paradigm I used was sensitive to small changes in risk preference, as revealed by thesystematic decrease in propensity to gamble from week 1 to week 2 across subjects. The 6%
choice shift in experiment 1 equates to a difference in model ρ parameters of 0.03. In financial terms this translates to a difference in risk premium of £0.80 for a 50:50 chance ofwinning £10 or £0 (i.e. this same gamble becomes £0.80 less appealing to an individual fromweek 1 to week 2). Thus although the paradigm was sensitive to this small, systematic driftin risk attitude over time, I did not detect a drug effect.
It can also be difficult to distinguish between drug induced changes in risk-reward trade-offversus changes in choice noise in previous paradigms. Inattentive or random responding in abinary choice task will shift choice proportions towards 50%, an effect which can oftenmasquerade as a change in risk evaluation, and may account for some previous findings indrug studies (Kaminski and Ator, 2001). Importantly, I can account for non-specific effects ofdrug administration on the randomness of responses in the behavioural model, whichpartitions effects into changes in risk preferences, and the independent quantification ofchoice noise.
7.4.2 EFFECTS OF L-DOPA
The dose of 100mg L-dopa used here has been previously employed in a range of studies,demonstrating effects on semantic priming (Kischka et al., 1996; Angwin et al., 2004;Copland, 2009), cognitive control (Onur et al., 2011), learning and memory (Knecht et al.,2004; Floel et al., 2005; de Vries et al., 2010), perception (Pleger et al., 2009), and decision-making (Pessiglione et al., 2006; Sharot et al., 2009b). A 100mg dose minimises side effects ofnausea or drowsiness, which can significantly impact upon performance. I also ensured adelay between drug administration and task execution such that the task was performed atthe time of peak L-dopa concentration (Dethy et al., 1997), making it unlikely that the lack ofeffect is simply due to low L-dopa levels. The absence of a change in reaction timedemonstrates that there was no non-specific slowing as a side-effect of dopamine (Micallef-
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Roll et al., 2001). The reported effects of L-dopa on reaction time in healthy individuals aremixed, occasionally speeding responses (Rihet et al., 2002; Hasbroucq et al., 2003), but oftenwith no effect (Kischka et al., 1996; Rakitin et al., 2006), thus I was unsurprised to find this inthis study.
7.4.3 RISK VERSUS REWARD LEARNING
Given previous reports of the effects of dopamine manipulation on risk-taking in patients andhealthy humans, I address alternative explanations for the lack of effect here. I was careful todesign our task to eliminate the effects of learning and reward feedback. Here, our stimuliwere explicit, whereas in many previous studies the level of risk associated with a stimulusneeds to be learnt over a number of trials. For example, in the IGT where different decks ofcards are presented, the quality of the decks needs to be ascertained by repeated sampling(Buelow and Suhr, 2009). Since dopamine has a central role in reward-based learning, andencodes reward-prediction error (Schultz et al., 1997), it is possible that the effect ofdopaminergic manipulation could be exerted at this early stage when probabilisticcontingencies are being acquired. This is especially the case given dopamine release encodespositive reward prediction errors (better than expected reward), whereas dopaminergicneurons have a limited dynamic range to encode lack of expected reward (Bayer andGlimcher, 2005; Niv et al., 2005). L-dopa augments dopamine release at synapses (Pothos,2002), therefore could encourage risk-taking by boosting the apparent value of stimuli in theface of unpredictable reward. Moreover, differential effects of dopamine on the response torewards and punishments (Daw et al., 2002; Frank et al., 2004; Cools et al., 2009) couldencourage risk-taking by outweighing previous poor outcomes with recent successfuloutcomes. This effect cannot be engendered in our paradigm, as all choices were resolvedafter the end of the experiment, as is standard in experimental economic paradigms (Kageland Roth, 1995).
Related to this is the distinction between explicit risk, where the probabilities of outcomesare precisely known, and ambiguity, where the outcome distribution is unknown and needsto be learnt through exploration. Ambiguity-aversion is a well-known behavioural bias(Ellsberg, 1961), very different from risk attitude. However the two are frequently conflatedin risk-taking tasks such as the BART and IGT, where risks are not explicit. Our finding of alack of effect of dopamine on risk evaluation is consistent with findings in PD patients ofspecific deficits in decision making under ambiguity rather than risk (Delazer et al., 2009).
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7.4.4 DOPAMINE RECEPTORS
An alternative explanation for the absence of a change in risk-taking with L-dopa might bethat any effect is specific to dopamine receptor subtypes. Pathological gambling and otherimpulse control disorders is a noted side effect of dopamine agonists, but rarely of L-dopamonotherapy in isolation (Gallagher 2007). One possibility is that risk-taking is a specificbyproduct of D1-receptor stimulation, an effect that might be opposed by simulataneous D2-receptor stimulation. Contrary to this is the findings that the risk-promoting effects ofamphetamine are abolished by both D1- and D2-receptor antagonists (St Onge and Floresco,2008), and that D1, D2 and D3-specific dopamine agonists all have been reported to inducegambling behaviour (Grosset et al., 2006; Lu et al., 2006), although D3- receptor agonism hasalso been reported to decrease risky choice in an animal model (St Onge and Floresco, 2008).L-dopa itself also potentiates gambling behaviour in co-administration with dopamineagonists (Imamura et al., 2006). An abnormal baseline in PD patients with depletednigrostriatal systems may engender disrupted dopamine receptor expression or sensitivitythat renders them vulnerable to agonist effects, however these side-effects have also beenreported in individuals treated for restless legs syndrome (Tippmann-Peikert et al., 2007). L-dopa promotes the phasic and tonic release of dopamine from synapses in response toafferent depolarisation, while dopamine agonists enhance the tonic stimulation of post- andpre-synaptic receptors in a non-physiological manner (Breitenstein et al., 2006). Thusdifferential effects of these agents could also be attributed to the distinction between phasicand tonic dopamine, which have been suggested to map onto different computationalprocesses (Niv et al., 2007). An important future avenue for research is to delineate whethereffects on gambling behaviour are dopamine-receptor specific, and whether any effectspertain to risk evaluation or other processes such as learning and reward-responsiveness.
7.4.5 GENETIC HETEROGENEITY
Genetic influences may also determine the effects of L-dopa on risk-taking, and a variety ofpolymorphisms in D1 (Comings et al., 1997; Takahashi et al., 2010), D2 (Comings et al., 1996;Lobo et al., 2010) and D4 (Comings et al., 2001; Dreber et al., 2009) receptors, and thedopamine transporter gene (Comings et al., 2001) have been associated with risky decisionmaking or impulsive behaviour. There may also be pharmacogenetic interactions, with areport of L-dopa increasing risk-taking, in a paradigm with feedback and dynamic riskchanges, only for subjects with a specific DRD4 polymorphism (Eisenegger et al., 2010).Dopamine receptor polymorphisms are also suggested to mediate different neuronal
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responses to reward during gambling tasks (Forbes et al., 2007; Marco-Pallarés et al., 2009;Camara et al., 2010). Given the constellation of findings, and the fact that individualpolymorphisms appear to account for only a small fraction of the tendency to pathologicalgambling (Comings et al., 2001), the specific effects of each receptor on different elements ofthe decision making and learning process remains to be fully described.
7.4.6 ROLE OF OTHER NEUROTRANSMITTERS
It is also possible that an alternative neurotransmitter is involved in imbuing risk-preference.Evidence from both neuroimaging and single-unit recording studies have implicatedserotonin in reward processing (Tanaka et al., 2007; Nakamura et al., 2008; McCabe et al.,2010), and serotonin augmentation (Tanaka et al., 2009) or depletion (Rogers et al., 2003;Long et al., 2009) alters reward and risk-based decision-making. An effect of serotonin onrisk-attitude could also contribute to the effect of satiety and starvation on decision makingunder risk (Symmonds et al., 2010b). While the rewarding and appetitive effects of food havebeen attributed to dopaminergic systems (Berridge, 1996), serotonin is also critical inbehavioural homeostasis (Leibowitz and Alexander, 1998). Serotonin and dopaminereceptor genes may also interact to determine propensity for risk-taking (Ha et al., 2009).
7.4.7 CONCLUSION
The central finding from this study is that L-dopa administration does not affect riskpreference in healthy humans. This contrasts to studies implicating dopamine in riskydecision making, and suggests that dopamine exerts an influence through other mechanismssuch as modulation of learning or response to reward, rather than the evaluation of riskitself. Our paradigm offers a careful control over different aspects of risk which are oftenconflated in behavioural studies, and a quantification of risk-preference independent of non-specific effects on choice noise due to attentional changes. Thus, this task could be furtheradapted to dissociate possible effects of dopamine on reward feedback, and to explore theeffects of stimulation of different dopamine receptor subtypes as well as the likely impact ofother neuromodulatory agents. Economically inspired paradigms can offer experimentalcontrol to selectively manipulate aspects of a decision and sensitively assay pharmacologicaleffects. I will discuss further these future potential avenues of investigation in Chapter 9.
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8.1 INTRODUCTION
Risk is a potent decision-making variable and risk-return tradeoffs are central to humaneconomic behaviour. In previous chapters I provide evidence for an involvement of specificcortical and subcortical regions in processing dimensions of this decision variable. Extendingthe extant literature, I identify a network in posterior parietal and prefrontal cortices asexpressing scaled parametric responses to statistical risk inherent in a particular stimulus ordecision, measured by the variance (dispersion) and skewness (asymmetry) of an outcomedistribution respectively (Smith et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2009; Symmonds et al., 2010a;Symmonds et al., 2011). Moreover, I find evidence to support previous findings that regionsin anterior insula and inferior frontal gyrus express differential sensitivity depending uponan individual’s risk-taking preferences and choices (Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al.,2009), in other words exhibiting activity that reflects a subjective risk assessment.
While fMRI allows precise regional localisation of risk-sensitive regions its major limitationrelates to its poor temporal resolution, being constrained to processes on the timescale ofseveral seconds (Kim et al., 1997). This means that while fMRI data are useful in building upan anatomical picture of a decision-making network, it cannot inform the precise temporalsequence of processing events. However decisions under risk, where different outcomesneed to be represented and considered occur rapidly, with individuals able to express clearand consistent preferences within 1-3s (Diederich, 2003; Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Huettelet al., 2006; Bollard et al., 2007; Xue et al., 2009). This implies rapid neural processing ofsalient statistical features of a decision, an integration of this decision information with anindividual’s subjective preferences or decision strategy, and generation of an appropriatesignal to engender a motor response within this time frame. In this study, I utilised the fine-grained data from magnetoencephalography (MEG) to study the temporal evolution ofresponses to risk within this decision-making network.
HE CHRONOMETRY OF RISK PROCESSING
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As abstraction of information is clearly crucial in informing a decision I hypothesised anearly processing of variance and skewness. I expected this to be evident in parietal andprefrontal cortex regions previously implicated in these processes. I also predicted choice-related signals would emerge subsequent in time to risk assessment and evaluation, with aninfluence of individual risk preference on these choice-related signals in anterior insula.There have been few studies using electrographic or magnetoencephalographic recording ofeconomic decision making (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Schutter et al., 2004; Hewig et al.,2007; Hedgcock et al., 2010; Harris et al., 2011; Steffen et al., 2011), but these have focusedon evoked responses (event-related potentials (ERPs) or fields (ERFs)), usually to feedbackabout the outcome of decisions. While the receipt of a reward or loss may reasonablygenerate synchronised and time-locked event-related signals occurring rapidly following afeedback signal, it is unlikely that the responses associated with risk evaluation occur in sucha uniform time-locked manner. The evaluation of risk is likely to occur over a period of tensto hundreds of milliseconds, and indeed start at different times on different trials due tonatural within-subject cognitive variability. This variability curtails an easy detection inevoked responses, as signal changes will average out rather than cleanly summate. Itherefore focus purely on spectral responses in the time-frequency domain. This enables thedetection of changes in trial-by-trial oscillatory power induced by specific components of adecision, without requiring time- or phase-locked signals. Given my a priori knowledge aboutthe regional localisation of a risk evaluation network (Symmonds et al., 2011), I drawinferences in source space and map the temporal profile of responses in posterior parietal,prefrontal and insular cortices.
I required subjects to choose between gambling on a lottery or selecting a sure amount ofmoney on each trial, and similar to my previous paradigms independently manipulated thevariance and skewness of a set of individually presented lotteries, recording choices andsimultaneous neural responses (i.e. MEG signal changes) as a function of these changingvariables. My key question was when and where within my a priori regions of interest arerisk signals represented. I again utilised behavioural economic models to measure subjects’subjective preferences for variance and skewness, which enabled me to determine when andwhere these individual preferences influence neural signals leading to choice, and whetherrisk-preferences modulate an expected early encoding of variance and skewness in additionto modulating a later choice signal.
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8.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
8.2.1 PARTICIPANTS
The study was approved by the Institute of Neurology (University College London) EthicsCommittee. 17 subjects (mean age: 31; age range: 25-50; 5 male) were recruited for theexperiment. 1 (female) subject was excluded because of metal artefact due to dental work,and 1 (male) subject excluded because of excessive drowsiness and failure to make button-press responses during the experiment.
8.2.2 TASK
To dissociate different components of risk, in terms of dispersion (variance) and asymmetryof outcomes (skewness), I adapted my previously used decision-making task (Symmonds etal., 2011) that controlled the distribution of outcomes, and ensured that variance andskewness of a set of lotteries were manipulated independently by design. Hence, as varianceand skewness of gambles were orthogonal factors, I could test whether neural activityevoked by variance could be distinguished from that evoked by skewness. Participants wererequired to choose between taking a ‘sure’ (fixed) amount of money or elect to ‘gamble’(choosing to play a lottery with a number of potential outcomes). Gambles were representedas pie-charts, where variance and skewness of outcomes varied over a range, with expectedvalue kept constant (Figure 8.1 A&B).
8.2.3 INDEPENDENT MANIPULATION OF VARIANCE AND SKEWNESS
I constructed a stimulus set of 252 lotteries (each presented once) where variance andskewness were independent and varied over a range. For every level of variance (16 levels), Iindependently varied skewness (16 levels, 8 positively skewed, 8 negatively skewed).Expected value of the lotteries was kept constant (between £5.95 and £6.05), and the sureamount alternative remained constant throughout at £4.50. Stimuli were constrained to have4 outcomes (segments of the pie chart), with outcome probabilities varying in minimum 0.1increments between 0 and 1 to mitigate against probability distortion effects at smallprobabilities. These restrictions allow the generation of a space of possible lotteries varyingin skewness and variance (Figure 8.1 C, Appendix D). Where 2 possible lotteries wereequidistant from the desired array of points, I selected a lottery at random. At the end of theexperiment, three trials were randomly selected and played out for real. If subjects hadelected to gamble, I resolved the lottery by an on-screen graphic of a red ball spinning
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around the outside of the pie until it stopped at a randomly selected position. This procedurewas also shown in the practice, to demonstrate the idea that the size of each segment of thepie chart represented the chance of that outcome occurring. Winnings ranged between £13and £35 (mean £21.17).
8.2.4 BEHAVIOURAL MODELLING
This follows a similar procedure to Chapter 4. For a given lottery with 4 potential outcomes
(m1, m2, m3, m4), with probabilities p = p1, p2, p3, p4, Expected Value (EV) = , Variance= , and Skewness = .
I analysed choice data by fitting a linear mean-variance-skewness model (MVS) whereindividuals are allowed to express different preferences for variance and skewness. Todemonstrate sensitivity to both variables of interest, I compared the behavioural fit of thismodel to two alternatives; a model based on mean difference (M) alone (where subjects onlytake account of the difference between the sure amount and the expected value of the gamblein selecting actions), and a mean-variance model (MV). These were specified as previously.
I again used a logistic/softmax function to allow for noise in action selection.
I estimated best-fitting model parameters using maximum likelihood analysis, withoptimisation implemented with a non-linear Nelder-Mead simplex search algorithm inMatlab (Matlab, Natwick, USA). I compared models using the Akaike Information Criterion(AIC), a comparison which penalises model complexity (Akaike, 1974).
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Figure 8.1 Experimental paradigm and behaviour. A. We represented gambles on-screen as
pie-charts, divided into four segments showing possible lottery outcomes. Numbers show
the monetary value of each outcome (in pounds sterling) and the angle subtended by each
segment indicated the probability of each outcome occurring. A positively skewed gamble
(left) has a small chance of a better than average outcome (the tail of the distribution is to
the right). Conversely, a negatively skewed gamble (right) has a small chance of a worse
than average outcome (the tail is to the left). Both examples have identical variance and
expected value. B. Each trial was self paced, with subjects first shown a fixation cross, and
then pressing a button to commence. Following initial button press, a gamble was
presented for 3.5 seconds, during which time the subject was required to make a two-
alternative forced choice between opting to gamble, or to take a sure amount of money of
£4.50. Subjects selected actions by button press, indicated on screen by a colour change in
the central fixation circle. At the end of the experiment, three trials were randomly selected
and played out for real. If subjects had elected to gamble, we resolved the lottery by an on-
screen graphic of a red ball spinning around the outside of the pie which stopped at a
randomly selected position. C. Plot of the stimulus space used in this study, showing 252
gambles independent in variance and skewness. The non-uniformity at the extremes of
variance is limited by the restrictions on stimulus generation (a fixed expected value of
£5.95-6.05, 4 segment pie charts with a minimum probability of 0.1) D. Reaction times were
normally distributed between approximately 1-3s. 99.7% of button press responses
occurred after 1s following stimulus presentation. E. Summed AIC scores for 3 models:
mean only (M), mean-variance (MV), mean-variance-skewness (MVS). A lower score
indicates a better model fit. The MV model was significantly better than the M model (2: p <
1 x 10-5), while the MVS model was significantly better than MV (2: p < 1 x 10-5). F.
Parameter estimates from the MVS model reveal a range of preferences for variance
(negative coefficent reflects variance aversion), and skewness (coefficient reflects
preference for positive versus negative skewness).
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8.2.5 MEG
8.2.5.1 MEG - experimental setup and preprocessing
MEG was recorded continuously (sample rate: 1200 Hz), using a 274-channel whole-headsystem (CTF Omega), with participants in a seated position. Stimuli were presented andresponses recorded using Cogent presentation software (Wellcome Trust Centre forNeuroimaging, London) written in MATLAB (version 6.5.1, MathWork, Natick, MA). Visualcues were projected onto a screen directly in front of the participant. Choices were indicatedby pressing a button box with the right index finger.
Imaging data were analysed using Statistical Parametic Mapping software (routines in theacademic freeware package SPM8; Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, UK,www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
MEG data were epoched to obtain 1000ms data segments corresponding to the first secondafter presentation of the stimulus. This cutoff was chosen as the time window during whichstimuli were being evaluated, before button press responses occurred. On 99.7% of trialsmotor responses occurred only after this point (Figure 8.1D). Data were downsampled to200Hz, bandpass filtered from 1-80Hz, and baseline corrected. 100ms of MEG data prior topresentation of stimulus (when fixation cross was on screen) was sampled as a baselineperiod. Data were logarithmically rescaled before subsequent analysis.
I performed artefact rejection using an algorithm that rejected all trials where the root meansquare (RMS) power was a factor of 10 greater than the average RMS power per trial acrosssubjects.
8.2.5.2 MEG - Source level analysis
I source localised induced responses within four predefined time windows (0-250ms, 250-500ms, 500-750ms, 750-1000ms) and four frequency bands theta (4-8Hz), alpha (8-16Hz),beta (16-32 Hz) and gamma (32-64 Hz), using the multiple sparse prior routine within SPM8(Friston et al., 2008), with group constraints (Litvak and Friston, 2008). This inverse solutionperforms an iterative Bayesian optimisation to localise potential activation within atessellated cortical surface template mesh of several hundred patches, where the mesh is a
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tessellated template based on the canonical Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain(Mazziotta, 2001). Hence I obtained 16 (4 time x 4 frequency) source images per subject pertrial.
Our contrasts of interest pertained to the 3 parameteric variables of variance, skewness andsubject’s choice (a categorical variable indicating gamble or sure choice) on each trial. Foreach subjects’ data (i.e. within-subjects), these 3 variables were entered into a multiple linearregression (in a GLM) against trial-by-trial source-localised data. All parametric variableswere normalised to the range 0-1 and mean-centred. This regression analysis was performedat each of the above time and frequency bins, generating within-subject statistical maps ofthe regression coefficients corresponding to variance, skewness and choice regressors. Tomake group (between-subject) inferences I then imported each of these 16 (4 time x 4frequency) source level statistical images per subject into a two-way repeated measuresANOVA, repeating this process for variance, skewness and choice regressors respectively.
The GLM-estimated coefficients for each parametric variable gave the estimated slope of thebest linear fit, where the null hypothesis at each sensor is that activity is insensitive tovariance, skewness or choice respectively (i.e. the regression coefficient equals zero). Forinference (using a mass univariate statistical approach) F-tests were performed to isolate themain effect of time, collapsing across frequency bands. In other words, I ask where source-localised power correlates with variance, skewness or choice at any of the 4 time windows.Subsequent t-tests were then used to delineate the effect size within each time-bin in areasexpressing a significant main effect.
8.2.5.3 Covariate analyses
I next asked whether neuronal responses correlating with choice (differential activity forgamble versus sure) was modulated by risk preferences (i.e. an interaction betweenbehavioural preference and neural activity coupled with choice), which I hypothesised wouldreflect an integration of preferences at the stage of action selection. I expected regionssensitive to subjective preferences to express different patterns of choice-related activitydependent upon individual variance or skewness aversion. Secondly, I examined for aninteraction of behavioural preference within the regions sensitive to variance and skewness,asking if risk-preferences alter the primary encoding of these decision statistics. I speculatedthat I might observe an interaction between preference and synchronised activity correlatingwith risk, for both variance and skewness, which I posited would reflect an integration of
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subjective preference with objective decision statistics. I carried out this between-subjectscovariate analysis separately for each time window and each of the three regressors,enteringsource-level estimated regression coefficients (beta images) for variance, skewness,and choice for each subject, inputting images for each of the four frequency bands intosecond-level one-way ANOVAs. For the choice ANOVA, I included both variance andskewness covariates (estimated from behaviour according to the MVS model) in the samestatistical model. For the variance and skewness ANOVAs, the corresponding behaviouralcovariate was entered. I then performed contrasts at the second-level to isolate significanteffects of preference on choice-related activity (across all frequencies) and similarlymeasured effects of preference on variance and skew-evoked activity.
8.2.5.4 Time-frequency analysis within identified regions
In order to obtain a full time-frequency characterisation I used a psudoinverse to extractregional signals from the areas displaying maximal effects of the parametric regressors. Thisdata extraction was performed in 10mm spheres centred on peak voxel coordinates from thestatistical image using a source-extraction routine implemented in SPM. I used a Morletwavelet time-frequency decomposition with 7 cycles, with a frequency-dependent cyclelength as implemented in SPM8 (Kiebel et al., 2005). I performed this on each trial’swaveform (i.e. not on an average waveform), thus capturing evoked (phase-locked) andinduced (non-phase-locked) oscillatory power. Analysing changes in induced power iscritical for this cognitive task, as the neural processes of interest (evaluating the statistics ofa decision and making a choice) are unlikely to be either time- or phase-locked to stimuluspresentation, given that individuals express variability in their speed of assessment ondifferent trials. This means that a simpler ERF analysis of evoked waveforms in the timedomain is likely to be uninformative, given that these (temporally jittered) evokedwaveforms will cancel each other out during averaging, rather than summating. I thenrepeated the above GLM analyses on the source extracted data in continuous frequency andtime, performing multiple linear regression at the within-subject level for variance, skewenssand choice regressors, and entering these effect sizes into t-tests (or regressions againstcovariates) at the group level in the standard hierarchical approach. Significant effects withineach region-of-interest could then be displayed as a time-frequency plot.
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8.2.5.5 Statistical reporting and figures
I report effects within a mask of bilateral posterior parietal cortex, anterior insula, and dorsalprefrontal cortex, given that these areas of prior interest. I report voxel-wise significantresults at a p<0.01 threshold and clusters of greater than 50 voxels. Brain image figures showsecond-level SPM-F or SPM-T images, superimposed upon a canonical brain image,thresholded at p=0.01. Stereotactic coordinates are reported in MNI space (Mazziotta, 2001).Time-frequency images show second-level equivalent Z-score maps, with correspondinglinear time-plots of the significance of effects averaged over our four a-priori frequencybands.
8.3 RESULTS
8.3.1 BEHAVIOUR
8.3.1.1 Choices
The stimulus set was designed to ensure that, on average, participants would evenlydistribute their choices between gamble and sure amounts. This maximises power for bothbehavioural fitting and subsequent analysis of oscillatory power corresponding to choice. Asplanned, our subjects (n = 15), on average, distributed their choices between gamble andsure options throughout the course of the experiment (mean percentage of gamble choices =55%, std. 17%). There were few error (missed) trials (0.4% of all trials). Variance and
skewness were uncorrelated with choice, aided by use of the orthogonal stimulus set. Response
times (from stimulus presentation to button press) were 2.26 +/- (SD) 0.53s (Figure 8.1D).
8.3.1.2 Behavioural modelling
I independently manipulated variance and skewness, expecting that individuals’ preferenceswould be sensitive to both summary statistics. To formally test this, I compared a mean-variance-skewness model (MVS) where individuals are allowed to express preferences forboth variance and skewness, to a set of alternative decision models. As predicted, a mean-variance-skewness (MVS) model provided a significantly better fit to the behavioural datathan the alternatives (summed AIC scores: M: 4909; MV: 3778; MVS: 3642); MVS modelposterior probability>0.99 (very strong evidence in favour of MVS) (Figure 8.1E).
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I then used the winning MVS model to provide subject-specific preferences for variance andskewness (Figure 8.1F). All subjects were averse to variance (average variance preference: -0.56 +/- SD 0.25), and 7/15 preferred negative to positive skewness (average skewnesspreference: -0.06 +/- SD 0.16). Beta (temperature) values for the logistic function were low,indicating that choices were well partitioned by the linear model (average beta = 0.13; SD.0.06).
8.3.2 MEG SOURCE LEVEL ANALYSIS
8.3.2.1 Parametric responses to variance and skewness
The primary focus of this study was to make inferences about the temporal processing of riskduring decision making in prior regions of interest. Hence, I localised induced power in fourpre-specified time windows (0-250ms, 250-500ms, 500-750ms, 750-1000ms) followingstimulus presentation, at each of 4 frequency windows (4-8Hz (‘theta’), 8-16Hz (‘alpha’), 16-32Hz (‘beta’), 32-48Hz (‘gamma’)). Although our regions of interest from fMRI studies arebased on areas showing positive correlations with variance and skewness, I am agnosticabout the direction of correlation with MEG responses and have no a priori assumptionsabout the frequency bands in which specific effects will be expressed. I aimed to identify anyresponses showing a significant linear correlation with our variables of interest, irrespectiveof whether these responses were driven by synchronisation or desynchronisation. Althoughincreased power at high (gamma band) frequencies has been shown to positively correlatewith BOLD activity, conversely increases in low-frequency power negatively correlate withthe BOLD signal (Logothetis et al., 2001). I thus perform bidirectional F-tests constructedfrom linear contrasts to identify the main effects of each regressor.
There was a significant effect of variance in left posterior parietal cortex (F3,219 = 4.25, p =0.005; Figure 8.2A). This linear modulation of induced power occurred in the initial 0-250ms following lottery presentation (t1,219 = 1.95, p = 0.02), and peaked between 250-500ms (t1,219 = 2.94, p = 0.002) (Figure 8.2B). Time-frequency decomposition within thisregion revealed the peak effect was driven by synchronised, correlated, beta activity between250-300ms, preceded by alpha activity (Figure 8.2C&D). For skewness, I observedsignificant effects in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, with the peak effect on the right (RDMPFC: F3,219 = 4.75, p = 0.003; L DMPFC: F3,219 = 4.17, p = 0.007; Figure 8.2E), a responsepresent (t1,219 = 4.21, p < 0.0001) between the 500-750ms time window (Figure 8.2E&F).There was simultaneous greater theta and beta-band synchronisation for positive, more than
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negative, skewed gambles at 250-300ms concurrent in time with the parietal response tovariance. Subsequently, at 650-700ms, there was greater gamma band synchronisation fornegative skewed gambles (Figure 8.2G&H). This demonstrates that both components of risk(variance and skewness) induce independent scaled modulations of oscillatory activity atindentical time epochs in parietal and prefrontal cortex, regions previously identified asshowing anatomic localisation of such responses, occurring rapidly after stimuluspresentation. The temporally delayed response to negatively skewed (vs positively skewed)gambles is notable as it suggests that lotteries with positive tails (a small chance of a largeoutcome) are registered prior to the mirror image lotteries with occasional poor outcomes
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Figure 8.2 Responses to risk and choice. A. Source-
reconstructed induced power parametrically correlating
with variance in left posterior parietal cortex (all effects
across 4 frequency bands: ‘theta’ (4-8Hz), ‘alpha’ (8-
16Hz), ‘beta’ (16-32Hz), ‘gamma’ (32-48Hz)). B.
Timecourse of effect, showing significant effects in first
0-250ms window, peaking at 250-500ms (variance peak
voxel at -12, -56, 52). C. Time-frequency plot of extracted
data. D. Peak effects at 150ms and 260ms in alpha and
beta bands respectively. E. Source-reconstructed
induced power parametrically correlating with skewness
in left and right DMPFC (across all frequencies). F.
Timecourses of effects in right DMPFC (skewness peak
voxel at 22, 24, 34). G. Time-frequency plot of extracted
data. Positive effect indicates greater activity for positive
than negatively skewed gambles, while negative effect
indicates the opposite pattern. H. Peak positive
correlation at 240-300 ms and peak negative correlation
at 600 ms in alpha-theta and gamma bands respectively.
I. Source-reconstructed induced power correlating with
trial-by-trial choices (gamble versus sure, across all
frequency bands). The effect is seen bilaterally over the
central sulcus. J. Timecourse for peak voxel (at 28, -46,
50) shows effects commencing at 250-500ms, maximal at
750-1000ms after stimulus presentation. K. Time-
frequency plot of extracted data. Positive effect indicates
greater activity preceding gamble than sure choices,
while negative effect indicates the opposite pattern. L.
Greater beta activity before sure choices early at 400ms,
while greater theta and gamma activity before gamble
choices at 620-880ms. Figures show second-level SPM-F
image thresholded at p<0.01, superimposed upon a
canonical brain (* = p<0.01, ** = p<0.0001; colourbars
show F-statistics or z-score). Time-frequency data
extracted from 10mm sphere centred on peak voxel.
Significant time-windows identified from preceding
analysis highlighted. Time-courses (bottom row) are of
effect significance, with data averaged by our four a
priori frequency bands. Dotted lines show p<0.05 two-
tailed significance threshold, with significant timepoints
indicated by gold bar.
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8.3.2.2 Modulations of induced activity before gamble or sure choices
I next ask whether there were choice-specific modulations of induced oscillatory power,which was evident bilaterally over the central sulcus (on right: F3,219=7.40; p = 0.0001; onleft: F3,219 = 5.56, p = 0.001; Figure 8.2I), reaching its peak effect in the 750-1000ms timewindow following stimulus presentation (t1,219 = 3.49, p = 0.0003; Figure 8.2J). Analysis incontinuous time and frequency revealed two temporally separate events – greater earlyresponses preceding sure more than gamble choices, occurring in the beta band at 300-350ms, but conversely greater late responses for gamble than sure choices expressed asconcurrent theta and gamma band synchronisation at 600-800ms (Figure 8.2K&L). This isconsistent with an hypothesis that signals driving a motor response evolve after intitialprocessing of the gamble stimulus. The novel finding here is that I see neural responsescorrelating with sure choices arising 250ms prior to those for gamble choices.
8.3.2.3 Effects of variance and skewness preferences
I considered two ways in which regional activity could express an integration of the encodedstatistics of each lottery with individuals’ tastes for risk. Firstly, preferences could exert aneffect on an action-selection network where one would expect a correlation betweendifferential activation preceding sure or gamble choices and an individual subjects’ riskpreference. For example, a more variance-averse individual when presented with a riskydecision might generate a stronger signal prior to accepting a gamble, while an individualwho is tolerant of variance might express a stronger signal prior to selecting a sure choice.
8.3.2.3.1 EFFECT ON CHOICE-RELATED ACTIVITY
I focused on regions where both variance and skewness preferences influenced choice-related activity. There was a significant correlation between choice activity and bothvariance and skew preferences in the anterior insula / inferior frontal gyrus region, and indorsal premotor cortex (Figure 8.3A). This between-subjects effect of behaviouralpreference on neural activity was expressed just prior to decision execution in the 500-1000ms window (conjunction analysis: 500-750ms, t1,54 = 2.69, p = 0.005; 750-1000ms, t1,54= 2.75, p = 0.004), but also in the first time window (0-250ms: variance coefficient x choiceactivity: t1,54= 2.70, p = 0.005; Figure 8.3B). Time-frequency extraction (Figure 8.3C) showedthat both variance averse and variance tolerant individuals expressed synchronisation of
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oscillatory power in high frequency bands prior to gamble choices at 400ms (predominantlyin the beta band for variance tolerant individuals versus gamma band for variance averseindividuals). Variance tolerant individuals also show earlier synchronised activity correlatingwith subsequent gamble or sure choices at 250ms, concurrent with activity seen for primarystimulus encoding of variance and skewness. In the theta band, there is even evidence ofemergence of activity coupled with choice at ~100ms. Thus insula activity predictive ofchoice occurs early, simultaneous with encoding of the variance and skewness of a riskystimulus in parietal and prefrontal cortices. From the very earliest stages of risk encoding weobserve an effect of preference, an effect that directs upcoming choice. Moreover this insulaactivity is differentially expressed depending upon an individual’s risk preference, as wouldbe expected from an area having a modulatory influence on risk processing according tosubjective tastes for risk.
In addition, variance averse individuals demonstrated significantly greater (beta and gammaband) responses at 850-900ms prior to choosing to gamble versus choosing a sure option,with greater theta band responses for the opposite choices at the same timepoint. This lateeffect is consistent with an anticipatory response prior to action execution, with heightenedactivity prior to gamble choices if one is risk averse (and an opposite pattern at the sametimepoint if risk-seeking. Splitting subjects by both variance and skewness preferences, ageneral pattern emerged such that variance averse and positive-skew seeking individuals(disliking uncertainty and driven by the potential of large rewards) expressed latesynchronisations across beta and gamma frequencies before choosing to gamble, whileindividuals with the opposite preference pattern exhibited earlier activity, in particular inthe beta band, before choosing to gamble (Figure 8.3D). Thus, insula activity predicts bothgamble and sure choices but exhibits different patterns and timecourses of activitydepending upon an individual’s specific risk preferences.
Figure 8.3 Choice-related activity is modulated by risk-preferences. A. Source-reconstructed induced power over 4 time windows showing regions
where choice-related activity covaried with both variance and skewness preferences (conjunction analysis - colourbar shows T-statistic). B. The
interaction between neural activity and behavioural preference (both for variance and skewness) plotted for left anterior insula (peak voxel -44, -14,
-2). Significant effects were observed in the 0-250 ms window and between 500-1000 ms. C. Time-frequency effects in left anterior insula region
plotted for variance averse and variance tolerant subjects (median split). The behavioural-neural interaction is driven by late responses at 900ms
for variance averse individuals, but early responses around 250ms in variance tolerant individuals. D. Median split of subjects into variance
averse/tolerant and positive/negative skew averse individuals. Late increased beta and gamma activity prior to gamble choices most evident in
variance and negative skew averse individuals, while early theta and beta activity prior to gamble choices most evident in variance tolerant,
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8.3.2.3.2 EFFECT ON ACTIVITY EVOKED BY LOTTERY STATISTICS
Preferences could also be expressed intrinsically in regions representing variance orskewness. These areas could themselves express different sensitivities to risk statisticsdepending upon an individual’s risk preferences. Consequently, I next tested for regionsexpressing a between-subjects correlation between either variance or skewness effects andsubjects’ variance and skewness preferences respectively. In other words, I looked for aninteraction between individual preferences and the parametric, induced, MEG signalresponse.
Figure 8.4 Between-subject effect of preference on neural response to variance. Left -
source-reconstructed induced power in left posterior parietal variance-sensitive region
showing early (300ms) and late (800ms) correlations with variance preferences. Right –
subjects (median) split by variance preference. Variance tolerant subjects show a negative
correlation in the gamma band at 300ms (i.e. more synchronised activity for low variance)
while variance averse subjects show a positive correlation (i.e. more synchronised activity
for high variance) in the gamma (and beta) bands at this time. The opposite pattern ensues
for the later correlation.
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I identified such an effect in variance-sensitive posterior parietal cortex (Figure 8.4). Gammaband activity (note a different frequency band than expressing a main effect of variance)showed a biphasic correlation with preference at 300ms. This reflected a positive correlationwith increasing variance in variance-averse individuals relative to a negative correlation invariance-tolerant individuals. Furthermore, the main effect of variance (i.e. statistical riskencoding) in this region occurred at different time-points for variance-tolerant and averseindividuals respectively. Variance-tolerant individuals show an early (~200ms) correlationof alpha band activity with variance, while variance averse individuals show slightly laterbeta synchronisation (250-300ms). These early effects are entirely consistent with anhypothesised effect of preference on stimulus encoding. A converse pattern of effects is seenat 750-850ms, with positive correlation with beta and gamma in variance tolerantindividuals and the opposite in variance averse. This is concurrent with choice-related insulaactivity, thus may reflect synchronisation between these regions in a risk-sensitive networkprior to action execution.
Similarly, the skew-sensitive DMPFC region also showed an effect of preference (Figure 8.4).A correlation with skewness preference was seen concurrent with encoding of skewness at250ms. or the 200-300ms time period there was enhanced positive correlation with(positive) skewness in individuals disliking positive skewness and preferring negative skew(across frequency bands). In subjects who show converse preferences and prefer positiveskew, I observed a negative correlation with skewness (i.e. early increased beta band activityfor more negatively skewed gambles).
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8.4 DISCUSSION
The timing of processing in the brain is of fundamental importance. To my knowledge this isthe investigation of the temporal evolution of induced responses to risk in a decision makingtask. I identify specific patterns of activation within previously identified risk-sensitiveregions (Huettel et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Platt and Huettel, 2008; Mohr et al.,2010a). I characterise parametric spectral responses, showing induced oscillatory powerduring the evaluation of lotteries was modulated specifically by the variance and skewness ofeach gamble on a trial-by-trial basis. A linear response to variance was observed in parietalcortex within the first 250 ms, and to skewness in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex persistinguntil 750ms following stimulus presentation. These findings again support the assertion,
Figure 8.5. Between-subject effect of preference on neural response to skewness. Left -
source-reconstructed induced power in right DMPFC skew-sensitive region showing early
(200-400 ms) correlation with skewness preferences. Right – subjects (median) split by
skewness preference. Subjects averse to negative skew show decreased beta show a
negative correlation (i.e. more activity for negative skewness) in the gamma band at 300ms
while positive skew averse subjects show a positive correlation (i.e. more activity for
positive skewness) in the theta, beta and gamma bands at this time.
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based on previous behavioural (Coombs and Bowen, 1971; Peiro, 1999) and fMRI(Symmonds et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2011) findings ,that risk is not a unitary phenomenon butis a variable with independent dimensions that are evaluated in discrete neural networks.The posterior parietal cortex is known to accumulate perceptual evidence under uncertaintyprior to action selection (Huk and Shadlen, 2005; Kiani et al., 2008), suggesting that thisregion is specialised for processing statistical decision-related information, and moregenerally is implicated in numerical and spatial quantification (Hubbard et al., 2005; Piazzaet al., 2007). Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex has been reported to encode the probability ofloss (Smith et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2010), and is also consistently implicated in risk-processing (Critchley et al., 2001; Tobler et al., 2007; Bach et al., 2009; St Onge and Floresco,2009; Venkatraman et al., 2009; Mohr et al., 2010b).
The early responses observe match the processing speed during other decision making tasks,for example judging the direction of moving dot stereograms (Bogacz et al., 2006; Heekerenet al., 2006), more complex perceptual discrimination between pictures of faces and houses(Fleming et al., 2010b), or value comparisons (Milosavljevic et al., 2010). I interpret theseearly stimulus-locked responses as consistent with specialised cortical evaluation of risk. It isinteresting to note that skewness-induced responses occur simultaneously with variance-induced responses. Variance is a first order measure of uncertainty, while skewness(mathematically) reflects a second order attribute of the gamble – the relative amount ofrelative gain versus loss inherent in a gamble. Although one can postulate a natural primacyin temporal processing of these dimensions, recent investigations in trading behaviour undertime pressure suggests that skew sensitivity emerges rapidly (Bollard et al., 2007). Indeed,the distributed spatial processing of these risk dimensions corroborates the hypothesis thatthe dispersion and relative hedonic asymmetry of outcomes are supported by separable,specialised, neural processing.
I found a main effect of choice over the central sulcus, concordant with a motor cortex origin.This response occurred after the stimulus encoding effects seen in parietal and prefrontalcortex although interestingly I observed a different temporal profile prior to gambling than asure choice option. In the late phase of the 1000ms period after stimulus presentation,gamble-related responses were greatest at ~800ms, contrasting with greater responsesprior to sure choice in the same frequency band, but occurring earlier at 300-400ms.
Behaviourally, subjects’ choices are sensitive to both the spread (variance) and asymmetryof a distribution of possible outcomes (skewness), but there is heterogeneity in these
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preferences, similar to my and others’ behavioural findings (Lopes, 1984; Symmonds et al.,2011). I asked where and when these subjective tastes for risk biased choice are expressed.In anterior insula and inferior frontal gyrus, commonly implicated in risk tasks (Preuschoff etal., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009), neural activitypredicts subsequent action selection and is modulated by individual tastes for risk (both forvariance and skewness), with a similar effect seen in premotor cortex. Intriguingly, thetemporal profile of the insula response shows two distinct effects - an early influence of riskpreference on choice-activity at 0-250ms after stimulus presentation, and a later effect, justprior to making a decision at 750-1000ms. The early effect occurs concurrently with theencoding of risk dimensions in parietal and prefrontal cortices, indicating an integral role ina risk-processing network.
The anterior insula has been suggested to promote or inhibit gamble selection dependentupon risk-preference in fMRI studies (Paulus et al., 2003a; Christopoulos et al., 2009;Engelmann and Tamir, 2009a; Xue et al., 2010). My findings in Chapter 4 also supported thistheory. The effect I observe here is consistent with this – while both all participants showgreater gamma synchronisation before choosing to gamble, beta band activity differentiatesvariance-tolerant from variance-averse individuals (hence could be antagonising the gammaband activity to promote risk-tolerant choices). Moreover, positive skew seeking, variancetolerant individuals (similar to casino gamblers who accept risk for the chance of highreward show strong early responses directing choice, while more conservative individualspreferring negative skewness and disliking uncertainty (variance) show mainly lateresponses after choosing to gamble. Moreover, the later response in anterior insula isconsistent with an affective response to risk, in particular as it follows choice sensitivepremotor activity. Insula activation has also been hypothesises to reflect such an anticipatoryor evaluative effect (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Preuschoff et al., 2008). These dataillustrate a dual role of the insula, both at the time of risk encoding and also reflecting riskexpectancy during entrainment of a motor program for action selection.
I also observed that activity correlating with the encoding of objective risk itself, in bothparietal and prefrontal cortex, was modulated by risk preferences. Indeed, in parietal anddorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the response to risk was sensitive to preference from the veryearliest time-point, with greater oscillatory activity when gambles were more aversive to theindividual which supports an hypothesis of enhanced processing of more (negatively) salientcues in these regions. This preference-dependent effect was seen even before significantmain effects of variance and skewness, emerging even before insula activity before a period
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of concurrent activation. This strongly indicates that preference is imbued to neural activityfrom the point of initial risk encoding, furthermore that insula activity communicates withthese risk-encoding regions at this time to establish a choice. Interesting, a late decrement ingamma-band variance-related activity is also seen in variance-averse individuals at 750-850ms. This effect, occurring at the same time as the later insula response, may again reflectsynchronisation between these regions in a risk-sensitive network, but now an effectanticipating action execution.
MEG is maximally sensitive to cortical effects; hence here I do not explore subcortical riskprocessing (Knutson et al., 2005; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Mohr et al., 2010a). MEG offers theability to resolve risk-sensitive processes at a sub-second timescale, and here for the firsttime I map out the evolution of a decision process, through risk assessment and integrationwith individually specific traits or predilection to an ultimate choice. Using MEG to measurethe temporal precedence of specific processes bypasses the problems of inferring causalityfrom fMRI data (Friston, 2009), and also provides information about parametric changes insteady-state oscillatory power which underlie a range of similar cognitive processes such assensory perception (Gray and Singer, 1989; Tiitinen et al., 1993; Tallon-Baudry and Bertrand,1999) a comparison between alternative percepts (Spitzer et al., 2010), and maintenance inworking memory (Romo et al., 1999). For example, here I observe both early and latecorrelations between choice and preference in insula, findings that would be confounded atthe temporal resolution of fMRI but which inform my interpretation of the decision process.Additionally, fMRI can be blind to excitatory activity at lower oscillatory frequencies (Goenseet al., 2011), here revealed by MEG.
8.5 CONCLUSION
Here, I provide a characterisation of the temporal sequence of decision making under risk. Ireport evidence supporting an initial rapid processing of salient risk dimensions in parietalcortex followed by dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and highlight a graded parametricvariation in oscillatory power that correlates with experimentally manipulated variablesspecific to the decision at hand. This localisation independently replicates my previousresults in Chapter 4, with a different imaging modality. Similar modulation has been recentlyreported in the context of perceptual decision-making (Spitzer et al, 2010), and here Idemonstrate a similar pattern of processing for the first time in an economic decision-making experiment. Strikingly, individual preferences have an effect upon neural risk-
214
sensitive networks at two specific times – early at the time of stimulus risk encoding andlater by altering the expression of oscillatory responses selective for action. Simultaneousactivation of anterior insula and risk-sensitive parietal and prefrontal cortex in a mannerdependent upon individual tastes for risk points to this region supporting processes thatmodulate risk-responses to influence choice. More broadly, this study demonstrates thepowerful potential of MEG as a complimentary tool to directly map out the causal sequenceof neuronal activity, and enable a temporal dissection of the cognitive processes engaged indecision-making.
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9.1 EVIDENCE FOR SUMMARY STATISTIC MODELS
9.1.1 OVERVIEW AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Classical utility theory assumes that each possible state of the world is assigned a value,which is then weighted by a probability (Machina, 2005). In this thesis I provide evidence foran alternative hypothesis, namely that the human brain is adapted to decompose a decisioninto summary statistics reflecting the dispersion and asymmetry of an outcome distribution.
An important methodological contribution is paradigm design. The paradigms hereinsubstantially differ from previous approaches to risk, as I render more tractable itsinvestigation by independently varying statistical features of a distribution of outcomes.Using multiple, rather than binary outcomes overcomes limitations of previous experimentsand gives the ability to flexibly map out a desired stimulus space. This approach ofcompartmentalizing the independent properties of a stimulus in order to deconstruct theassociated neural networks is well established in sensory neuroscience. Such a methodenables testing of systematic influences on different aspects of behaviour, as well as allowingindependent neural inferences to be drawn.
Similar to processing of component features of complex visual stimuli, I find that contrary toa common assumption, risk is not monolithic but can be decomposed into separatedimensions which have a segregated representation in the brain. While agnostic as to theexact coding of these statistics (e.g. variance, standard deviation and coefficient of variationare all correlated measures of spread), I observed that responses to the dispersion versus theasymmetry of outcomes evoke activity in anatomically separate networks. Strikingly, neuralactivity during risky choice also reflects individuals’ tastes for different features of an
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outcome distribution, leading to an evaluation and integration within dissociable neuralregions involved in risk processing (Symmonds et al., 2011).
9.1.2 BEHAVIOUR
A consistent behavioural finding throughout these studies is that experimental subjects wereon average both variance and positive skew-averse. This means individuals dislikeuncertainty (outcome dispersion) and prefer gambles with mostly above average rewardsassociated with a small chance of low payoffs. Negative skew preferring individuals aretolerant of downside risk, a common feature in everyday scenarios such as propertyinvestment or consenting to surgery – generally the outcomes or rewards are good, but thereis a small chance of heavy loss. Positive skew preferring individuals on the other hand seeklarge-but-unlikely rewards, and people with such preferences might take the opportunity ofinvesting in oil exploration or gambling in a casino. Critically, these preferences do not relateto the spread of a distribution, but the relative potential for gains and losses entailed. Incontrast with normative theoretical predictions of positive skew preference in varianceaverse individuals (Scott and Horvath, 1980), I find that individual’s behavioural preferencesare heterogeneous and uncorrelated.
There have been relatively few experimental investigations where variance and skewnessare dissociated. In experiments where preferences for lotteries with different variance andskewness have been systematically examined, individuals exhibit similar heterogeneousbehaviour. Several studies have reported predominantly positive skew-seeking behaviour(Coombs and Pruitt, 1960; Alderfer, 1970), or used positive skew preference to explaingambling behaviour (Golec and Tamarkin, 1998; Garrett and Sobel, 1999). Other studieshave reported varied preferences, with different participants showing positive or negativeskew-seeking as in my studies (Lopes, 1984), or negative skew preference on average(Lichtenstein, 1965). Skewness has also been shown to influence perceived riskiness indifferent directions (Coombs and Bowen, 1971), and negative skew-seeking behaviour isalso reported as common in investors (Tan, 1991; Taleb, 2004).
While there are no clear biological restrictions on the range of preferences individuals areallowed to exhibit in a summary statistic framework, it is nonetheless interesting tospeculate on the reasons why different studies report disparate preferences for variance andskewness. Distorted estimates of very small probabilities are likely to have an additionalimpact on choice, and some previous studies have used extremely unlikely events when
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demonstrating skew-preferences. Many previous studies also present mixed gambles (withboth possible financial losses and gains), rather than presenting decisions purely in the gaindomain as in the current study. This raises the possibility that contextual frame (loss or gain)of the decision could additionally influence predilections for risk.
9.1.3 NEURAL ENCODING OF SUMMARY STATISTICS
There have been a number of recent investigations examining neural responses tocomponents of a risky decision. These studies have highlighted a number of brain regionsinterested in risk, in particular anterior insula, DMPFC, PPC, and ventral striatum. Whilstmany of these studies frame risk in terms of summary statistics (e.g. Fiorillo et al., 2005;Preuschoff et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009;Mohr et al., 2010b), others follow the tradition of classical economics and define values bythe subjective utility and probability of outcomes (e.g. Hsu et al., 2005; Knutson et al., 2005;Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007; Tom et al., 2007; Samanez-Larkinet al., 2010). Given that risk is not an explicit variable in classical theory, these are seeminglyincommensurable findings (Boorman and Sallet, 2009).
Previously observed non-linear ventral striatum activation for probability (Hsu et al, 2009)could be explained by positive skewness encoding as these variables are correlated whenbinary outcomes are used. It is also possible that the converse is true, although less likelygiven that in these studies I employ multiple outcomes. Moreover, and perhaps moretellingly, there is no clear model of how multiple outcomes would be encoded. Indeed onemight expect neural representation of both ‘win’ and ‘loss’ outcomes assuming separateencoding of amounts and probabilities. Often in neural decision making experiments forbinary gambles, only the probability of winning is modelled. While agnostic as to the exactcoding of the summary statistics of outcome distributions (e.g. variance, standard deviationand coefficient of variation are correlated measures of spread), critically I find responses todispersion versus asymmetry of outcomes evokes activity in anatomically separatenetworks. Moreover, I independently replicate these anatomical findings during single-shotdecisions using fMRI and MEG.
Consistent with these data, PPC insula and DMPFC activation were also reported in a studywith choices between multiple-outcome lotteries (e.g. Venkatraman et al., 2009), potentiallyreflecting preferences for different kinds of outcome distribution. Additionally, a recentpaper (Wu et al., 2011) has examined skewness, investigating neural responses to
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presentation of 4 repeatedly presented mixed gambles (high variance, low variance,positively skewed, negatively skewed) in a passive viewing (no-choice) paradigm. In linewith my findings, the authors report greater ventral striatal activity for positive versusnegatively skewed gambles and anterior insula sensitivity to skewness. There are severalimportant differences and limitations in the aformentioned study compared to theexperiments I present in Chapters 4 and 8. Critically, my subjects made active choicesallowing a distinction between processes supporting risk quantification and evaluation fromchoice. I did not present outcomes of gambles on each trial, thus I could outrule feedback-related activity. In addition, I employ an orthogonal parametric design presenting a range ofgambles with different variance and skewness, avoiding a potential confound betweenskewness and high variance. My paradigm is controlled to avoid a priori expectations of highrisk stimuli and these design features enabled me to accurately and independently measurebehavioural and neural sensitivity to each risk dimension. Moreover, I avoid the limitationsof using a small number of stimuli as in a cognitive paradigm. Interestingly, Wu at al., 2011elicited ratings of arousal, perceived risk and preference for each of the 4 lotteries, and foundthat these ratings are not commensurate, highlighting a disparity between the gambles thatsubjects preferred and gambles that evoked an affective response. Despite differences inbehavioural preferences between this study and my participants, there is a similarity inneural responses. Here, I report anterior insula activation for positively skewed gambles innegative-skew preferring subjects, whereas anterior insula was most active for skewedversus symmetric gambles in Wu’s study where subjects exhibit converse preferences.
9.1.4 CHOICE
Another notable finding from the fMRI studies is that a network of brain regionsdemonstrates greater activation for a gamble than a sure choice. This has also been reportedin several previous studies (Matthews et al., 2004; Weber and Huettel, 2008b; Christopouloset al., 2009). This indicates that recruitment of brain regions is different when generatinggamble versus sure choices. This contrasts with the simplifying assumption portrayed inbehavioural models, where the process of choice is modelled as a softmax comparisonbetween equally-weighted utilities for a lottery and sure amount. While I make noassumptions here about the neural processes underlying choice generation, similardifferential activation in striatum has been related to the acceptance or rejection of a defaultaction (Yu et al., 2010) and in prefrontal cortex during the selection of ‘exploratory’ actions(Daw et al., 2006).
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I shed light on this activity in Chapter 8, showing different temporal processing prior togamble and sure choices. In other words, in brain regions supporting the formulation of amotor plan (premotor and motor cortex), this choice-related activity is expressed at differenttimes, and by different mechanisms, as dictated by one’s taste for risk. In fMRI, one lacks thetemporal resolution to distinguish these clearly-seen effects using MEG.
9.1.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Although the evidence here indicates that the brain decomposes risky choices into summarystatistics, it is likely that the brain does encode states of the world in specific circumstances.There is a large body of evidence for OFC encoding of stimulus value in decisions without risk(Plassmann et al., 2007a; Rangel et al., 2008a). In risk-free situations, there is an expectationof a single specific outcome. Choosing between options entails a comparison – the actionselected is necessarily predicted to lead to the optimal outcome. Uncertainty is irrelevant incompletely predictable scenarios, and it is unsurprising that a risk-evaluation networkremains quiescent. Binary probabilistic scenarios are very similar – again there is a predictedstate (a win), but here there is uncertainty. In situations where the states are the most salientfeature, and in particular where outcomes are given following choice (i.e. learning), the OFCappears to be recruited (Chib et al., 2009).
In my single-shot experiments, risky choices comprise multiple potential states of the world,and the salient features are the dispersion and asymmetry of outcomes (which areexperimentally manipulated) rather than the average expected value of actions (which arestatic). These scenarios strongly activate a risk network in insula, parietal and prefrontalcortex.
Although computationally simpler to track summary statistics, at other times it can be easyto track and update all states and probabilities if they are limited in number (D'Acremontand Bossaerts, 2008). Thus an important future direction is to establish whether bothprocesses work in concert – tracking important states (e.g. best or worst outcome), as well asmeasuring distributional uncertainty. This could underlie biases during decisions withparticularly salient states, and also explain why some outcomes might be ignored (i.e. akin to‘editing’).
A second important avenue is to delineate which statistics are the most representativeapproximations of neural activity - variance, coefficient of variation, range, and entropy are
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all measures of dispersion; skewness, partial moments, and value-at-risk all measureasymmetry. In practice this is challenging because of the highly correlated nature of thesedescriptives, however in principle the method I have developed herein could be extended toorthogonalise any given dimensions. For example, one could clearly differentiate betweenasymmetry versus a state-based encoding of only the best and worst outcomes in anexperiment where the extreme outcomes are held constant but the shape of the outcomedistribution is altered. This is similar to asking if the kurtosis of a distribution elicits neuralactivity (i.e. differences in the distribution between the extreme and modal outcome).
Surveying my data, dispersion is unlikely to be encoded as entropy, as this pertains to the
probability rather than value of states, therefore variance is well dissociated when usingmultiple outcome gambles (though not for binary gambles). In addition, the brain is unlikelyto be sensitive to purely single-sided measures of asymmetry such as probability of loss oronly to extreme outcomes, as we found sensitivity to relative asymmetry outperformed thesetype of models in Chapter 4.
9.2 TRACKING OF RISK IN SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING
9.2.1 OVERVIEW AND CONTRIBUTIONS
Much of the existing literature on neural responses to risk focuses on single-shot choices.This is critical for delineating evaluative, anticipatory and feedback-related activity duringindividual decisions, but does not answer how risk is tracked during a chain of decisions orchoices. I tackled this question in Chapter 5, presenting a chain of individually simpledecisions which lead to different distributions of potential outcomes when strung together ina sequence. I further manipulated the possible distributions of outcomes by varying athreshold or watermark that participants were required to reach to obtain reward. Ihighlighted two separate but interlinked questions that needed to be addressed in such anexperiment. I thus asked which utility model the brain approximates in tracking value andrisk through a sequence of decisions, and also asked how individuals weigh up all possiblealternative outcomes when making such plans.
Methodological contributions here included both the construction and analysis of differentmodels of sequential choice, and also applying the method of simulated moments to fit thesemodels. This study (Symmonds et al., 2010a) is to my knowledge the first example of the use
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of this simulation method in a neuroscientificaly motivated decision making experiment. Thiswas essential here as maximum likelihood estimation for such a sequential task, where trialsare not independent but rather are conditional on previous responses, is computationallydifficult to implement.
The key finding was a similar observation of responses to individual statistical moments of adistribution of outcomes in prototypical valuation and risk-sensitive areas, although thereare several key differences from Chapter 4 which I discuss further below.
9.2.2 CONTINUATION VALUE MODELS OF CHOICE
An important point is that observed responses track the statistics of outcomes predictedseveral trials into the future in accordance with a specific model (ACV) of planned choice.This contrasts with the optimal OCV model, which would be consistent with a rationaldecision maker with full knowledge of the available terminal outcomes (where one fixed beststrategy is followed from the outset).
Although using a fixed strategy model is possible in this task, more generally it can fail insituations where an individual errs or if some planned alternatives are no longer available.An ACV decision-maker considering all possible future outcomes is myopic (i.e. does notdeterministically plan choices in advance). However, such a decision-maker can mitigatefuture errors or constraints by weighting all possible action-outcome combinations, enablingrecovery from error by selecting the best set of remaining choices without needing to assumea fixed strategy. ACV can also partly capture decision processes where a proportion of (butnot necessarily all) possible outcomes in a decision-tree are considered. A more informedversion of the ACV model might weight strategies according to the proportion of time thatthey are expected to be chosen either according to previous experience, or based on arational expectations model similar to quantal response equilibria models of choice(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998).
Implicit in behavioural modeling is that one necessarily tests the joint hypothesis that both
MVS and ACV models are true, because the continuation value models are coupled to avaluation model. Thus, while these neural data support ACV over OCV contingent upon MVS,it is possible that this could be bettered by a combination with an alternative utility model. In
Chapter 5, I cannot draw direct statistical comparisons between utility models (as themodels are non-nested with different numbers of parameters), however the other studies
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provide good supportive evidence for the MVS model. In addition, it is possible that I do notsee neural responses corresponding to an OCV model even in individuals who actually dofollow this strategy purely because there is no requirement for a trial-by-trial tracking of theoutcome distribution if you have pre-planned a trajectory of choices. However, the fact that Isee responses corresponding to the ACV model suggests, that at least in some subjects, theseaverage continuation values are being continuously tracked and re-evaluated.
9.2.3 CHOSEN VERSUS EVALUATED RISK
A second observation in the sequential risk study is that the responses are conditional uponchoice - chosen risk rather than a pure stimulus-bound assessment as in Chapters 4 and 8.All options apart from the sure-only strategy entail risk, so it is not straightforward toanalyse the representation of risk independent of choice. This contingency may partlyexplain the predominant OFC activity seen. The OFC is commonly reported to reflect chosenvalue (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). My data suggests that chosen value, at least forsequential decisions under risk, is also decomposed into summary statistics of expectationand risk.
More broadly, the prefrontal cortex represents higher order contingencies and maintainsrepresentations over extended periods of time (i.e. working memory). This has beenexplored at both a cellular (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009) and systems (Barbey et al., 2011)level. It is therefore unsurprising that we should observe maintenance of attributes of a plan(i.e. the value of a planned trajectory of actions) in this region. Interestingly, I observe arepresentation of this value or cost function in terms of the sufficient statistics of ananticipated distribution of contingent outcomes.
9.2.4 TARGET LEVEL
Finally, these statistics are relative or adapted to the current target level, reflecting anintegration of risk with an externally imposed constraint. I observed a separate neuronalresponse correlated with the current target level. This adaptation of signals to anoverarching target or goal can help overcome the limited dynamic range of neuronalsignalling, as responses can be scaled to the context rather than encoding absolutenumerosity. This also implies that responses to expected value are integrated withinformation about the target in generating action values. This parallels a range of fMRI and
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neurophysiological findings of adaptive signaling during decision making (Tobler et al., 2005;Elliott et al., 2008; De Martino et al., 2009; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009), psychological insightsabout relative valuation (Stewart et al., 2003), and rank-dependent decision theories(Quiggin, 1982).
9.2.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are a number of important questions arising from this study. Firstly, more refinedmeasures of strategy valuation could be tested against behavioural and neural data, inparticular the aforementioned quantal response equilibria models. In addition, the concept ofpruning of behavioural options is central to solving complex problems and has beenaddressed in machine learning (Almuallim, 1996). Whether and how certain types of strategyare downweighted or ignored in goal-directed choice is unknown, although certainly myfindings would indicate this.
A second important question is how and when targets are integrated in the decision process.Many real-world situations involve reaching a threshold or goal, and the entire body of workon reference-dependent decision making addresses the behavioural consequences of salienttargets or anchors. This study was necessarily simplistic in its manipulation of targets. It isan open question as to whether overarching goals are separately maintained in prefrontalcortex and at what stage these influence action and strategy valuation. The separatetimescales required to track trial-by-trial predictions versus longer-term consequenceswould seem to necessitate distinct neuronal supports, although here I only offer tentativeevidence in this direction. Studies using methods with high temporal resolution, such asMEG, could potentially address how these hypothesized separate neuronal pools mightinteract.
A final issue is that here I focus on the encoding or prediction of outcomes. Mechanistically, itis vital to ask how these predictions then guide or inform choice. The ACV model appearsoptimal under bounded rationality assumptions that individuals might not follow anintended choice trajectory, however it would be important to test this prediction and toexamine neural responses consequent on such deviations to fully elucidate this process.
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9.3 INTEGRATION OF RISK WITH RISK-PREFERENCE
9.3.1 OVERVIEW AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In Chapter 2, I discussed possible neurobiological mechanisms by which individualsubjective preference could be imbued to choices. In the first instance, I suggested that theprimary encoding of risk itself could be different for risk-averse and risk-seeking people. Inother words, risk preference could reflect an intrinsic property of risk-sensitive zones in thebrain. An alternative is that risk preference could affect action, or the encoding of a motorprogram, biasing choice towards or away from a risky option. This type of bias I envisaged tobe instantiated after primary stimulus encoding, prior to action execution, an influenceperhaps generated by a separate cortical region such as insula. A third hypothesis was that aspecialised cortical region such as medial prefrontal / orbitofrontal cortex integrateddifferent aspects of value, and in the process of integration weighted different dimensions ofthe choice to construct an overall ‘utility’.
I find strong evidence in favour of the first two mechanisms in Chapters 4 and 8; in thelatter I elucidate the precise timing of insula influence on the choice process. I also find someevidence of the third hypothesis in particular in Chapter 5, as different components of valueare each represented in OFC.
9.3.2 THE EFFECT OF RISK PREFERENCE ON RISK ENCODING
One important finding is that preferences are imbued in the process of decision making fromthe very outset of stimulus evaluation. Risk, both in terms of variance and skewness ofoutcomes, is encoded differently depending on one’s risk preference in a risk evaluationnetwork. This does not simply appear to be due to the presence of a risk response in risk-sensitive individuals or an absence of response in risk-neutral individuals. Rather, thedirection of effect, both seen in Chapter 4 and 8, reflects the type of risk-preference that anindividual exhibits.
The timing of this risk encoding also seems to be crucial for the formation of preference. Idemonstrate in Chapter 8 that early encoding of variance predicts risk-tolerant choices. Onecould speculate that risk-tolerant individuals have an improved ability to assess variance,subsequently make more ‘rational’ choices. The effect is more subtle than this, as both
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positive and negative skew-preference are expressed early at the time of stimulus riskencoding (but with different directions of effect).
9.3.3 THE ROLE OF THE INSULA
In Chapter 4, I reported an integration of risk information with individual preferences (i.e. a‘risk valuation’) in anterior insula and IFG. The insula is suited to perform such integration,with a central role in representing interoceptive states (e.g. arousal or sympathetic outflow)consequent upon the perception and evaluation of risk (Craig, 2002; Critchley et al., 2004;Craig, 2009; Singer et al., 2009). It also influences behavioural output by motoric projectionsto basal ganglia and pre-motor areas or via regions performing value comparison inorbitofrontal cortex (Augustine, 1996; Plassmann et al., 2007a; FitzGerald et al., 2009a).Here, I decorrelated choice from risk, offering the same gamble against different sureamounts, whereas many previous studies have characterised risk anticipation contingent onchoice rather than the process of quantifying decision statistics (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005;Preuschoff et al., 2006; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2009; Xue et al., 2010).
An anticipation of chosen risk could recruit insula activity, explaining consistent reports of(risk-attitude dependent) activity in this region. Thus in Chapter 5, where responses tostatistical moments are also conditioned on choice, the variance-related activity we see ininsula could reflect downstream emotional or physiological responses consequential ondetecting increased risk rather than direct risk-assessment itself. However, finding aparametric response to risk in these regions is less easily explained as a simple arousalresponse unless one invokes a monotonic relationship between risk and arousal. Rather, thispattern supports the idea that anterior insula is combining a statistical assessment of achoice with individual tastes for different aspects of risk to arrive at an integrated measure ofvalue.
These findings are further explored in Chapter 8, where I map the chronometry of riskprocessing. Interestingly, I find evidence for an influence of the insula at two time points,both concurrent with stimulus evaluation and immediately preceding action execution.Specifically, the insula expresses activity that predicts subsequent choice at 250-500 ms afterstimulus presentation. Moreover, the earlier that activity in insula predicts choice, the morelikely one is to be risk tolerant rather than risk averse. This activity starts slightly after theinitial encoding of risk itself, and the synchronicity of this response strongly suggests aninteraction between insula, parietal cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex at the time of
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stimulus evaluation which then subsequently influences action. Secondly, the insulareactivates strongly at 800-900 ms following stimulus evaluation, maximally for risk averseindividuals prior to choosing to gamble. This is entirely consistent with an affectiveanticipatory response, strongest in those who dislike taking risks. Thus, this tentatively tiestogether the two dominant theories of insula function in risky choice – not only does theinsula express an affective or emotional response prior to risk-taking, but also is centrallyinvolved in the evaluation of risk and its integration with intrinsic preferences.
9.3.4 SEARCHING FOR A HEDONIMETER
My finding that expected value and overall utility correlates with activity in mOFC supportsan hypothesis that mOFC integrates overall value (an estimate of mean and risk) given apredicted distribution of outcomes. In Chapter 5 these variables related to a distribution ofoutcomes not from a single choice but from a set of serial choices, forecast to the end of eachblock. This corroborates a suggestion that neural responses to value invoke an integrated,goal-directed, representation of choice (Quintana and Fuster, 1999; Fincham et al., 2002). In
Chapter 4, I also observe a signal correlating with utility in mOFC, albeit a weaker response.
The fact that these responses are much stronger in a sequential risk taking task, and arecommonly observed in experiments where reward feedback is given, hints at one possiblerole for the mOFC in decision making. As previously discussed, it is not necessary to invokean integrated area encoding utility to explain choice, rather a distributed network of areascould together causally influence neural activity leading to action in premotor and motorregions. However, encoding the predicted trajectories of events in the world is vital if we areto evaluate the consequences of our actions. Prefrontal cortex, with its central role inmaintaining strategy representations over several seconds by sustained delay-periodactivity, and its’ role in working memory maintenance modulated by dopamine (Sawaguchi,2001), would be suited for making these predictions. Hence OFC activity could reflectexpected value (contingent on choice or as a counterfactual response) not because it is theequivalent of an hedonimeter in the brain, directing actions in accordance with an internalutility scale, but rather because it predicts and anticipates future outcomes. This concordswith a Bayesian brain hypothesis (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston, 2010), but interestinglysuggests that OFC does not simply encode predicted states of the world, but also the likelyhedonic consequence of these states.
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9.3.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A critical future line of research is to explore the specific role of the insula in encoding riskpreference. I show strong evidence that the insula co-activates with risk-processing regionsfrom an early stage of information processing. Indeed, it appears that insula activates shortlyafter the PPC and DMPFC, in a way that temporally parallels intrinsic preference. Thissuggests the insula is receiving information from these more primary regions; what is lessclear is if the insula is concurrently modulating the activity within the aforementioned areasin a top-down fashion. This could be addressed in a causal analysis.
Moreover, the late reactivation of the insula which is seen in variance averse individuals in
Chapter 8, synchronous with motoric responses to choice, indicates a co-activation thatpotentially anticipates or predicts outcomes. An intriguing hypothesis for further explorationis that insula influences both the perception and anticipation of risk by message-passingbetween evaluative and executive regions of cortex. There is some evidence that disruptionsof insula function affect risk sensitivity and risky choice (Weller et al., 2009) –reversiblemodulations of insula activity at specific times during a decision process (e.g. withtranscranial magnetic stimulation) could determine if and how the insula fulfils these roles.Finally, there are unanswered questions about the role of the mOFC in risky choice.Comparisons between feedback and no-feedback paradigms, and situations where keepingtrack of risk between trials is required or superfluous could test the hypotheses aboutmaintenance and tracking of chosen risk in mOFC.
9.4 MODULATING RISK PREFERENCE
9.4.1 OVERVIEW AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In Chapters 6 & 7, I investigated how risk preferences are modulated by intrinsicphysiological state and extrinsic pharmacological manipulation respectively. I found asignificant effect of metabolic state on risk-preference that shifted decisions in a riskier orless risky direction depending upon the impact of a calorific meal. Conversely, I found nosystematic effect of dopamine administration on decision making under risk. These findingsare novel, and exploit the same theme of systematic experimental manipulations of risk inorder to quantify effects on valuation in a controlled manner.
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9.4.2 PHYSIOLOGICAL STATE
I demonstrate that metabolic state is an important modulator of risk preference. This is thefirst quantitative demonstration of an effect of physiological state on economic decisionmaking, and illustrates that biological effects can have systematic, non-trivial influences onfinancial choices. This counters some of the more heated arguments that neurobiology isirrelevant to economics, as here physiological state is an important predictor variable forbehaviour (and one that is amenable to biological influence).
It is interesting to speculate on the mechanism of such an effect in light of my other findings.There are several potential loci for this influence. Hypothalamus projects to both prefrontaland insular cortices, and hence may directly mediate such effects by relaying changes inhormonal state to risk processing areas. Alternatively, cortical neurons may be directlysensitive to ghrelin and leptin levels (as well as other peptide transmitters), as they expressrelevant receptors (albeit at low concentration) (Zigman et al., 2006).
9.4.3 NEUROMODULATORY INFLUENCES ON RISK
The lack of effect of levodopa on decision making is contrary to some previous assertionsthat dopamine may quantify risk. I suggest that instead dopamine is important duringreward feedback rather than risk evaluation. I utilised my paradigm design to dissociatepossible effects on the evaluation of different risk dimensions without feedback or learning.Although there are several caveats in the interpretation of such a null result, this providessome supportive evidence of absence of a neffect and is more specific than previousexperimental findings in the literature.
Although a lack of effect could be for pharmacokinetic or pharmacogenetic reasons, thedosage and schedule deliberated paralleled many previous studies using levodopa whereeffects have been demonstrated. Dopamine is however integral to reward processing,manifesting phasic and tonic responses, with striatal and prefrontal regions receivingnigrostriatal and mesocortical dopaminergic projections respectively. While the morphologyof in vivo physiological effects at the cellular level in response to acute levodopaadministration is unclear, one might reasonably expect a disruption with consequentbehavioural change. However this disruption does not appear to have an influence on theperception of risk or ability to execute appropriate and consistent action. Indeed one mightconjecture that dopaminergic transmission is unlikely to be an effective mediator of
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(complex) perceptual or cognitive information in itself given the sparsity of cortical andsubcortical projection targets. Instead, a modulatory role on action representation inresponse to environmental changes seems likely in view of dopamine’s diverse roles.
9.4.4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Other physiological drives have a substantial impact on behaviour – for instance thirst andemotional arousal have both been shown to influence risky choice (Isen and Geva, 1987;Hayden and Platt, 2009). One line of investigation is to explore the impact of these otherfactors on risky choice in a systematic manner exploiting the same paradigms.
A second important avenue is to map out the influence of other neuromodulatorytransmitters on risk perception, and conversely the response to feedback. Alternativetransmitters such as acetylcholine are present in higher concentration in sensory andassociative cortex, thus realistically may influence the perception of uncertainty. Serotonin isalso implicated in (negative) valuation (Daw et al., 2002), and serotonergic neurons from thedorsal raphe nucleus project densely to medial prefrontal cortex. Thus, serotonin is acandidate to influence both skewness representation, and to disrupt the maintenance ofanticipated value which we find in this region.
9.5 CONCLUSION
Neurobiological evidence can be used to furnish process theories of choice (i.e. theories thatdescribe choices as the product of a series of distinct computations in functionally oranatomically separable networks), and yield new hypotheses beyond the bounds oftraditional economic methodologies. Strong and vociferous arguments have been advancedabout the irrelevance of neuroscience in addressing traditional economic questions (Gul andPesendorfer, 2008, 2009), and from a more positive viewpoint about the scope andlimitations of neuroscientific evidence in illuminating economic theory (Harrison, 2008;Bernheim, 2009). However, while economic methodologies provide a clear quantitativeframework within which to explore the neurophysiology of decision making (and which Iexploit in these studies), I argue that a purely economic lens severely restricts the kind ofquestion asked about the causes of, and influences upon, human behaviours.
230
For example, the influence of affect or arousal on risky choice can be understood as amodulation of risk integration in neural regions typically reflecting interoceptive processes.Knowledge about attentional or limbic systems can inform out-of-sample predictions aboutthe influence of specific choice configurations on risky decision-making, where notablepsychological effects such as framing can be rephrased in neurobiological terms rather thanas purely descriptive economic theories (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Physiologicalinfluences on choice, known from the ecological literature, can be hypothesised to exert astate-dependent generic influence on risk processing at a basic neurophysiological level,leading to the expectation of an effect of metabolic state not only on decisions for food butalso for financial decisions Chapter 6, (Symmonds et al., 2010b). Effects of damage tospecific brain regions on decision making (Clark et al., 2008; Weller et al., 2009) can beinterpreted as deficits at specific points in a neural processing pathway, and modulatorypharmacological influences on risk-taking can be quantified (Chapter 7). Such exogenousinfluences are not within the scope of typical economic endeavour, despite their tangibleimpact.
Neural data can also help arbitrate between behavioural models, whether these arecompeting theories of risk (as in Chapter 4), or strategy evaluation (as in Chapter 5). Evenwhen different hypotheses are indistinguishable by observing choices alone, they can positvery different underlying structural mechanisms, such as the decomposition of predictedoutcomes into summary statistics. Moreover, elucidating structural mechanisms can yieldnew instruments for furnishing models – for example, constraints may be imposed by thetemporal processing of different dimensions of risk, and the time-sequence of the integrationof statistical information with subjective preference (Chapter 8), or by the way in whichnoise is introduced into decisions.
In conclusion, the studies in this thesis elaborate the neural mechanisms underlying howhumans make both single-shot and sequential decisions under risk, central elements indecision-making scenarios ranging from foraging to financial investment. This demonstratesthat phylogenetically ancient circuitry subserving valuation and reward decompose choiceinto their salient statistical features, enabling the sophisticated representation of the futureand its alternatives.
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Amounts (p)
Lottery 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260
Expected
value
Variance Skewness
1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 130 0.11 -0.83
2 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 132 0.11 -0.49
3 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0 0 0 0 130 0.11 -0.19
4 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 130 0.11 0.19
5 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0.4 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 128 0.11 0.49
6 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 130 0.11 0.81
7 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 126 0.18 -0.85
8 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0 0 0 0 132 0.18 -0.49
9 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 132 0.18 -0.17
10 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0 128 0.18 0.17
11 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0 128 0.18 0.49
12 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.6 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 128 0.17 0.83
13 0 0.1 0 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 126 0.24 -0.84
14 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 132 0.24 -0.50
15 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0 0.1 0.4 0 0 0.1 0 0 132 0.24 -0.18
16 0 0 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 128 0.24 0.18
17 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 128 0.24 0.50
18 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 128 0.24 0.83
19 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 132 0.31 -0.83
20 0 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 128 0.31 -0.50
21 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 128 0.31 -0.16
22 0 0 0.1 0 0.3 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 126 0.30 0.17
23 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.2 0 0 132 0.31 0.50
24 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0 126 0.30 0.83
25 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0 0 0.1 0 0 128 0.37 -0.83
26 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 126 0.37 -0.50
27 0 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.3 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 128 0.37 -0.17
28 0 0 0.1 0 0.3 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0 0.2 0 0 132 0.37 0.17
29 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 130 0.37 0.50
30 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.1 126 0.37 0.83
31 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.5 0 0 0 0 128 0.43 -0.83
32 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0 0.3 0 0.1 0 0 126 0.43 -0.50
33 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.3 0 0 0 126 0.43 -0.16
34 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0 134 0.43 0.16
35 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.3 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0 128 0.43 0.50
36 0 0 0 0.3 0 0.3 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 126 0.43 0.83
37 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 128 0.50 -0.84
38 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.3 0.2 0 0 0 126 0.50 -0.50
39 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0.2 0 0 126 0.50 -0.17
40 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 134 0.50 0.17
41 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0.3 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 128 0.50 0.50
42 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.3 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 132 0.50 0.84
43 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 0 0 132 0.56 -0.83
44 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.1 0 0 128 0.56 -0.50
45 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0.1 0 128 0.56 -0.17
46 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.1 0 0.1 132 0.56 0.17
47 0 0 0.1 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.1 132 0.56 0.50
48 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.2 126 0.56 0.84
49 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.4 0.2 0 0 0 132 0.62 -0.83
50 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.3 0.1 0 0.2 0 0 126 0.62 -0.50
51 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 126 0.62 -0.16
52 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0 0 0.2 0 126 0.62 0.17
53 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 126 0.62 0.50
54 0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 130 0.62 0.81
55 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0 0 0 132 0.69 -0.82
56 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 0 0.3 0 0.1 0 132 0.69 -0.50
57 0.2 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0.3 0.1 0 0 0.1 126 0.69 -0.16
58 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.3 0 132 0.69 0.17
59 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 132 0.69 0.50
60 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 128 0.69 0.82
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Lottery A Lottery B Expected value
difference Risk differenceCard 1 Card 2 Card 3 Card 4 Card 1 Card 2 Card 3 Card 4
20 20 20 20 0 0 20 100 10 2266.67
40 40 40 40 0 60 60 60 5 900.00
60 60 60 60 40 60 100 100 15 900.00
20 20 40 60 0 0 40 100 0 1866.67
0 20 20 40 0 0 0 80 0 1333.33
40 40 40 80 0 0 100 100 0 2933.33
20 40 60 80 0 20 40 100 -10 1200.00
0 20 20 20 0 0 20 60 5 700.00
20 20 20 40 0 20 80 100 25 2166.67
60 60 60 60 20 60 60 100 0 1066.67
40 40 40 80 0 0 0 100 -25 2100.00
60 60 60 60 0 20 20 100 -25 1966.67
80 80 80 80 60 100 100 100 10 400.00
0 20 40 60 20 20 100 100 30 1466.67
0 0 80 80 20 20 40 100 5 -700.00
20 20 20 20 0 60 60 80 30 1200.00
0 20 40 60 0 0 60 100 10 1733.33
0 0 0 60 0 40 40 100 30 800.00
20 40 40 100 0 40 60 100 0 533.33
20 40 80 80 0 0 0 100 -30 1600.00
40 40 40 80 0 80 80 80 10 1200.00
60 80 80 80 0 40 60 100 -25 1633.33
60 60 60 60 0 0 0 80 -40 1600.00
40 40 40 40 0 40 60 60 0 800.00
20 20 20 20 0 0 60 100 20 2400.00
0 20 40 40 20 20 40 100 20 1066.67
20 40 80 80 0 60 80 100 5 966.67
60 80 100 100 40 100 100 100 0 533.33
20 40 40 40 20 20 60 100 15 1366.67
40 40 100 100 20 60 100 100 0 266.67
20 20 20 20 0 40 40 40 10 400.00
0 0 40 40 20 40 60 100 35 633.33
20 40 60 80 0 0 60 100 -10 1733.33
20 60 60 100 0 0 80 100 -15 1700.00
0 0 40 40 20 20 80 100 35 1166.67
20 20 20 20 0 100 100 100 55 2500.00
0 20 20 40 0 0 0 60 -5 633.33
40 40 40 40 0 20 60 80 0 1333.33
20 20 20 40 0 0 60 80 10 1600.00
20 20 20 20 0 60 100 100 45 2233.33
60 60 60 60 40 40 40 80 -10 400.00
20 20 20 60 0 80 100 100 40 1866.67
0 60 60 60 20 40 40 100 5 300.00
20 40 40 60 0 60 80 100 20 1600.00
20 20 20 60 0 0 40 60 -5 500.00
0 0 20 20 0 0 0 60 5 766.67
80 80 80 80 40 40 100 100 -10 1200.00
80 80 80 80 20 20 80 100 -25 1700.00
80 80 80 80 40 60 100 100 -5 900.00
40 40 40 40 0 0 20 60 -20 800.00
80 80 80 80 0 0 20 100 -50 2266.67
0 60 60 60 40 60 60 80 15 -633.33
40 40 40 40 20 40 40 40 -5 100.00
0 0 20 40 0 0 0 80 5 1233.33
60 80 80 80 0 100 100 100 0 2400.00
0 0 0 60 20 40 40 40 20 -800.00
20 20 40 40 0 20 100 100 25 2633.33
40 40 40 40 20 40 80 80 15 900.00
0 20 40 40 0 0 20 80 0 1066.67
0 0 40 40 0 0 20 100 10 1733.33
20 20 40 60 0 40 40 80 5 700.00
0 40 40 40 20 40 60 80 20 266.67
60 60 60 60 40 40 80 100 5 900.00
0 0 60 60 0 20 40 100 10 666.67
0 20 20 60 0 0 60 80 10 1066.67
0 40 40 40 0 0 60 60 0 800.00
20 20 40 40 0 80 80 100 35 1833.33
20 20 20 20 0 20 80 80 25 1700.00
20 40 80 80 20 20 80 100 0 800.00
0 0 80 80 40 40 40 100 15 -1233.33
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0 40 40 40 20 60 60 100 30 666.67
60 60 60 60 40 40 80 80 0 533.33
0 20 40 40 20 20 80 100 30 1333.33
20 20 20 40 0 0 100 100 25 3233.33
0 0 40 60 0 20 40 60 5 -233.33
60 60 60 60 20 80 100 100 15 1433.33
20 20 20 20 0 0 0 60 -5 900.00
20 20 20 20 0 60 60 60 25 900.00
0 60 60 60 0 40 40 80 -5 166.67
20 20 40 60 0 20 20 80 -5 833.33
20 20 20 40 0 0 60 60 5 1100.00
0 0 0 60 40 40 100 100 55 300.00
0 0 40 40 20 60 80 80 40 266.67
0 20 20 60 0 0 80 100 20 2133.33
20 40 40 60 20 20 40 100 5 1166.67
0 60 60 60 20 20 80 80 5 300.00
20 40 80 80 0 0 80 100 -10 1866.67
0 20 20 20 0 0 60 80 20 1600.00
20 40 40 40 0 40 40 60 0 533.33
0 20 20 40 0 0 80 100 25 2500.00
60 80 80 80 20 60 80 100 -10 1066.67
60 60 60 60 0 0 0 100 -35 2500.00
20 40 80 80 40 60 60 100 10 -266.67
0 20 20 20 0 0 0 60 0 800.00
0 0 40 60 0 0 80 100 20 1866.67
20 20 20 40 0 0 0 60 -10 800.00
0 0 0 60 0 0 20 80 10 533.33
60 60 80 80 0 80 100 100 0 2133.33
0 0 20 20 0 20 20 60 15 500.00
20 20 40 40 0 0 40 80 0 1333.33
20 40 40 60 0 20 80 100 10 2000.00
0 0 40 40 20 40 60 60 25 -166.67
0 0 0 60 40 80 100 100 65 -100.00
20 40 40 40 0 80 80 80 25 1500.00
20 20 20 40 0 0 20 80 0 1333.33
20 20 20 60 0 0 0 100 -5 2100.00
0 40 40 40 20 20 60 60 10 133.33
0 20 40 40 0 0 80 80 15 1766.67
20 40 40 40 0 0 40 60 -10 800.00
60 60 80 80 20 100 100 100 10 1466.67
0 20 40 60 20 20 40 60 5 -300.00
0 40 40 40 20 40 40 100 20 800.00
60 60 60 60 40 60 80 80 5 366.67
20 20 20 60 0 40 40 60 5 233.33
0 0 0 60 20 20 80 100 40 800.00
20 40 60 80 0 40 60 100 0 1066.67
20 20 40 40 0 0 20 60 -10 666.67
0 20 40 60 20 20 80 100 25 1033.33
0 0 0 40 20 20 100 100 50 1733.33
0 0 20 20 0 0 20 60 10 666.67
60 60 60 60 0 0 60 80 -25 1700.00
40 40 40 80 0 80 80 100 15 1566.67
40 40 40 80 20 20 80 100 5 1300.00
0 20 20 20 0 0 60 100 25 2300.00
20 40 40 40 0 0 60 80 0 1600.00
0 60 60 60 20 20 80 100 10 800.00
60 60 60 60 0 40 60 80 -15 1166.67
0 0 80 80 40 60 100 100 35 -1233.33
20 20 20 60 0 0 80 100 15 2366.67
20 40 40 100 0 60 100 100 15 1033.33
20 40 40 60 0 100 100 100 35 2233.33
20 20 40 40 0 0 0 100 -5 2366.67
20 20 40 40 20 20 20 100 10 1466.67
40 40 40 40 20 60 80 80 20 800.00
20 20 20 40 0 40 80 80 25 1366.67
60 60 80 80 20 40 40 100 -20 1066.67
0 0 40 60 0 0 20 100 5 1366.67
20 20 20 40 0 60 80 100 35 1766.67
0 20 40 40 0 0 0 60 -10 533.33
60 60 60 60 40 100 100 100 25 900.00
0 60 60 60 0 0 20 100 -15 1366.67
0 0 80 80 40 100 100 100 45 -1233.33
20 40 40 40 0 20 60 60 0 800.00
0 20 40 40 20 20 60 100 25 1100.00
60 60 80 80 0 0 80 100 -25 2633.33
20 40 40 40 0 20 20 60 -10 533.33
0 0 40 40 0 0 20 80 5 900.00
60 80 80 80 0 80 80 100 -10 1866.67
0 0 80 80 40 80 100 100 40 -1333.33
0 60 60 60 0 20 20 80 -15 300.00
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0 40 40 40 20 20 20 80 5 500.00
60 60 80 80 0 40 80 100 -15 1833.33
40 40 40 40 0 20 60 60 -5 900.00
20 20 20 20 0 20 40 40 5 366.67
0 60 60 60 40 40 40 80 5 -500.00
0 20 20 40 0 0 40 100 15 1966.67
20 20 20 60 0 20 80 80 15 1300.00
0 20 20 20 0 0 20 40 0 266.67
20 20 40 60 0 0 60 100 5 2033.33
0 0 40 60 0 0 0 80 -5 700.00
20 40 40 60 0 20 40 80 -5 900.00
0 20 20 20 0 0 100 100 35 3233.33
0 20 40 60 0 0 60 80 5 1033.33
20 40 40 40 0 40 60 80 10 1066.67
80 80 80 80 40 40 80 100 -15 900.00
20 20 20 20 0 80 80 80 40 1600.00
20 20 40 40 0 20 20 100 5 1833.33
0 20 20 20 0 0 60 60 15 1100.00
20 20 40 40 0 60 80 80 25 1300.00
0 0 40 40 0 0 0 60 -5 366.67
20 20 20 40 0 0 0 100 0 2400.00
0 40 40 40 0 20 80 80 15 1300.00
0 60 60 60 0 20 60 100 0 1066.67
20 60 60 100 20 20 80 100 -5 633.33
20 20 20 40 0 60 60 60 20 800.00
20 20 40 40 0 0 0 60 -15 766.67
0 20 40 40 20 20 100 100 35 1766.67
80 80 80 80 0 40 60 100 -30 1733.33
20 20 40 60 0 0 0 100 -10 2133.33
40 40 40 40 20 20 20 60 -10 400.00
20 40 40 40 0 0 0 100 -10 2400.00
0 20 20 20 0 0 0 40 -5 300.00
60 80 80 80 60 80 100 100 10 266.67
20 20 20 20 0 0 60 80 15 1700.00
40 40 40 40 0 40 40 80 0 1066.67
20 20 40 40 0 0 60 80 5 1566.67
80 80 80 80 60 80 80 100 0 266.67
20 20 20 20 0 0 60 60 10 1200.00
20 20 20 20 0 0 40 40 0 533.33
20 20 20 40 0 0 40 40 -5 433.33
0 60 60 60 40 80 80 80 25 -500.00
20 20 20 20 0 0 20 60 0 800.00
0 0 20 20 0 0 0 40 0 266.67
20 40 40 40 0 0 80 80 5 2033.33
0 60 60 60 0 0 0 80 -25 700.00
20 20 40 60 0 40 100 100 25 2033.33
20 40 40 40 0 60 60 100 20 1600.00
0 0 0 60 40 40 40 100 40 0.00
20 40 40 60 0 20 20 80 -10 933.33
80 80 100 100 20 100 100 100 -10 1466.67
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Probabilities Amounts (£)
Trial p1 p2 p3 p4 m1 m2 m3 m4 EV Var
1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 3 1.5 5 3.5 3.25 0.66
2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 5.5 2 1 4.5 3.25 2.26
3 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 1 4.5 5.5 2 3.25 4.01
4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 6 0.5 5 1.5 3.25 5.76
5 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 5 6.5 0 1.5 3.25 7.56
6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 6.5 0.5 6 0 3.25 9.36
7 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 6.5 0.5 7 0 3.5 10.95
8 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0 0.5 6.5 7 3.5 11.60
9 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 5 4 2.5 3.5 3.75 0.51
10 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 6 2.5 5 1.5 3.75 2.26
11 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15 1.5 6 5 2.5 3.75 4.01
12 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 6.5 1 2 5.5 3.75 5.76
13 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 7.5 5.5 0 2 3.75 7.46
14 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 7 1 0.5 6.5 3.75 9.36
15 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 6.5 7.5 1 3.75 10.81
16 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0 7.5 1 6.5 3.75 12.76
17 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.5 7.5 0 7 3.75 13.01
18 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 0 7 7.5 0.5 3.75 13.36
19 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 3 5 3.5 4.5 4 0.48
20 0.25 0.15 0.1 0.5 2.5 6.5 1.5 4.5 4 2.25
21 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0 5 3 8 4 4.00
22 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 3 5 1 7 4 5.80
23 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0 5.5 7.5 3 4 7.50
24 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 1.5 7.5 6.5 4 9.25
25 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 1 7 7.5 0.5 4 10.95
26 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 3.5 8 4.5 0 4 12.85
27 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 7.5 8 0 4 14.50
28 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 7 0 8 1 4 14.60
29 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.35 0 0.5 7.5 8 4 14.88
30 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 7.5 0 8 4 15.25
31 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.35 4.5 5.5 3 4 4.25 0.51
32 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 2 3 5.5 6.5 4.25 2.26
33 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15 6.5 2 5.5 3 4.25 4.01
34 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.5 2.5 6 7 4.25 5.76
35 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 2.5 6 8 0.5 4.25 7.46
36 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3.5 5 0 8.5 4.25 9.31
37 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 5 0 3.5 8.5 4.25 11.06
38 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 1.5 8 0.5 7 4.25 12.76
39 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 8.5 4 0 4.5 4.25 14.46
40 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 8.5 8 4.25 16.06
261
41 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0 8 8.5 4.25 16.46
42 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 7.5 8.5 1 0 4.25 16.56
43 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 8 0 0.5 8.5 4.25 16.86
44 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0 8 0.5 8.5 4.25 17.26
45 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15 5 4 5.5 3.5 4.5 0.48
46 0.1 0.15 0.5 0.25 2 7 5 3 4.5 2.25
47 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 3.5 8.5 5.5 0.5 4.5 4.00
48 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 3.5 1.5 5.5 7.5 4.5 5.80
49 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 6 3.5 8 4.5 7.50
50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 2 7 8 1 4.5 9.25
51 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 8 7.5 1.5 1 4.5 10.95
52 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 5 4 0.5 8.5 4.5 12.85
53 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 8 1 0.5 8.5 4.5 14.50
54 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 9 1 8 0 4.5 16.25
55 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 8 1 0 9 4.5 17.85
56 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.5 7.5 0 9 4.5 18.00
57 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 9 0.5 8.5 4.5 18.13
58 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 9 0.5 0 8.5 4.5 18.55
59 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 9 1 0 8 4.5 18.65
60 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 9 8.5 0 0.5 4.5 18.98
61 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 9 0 8.5 0.5 4.5 19.40
62 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 3.5 6 4.5 5 4.75 0.51
63 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 6 7 3.5 2.5 4.75 2.26
64 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 3.5 6 2.5 7 4.75 4.01
65 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 9.5 0 6 3.5 4.75 5.76
66 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 8.5 1 3 6.5 4.75 7.46
67 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 5.5 4 9 0.5 4.75 9.31
68 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 9 5.5 0.5 4 4.75 11.06
69 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 2 7.5 8.5 1 4.75 12.76
70 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 5 0.5 9 4.5 4.75 14.46
71 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 3.5 6 9.5 0 4.75 16.26
72 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 9.5 7.5 0 2 4.75 18.06
73 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0 0.5 9.5 9 4.75 19.86
74 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 8.5 9.5 1 0 4.75 20.01
75 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 8 0 9.5 1.5 4.75 20.16
76 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 9 0.5 9.5 0 4.75 20.31
77 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 9.5 0 9 4.75 20.76
78 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 1 9.5 0 8.5 4.75 20.86
79 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.5 9 9.5 0 4.75 21.21
80 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0 9.5 9 0.5 4.75 21.66
81 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.15 4 4.5 5.5 6 5 0.48
82 0.5 0.15 0.1 0.25 5.5 7.5 2.5 3.5 5 2.25
83 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 9 1 4 6 5 4.00
84 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 10 6 0 4 5 5.80
85 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 8.5 1 6.5 4 5 7.50
86 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 7.5 8.5 1.5 2.5 5 9.25
87 0.15 0.35 0.4 0.1 10 2 7 0 5 11.00
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88 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 9 1 5.5 4.5 5 12.85
89 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 0 10 7 5 14.50
90 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 9.5 8.5 1.5 5 16.25
91 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 8 2 9.5 5 18.00
92 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 9 10 1 0 5 19.60
93 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 10 9 0 1 5 21.40
94 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 10 9.5 5 22.63
95 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 10 0 9.5 0.5 5 23.10
96 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 10 1 9 0 5 23.20
97 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15 0 10 9.5 0.5 5 23.58
98 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0 0.5 9.5 10 5 24.05
99 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 4 5.5 6.5 5 5.25 0.51
100 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 4 7.5 6.5 3 5.25 2.26
101 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 6.5 4 3 7.5 5.25 4.01
102 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 10 6.5 4 5.25 5.76
103 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 3.5 1.5 7 9 5.25 7.46
104 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.5 1 9.5 6 5.25 9.31
105 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 5.5 0 10.5 5 5.25 11.06
106 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 8 9 1.5 2.5 5.25 12.76
107 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 9.5 5 5.5 1 5.25 14.46
108 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.35 10 4 6.5 0.5 5.25 16.26
109 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 8 10 2.5 0.5 5.25 18.06
110 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 10.5 4 0 6.5 5.25 19.76
111 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 10.5 2.5 0 8 5.25 21.56
112 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 3 10.5 7.5 0 5.25 23.06
113 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 7 4 5 6 5.5 0.65
114 0.5 0.25 0.15 0.1 6 4 8 3 5.5 2.25
115 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 4.5 9.5 1.5 6.5 5.5 4.00
116 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 10.5 6.5 0.5 4.5 5.5 5.80
117 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.5 4.5 9 7 5.5 7.50
118 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 7.5 11 3.5 0 5.5 9.25
119 0.35 0.15 0.4 0.1 2.5 10.5 7.5 0.5 5.5 11.00
120 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 6.5 4.5 0 11 5.5 12.70
121 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0 7.5 11 3.5 5.5 14.50
122 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 11 7 0 5.5 16.25
123 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 10 2.5 8.5 1 5.5 18.00
124 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 7.5 11 0 3.5 5.5 19.75
125 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 4.5 6.5 11 0 5.5 21.48
126 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 11 0 10 1 5.5 23.25
127 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 6 5.5 7.5 4 5.75 0.66
128 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 8 4.5 7 3.5 5.75 2.26
129 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 3.5 7 8 4.5 5.75 4.01
130 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 7 10.5 1 4.5 5.75 5.76
131 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 2 9.5 4 7.5 5.75 7.46
132 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.5 10 6.5 5 5.75 9.31
133 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 11.5 0 7 4.5 5.75 11.01
134 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 2 9.5 3 8.5 5.75 12.76
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135 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 5.5 6 10 1.5 5.75 14.46
136 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 11.5 8 0 3.5 5.75 16.26
137 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 0 11.5 7.5 5.75 18.06
138 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.15 0 9.5 2 11.5 5.75 19.76
139 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.15 3 11 0.5 8.5 5.75 21.56
140 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 0 5 11.5 6.5 5.75 23.31
141 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 6.5 4 8 5.5 6 1.00
142 0.25 0.5 0.15 0.1 4.5 6.5 8.5 3.5 6 2.25
143 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 10 5 2 7 6 4.00
144 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 7 1 5 11 6 5.80
145 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 7.5 9.5 5 2 6 7.50
146 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 8 11.5 4 6 9.25
147 0.15 0.1 0.4 0.35 11 1 8 3 6 11.00
148 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 5 0.5 7 11.5 6 12.70
149 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 11.5 8 4 6 14.50
150 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 11.5 4.5 7.5 6 16.25
151 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 10.5 3 9 1.5 6 18.00
152 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 4 0.5 8 11.5 6 19.75
153 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.35 11.5 7 5 0.5 6 21.48
154 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.5 1.5 10.5 11.5 6 23.25
155 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 6 4 6.5 8.5 6.25 1.06
156 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 8.5 4 7.5 5 6.25 2.26
157 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 4 7.5 8.5 5 6.25 4.01
158 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 7.5 5 1.5 11 6.25 5.76
159 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 4.5 8 2.5 10 6.25 7.46
160 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 7 2 5.5 10.5 6.25 9.31
161 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15 5 7.5 12 0.5 6.25 11.01
162 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 9 10 3.5 2.5 6.25 12.76
163 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 2 6 6.5 10.5 6.25 14.46
164 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 4 12 0.5 8.5 6.25 16.26
165 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.5 8 12 0.5 6.25 18.06
166 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 12 2.5 0.5 10 6.25 19.76
167 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.35 1 3.5 9 11.5 6.25 21.56
168 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 12 7 0.5 5.5 6.25 23.31
169 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 7 4 9 6 6.5 1.45
170 0.1 0.25 0.15 0.5 4 5 9 7 6.5 2.25
171 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 7.5 10.5 5.5 2.5 6.5 4.00
172 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 5.5 1.5 7.5 11.5 6.5 5.80
173 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 5.5 8 10 2.5 6.5 7.50
174 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 12 4.5 1 8.5 6.5 9.25
175 0.4 0.35 0.1 0.15 8.5 3.5 1.5 11.5 6.5 11.00
176 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 7.5 1 12 5.5 6.5 12.70
177 0.25 0.15 0.1 0.5 12 0 7.5 5.5 6.5 14.50
178 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 12 1 5 8 6.5 16.25
179 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 11 3.5 9.5 2 6.5 18.00
180 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 1 8.5 4.5 12 6.5 19.75
181 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 5.5 7.5 12 1 6.5 21.48
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182 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 1 12 11 2 6.5 23.25
183 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 6.5 9.5 4 7 6.75 1.56
184 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 6.5 4 7 9.5 6.75 2.31
185 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 5 4 9.5 8.5 6.75 3.96
186 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 5.5 8 2 11.5 6.75 5.76
187 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 8.5 10.5 3 5 6.75 7.46
188 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 2.5 6 11 7.5 6.75 9.31
189 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 7 6.5 12 1.5 6.75 11.06
190 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 9.5 4 3 10.5 6.75 12.76
191 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 6.5 2.5 11 7 6.75 14.46
192 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15 2 11.5 5.5 8 6.75 16.26
193 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.35 11.5 9.5 4 2 6.75 18.06
194 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 12 8 1.5 5.5 6.75 19.76
195 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 4 9.5 1.5 12 6.75 21.56
196 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 1.5 9 12 4.5 6.75 23.06
197 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 6.5 7.5 4 10 7 2.00
198 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 10 6 4 8 7 2.60
199 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 3 11 8 6 7 4.00
200 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 6 8 12 2 7 5.80
201 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 6 8.5 10.5 3 7 7.50
202 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 10.5 9.5 3.5 4.5 7 9.25
203 0.1 0.4 0.15 0.35 2 9 12 4 7 11.00
204 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 11 6.5 3 7.5 7 12.85
205 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 5 2 9 12 7 14.50
206 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 11.5 2.5 10.5 3.5 7 16.25
207 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 2.5 10 11.5 4 7 18.00
208 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 2 3 11 12 7 19.60
209 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 11 3 12 2 7 21.40
210 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 2.5 2 12 11.5 7 23.10
211 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 2 3 11 12 7 23.20
212 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 7.5 4 7 10.5 7.25 2.16
213 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 8 4 6.5 10.5 7.25 2.56
214 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 3 6.5 8 11.5 7.25 4.06
215 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 2.5 6 8.5 12 7.25 5.76
216 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 5.5 9 11 3.5 7.25 7.46
217 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 8 6.5 3 11.5 7.25 9.31
218 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 6.5 3 11.5 8 7.25 11.06
219 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 3.5 10 4.5 11 7.25 12.76
220 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 7.5 7 11.5 3 7.25 14.46
221 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 8.5 12 6 2.5 7.25 16.26
222 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.35 2.5 4.5 10 12 7.25 18.06
223 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 3 2.5 12 11.5 7.25 19.86
224 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 12 2.5 11.5 3 7.25 20.31
225 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 2.5 3 12 11.5 7.25 20.76
226 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 11 2.5 12 3.5 7.25 20.86
227 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15 2.5 12 11.5 3 7.25 21.21
228 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 2.5 12 11.5 3 7.25 21.66
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229 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 4 7 8 11 7.5 2.65
230 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 11 8.5 4 6.5 7.5 3.25
231 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 11.5 3.5 8.5 6.5 7.5 4.00
232 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 9 12 6 3 7.5 5.85
233 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 3.5 6.5 11 9 7.5 7.50
234 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 11 4 5 10 7.5 9.25
235 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 11 4 10.5 4.5 7.5 10.95
236 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 8 7 11.5 3.5 7.5 12.85
237 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 11 3.5 11.5 4 7.5 14.50
238 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 11 4 12 3 7.5 16.25
239 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 12 10.5 3 4.5 7.5 18.00
240 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15 12 3 3.5 11.5 7.5 18.98
241 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 12 3.5 3 11.5 7.5 19.40
242 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 7.5 8 4 11.5 7.75 2.86
243 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 11.5 4 7 8.5 7.75 3.26
244 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 3.5 12 11.5 7.75 16.06
245 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 4 12 3.5 11.5 7.75 17.26
246 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 12 7 9 4 8 4.00
247 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 7 3 8 12 8 6.00
248 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 9.5 4 7 11.5 8 7.50
249 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 5.5 4 10.5 12 8 9.18
250 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 12 4 5 11 8 11.10
251 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 8.5 7.5 4 12 8 12.85
252 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 4 12 11.5 4.5 8 14.50
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Probabilities Amounts
Trial p1 p2 p3 p4 m1 m2 m3 m4 EV Var Skew
1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 6.5 3.5 7 6 6.05 1.72 -2.95
2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 6 9.5 5 4 6.05 1.72 3.13
3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 6.5 7 6 1.5 5.95 2.27 -8.60
4 0.55 0.1 0.1 0.25 5.5 10.5 4 6 5.975 2.56 8.44
5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 6.5 6 1 7 6.05 2.92 -12.58
6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 11 4 6 5.5 5.95 3.07 12.07
7 0.15 0.1 0.55 0.2 2 8 7 5.5 6.05 3.40 -8.78
8 0.55 0.1 0.15 0.2 5 4 10 6.5 5.95 3.40 8.78
9 0.35 0.15 0.3 0.2 6.5 4.5 8 3 5.95 3.42 -2.95
10 0.2 0.35 0.15 0.3 9 5.5 7.5 4 6.05 3.42 2.95
11 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 6.5 6 7 0.5 6.05 3.52 -16.72
12 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 6 0.5 8 6.5 5.95 3.57 -15.23
13 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 4 11.5 6 5.5 6.05 3.57 15.23
14 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 6 0 6.5 7 5.95 4.02 -20.63
15 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 6.5 0 6 7 6.05 4.17 -21.69
16 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 0 7.5 6.5 7 6.05 4.17 -21.61
17 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 4 12 6 5.5 6.05 4.17 20.09
18 0.2 0.1 0.55 0.15 6.5 0 7 6 6.05 4.20 -21.65
19 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 5 4 5.5 12 5.95 4.27 21.25
20 0.1 0.45 0.1 0.35 4 5 12 6 5.95 4.45 21.02
21 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 3.5 12 7 5 5.95 5.02 20.39
22 0.25 0.1 0.55 0.1 5 6.5 7.5 0 6.025 5.11 -20.36
23 0.15 0.4 0.1 0.35 7 8 0.5 5 6.05 5.12 -14.41
24 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 7 5 2 9.5 6.05 5.12 -8.78
25 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 5 10 7 2.5 5.95 5.12 8.78
26 0.1 0.15 0.35 0.4 11.5 5 7 4 5.95 5.12 14.41
27 0.2 0.15 0.4 0.25 2.5 5 8.5 5.5 6.025 5.16 -2.89
28 0.2 0.15 0.4 0.25 9.5 7 3.5 6.5 5.975 5.16 2.89
29 0.15 0.1 0.6 0.15 7.5 6.5 7 0.5 6.05 5.50 -24.66
30 0.55 0.2 0.15 0.1 5 5.5 11.5 4 5.975 5.54 24.00
31 0.1 0.15 0.15 0.6 4 11.5 5.5 5 5.95 5.57 24.37
32 0.1 0.1 0.65 0.15 7.5 6.5 7 0 5.95 6.30 -30.46
33 0.15 0.6 0.15 0.1 7.5 7 0 6.5 5.975 6.36 -30.80
34 0.55 0.1 0.2 0.15 5 4 5.5 12 6.05 6.40 30.07
35 0.15 0.1 0.6 0.15 12 4 5 5.5 6.025 6.44 30.50
36 0.15 0.1 0.65 0.1 12 5.5 5 4 6 6.48 30.94
37 0.25 0.5 0.15 0.1 7.5 7 0 6.5 6.025 6.49 -31.53
38 0.45 0.15 0.3 0.1 7 0 7.5 6.5 6.05 6.55 -31.91
39 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15 7 7.5 6.5 0 6.05 6.57 -31.84
40 0.55 0.15 0.15 0.15 5 5.5 12 4 5.975 6.59 31.13
41 0.1 0.15 0.15 0.6 5.5 4 12 5 5.95 6.62 31.58
42 0.65 0.15 0.1 0.1 5 12 3.5 5.5 5.95 6.70 31.18
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43 0.15 0.2 0.2 0.45 12 4 5.5 5 5.95 6.70 31.33
44 0.55 0.1 0.1 0.25 5 12 10 4 5.95 6.75 26.46
45 0.5 0.1 0.25 0.15 7.5 5.5 7 0 6.05 6.80 -31.49
46 0.2 0.35 0.15 0.3 7.5 8 7 2 5.95 6.80 -14.56
47 0.3 0.2 0.35 0.15 10 4.5 4 5 6.05 6.80 14.56
48 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 1 7 0.5 7.5 5.95 6.82 -26.36
49 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 1 7.5 8 6 5.95 6.82 -20.44
50 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 6 11 4 4.5 6.05 6.82 20.44
51 0.2 0.4 0.25 0.15 5 8.5 2 7 5.95 6.85 -8.77
52 0.2 0.15 0.4 0.25 7 5 3.5 10 6.05 6.85 8.77
53 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.5 8 9 2.5 6 6.88 -2.81
54 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 3 9.5 7.5 6 6.88 2.81
55 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0 7 0.5 7.5 6 8.30 -35.78
56 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0 6 3 8.5 6.05 8.52 -20.47
57 0.3 0.35 0.2 0.15 8.5 2 7.5 8 5.95 8.52 -14.56
58 0.15 0.3 0.35 0.2 4 3.5 10 4.5 6.05 8.52 14.56
59 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 12 3.5 6 9 5.95 8.52 20.47
60 0.1 0.15 0.5 0.25 3 0 8 7 6.05 8.55 -32.13
61 0.25 0.5 0.15 0.1 5 4 12 9 5.95 8.55 32.13
62 0.25 0.15 0.4 0.2 9 7 6.5 0.5 6 8.55 -26.33
63 0.4 0.2 0.25 0.15 5.5 11.5 3 5 6 8.55 26.33
64 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 6.5 11.5 8 1 6.05 8.57 -8.77
65 0.2 0.15 0.3 0.35 8.5 4.5 9 2.5 5.95 8.57 -3.00
66 0.2 0.3 0.35 0.15 3.5 3 9.5 7.5 6.05 8.57 3.00
67 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 4 5.5 0.5 11 5.95 8.57 8.77
68 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 12 11.5 5 4 5.95 8.62 35.93
69 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0 8.5 7.5 7 5.95 9.02 -38.63
70 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 12 5 4.5 3.5 6.05 9.02 38.63
71 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.45 7.5 0.5 3.5 8.5 5.95 10.25 -26.38
72 0.2 0.45 0.2 0.15 11.5 3.5 4.5 8.5 6.05 10.25 26.38
73 0.15 0.2 0.4 0.25 10 0 6.5 7.5 5.975 10.26 -31.94
74 0.15 0.1 0.6 0.15 0.5 3.5 8.5 3 5.975 10.26 -20.42
75 0.1 0.5 0.25 0.15 4.5 9 4 0.5 6.025 10.26 -14.56
76 0.45 0.25 0.15 0.15 2.5 8 9 10 5.975 10.26 -2.87
77 0.45 0.25 0.15 0.15 9.5 4 2 3 6.025 10.26 2.87
78 0.25 0.1 0.5 0.15 8 7.5 3 11.5 5.975 10.26 14.56
79 0.6 0.15 0.1 0.15 3.5 11.5 8.5 9 6.025 10.26 20.42
80 0.2 0.4 0.25 0.15 12 5.5 4.5 2 6.025 10.26 31.94
81 0.5 0.2 0.15 0.15 8 0 5 8.5 6.025 10.29 -37.78
82 0.1 0.35 0.2 0.35 1 8.5 9.5 3 6.025 10.29 -8.68
83 0.35 0.1 0.35 0.2 3.5 11 9 2.5 5.975 10.29 8.68
84 0.5 0.2 0.15 0.15 4 12 3.5 7 5.975 10.29 37.78
85 0.15 0.4 0.1 0.35 9.5 9 3 2 6.025 11.94 -8.76
86 0.4 0.35 0.15 0.1 3 10 2.5 9 5.975 11.94 8.76
87 0.4 0.25 0.1 0.25 9 7.5 4.5 0.5 6.05 11.95 -32.08
88 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.45 8 6 1 9 6.05 11.95 -26.34
89 0.3 0.15 0.1 0.45 11 6 4 3 5.95 11.95 26.34
90 0.1 0.4 0.25 0.25 7.5 3 11.5 4.5 5.95 11.95 32.08
91 0.25 0.25 0.1 0.4 2 6.5 0.5 9.5 5.975 11.99 -14.56
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92 0.25 0.2 0.25 0.3 4 10.5 1.5 8.5 6.025 11.99 -2.77
93 0.25 0.2 0.25 0.3 10.5 1.5 8 3.5 5.975 11.99 2.77
94 0.25 0.4 0.1 0.25 10 2.5 11.5 5.5 6.025 11.99 14.56
95 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.55 2.5 7 0 8.5 5.975 12.01 -37.84
96 0.15 0.55 0.2 0.1 5 3.5 12 9.5 6.025 12.01 37.84
97 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.45 0.5 10 1.5 7 5.95 12.02 -20.37
98 0.25 0.45 0.15 0.15 2 5 11.5 10.5 6.05 12.02 20.37
99 0.15 0.45 0.25 0.15 10.5 2 9.5 7.5 5.975 13.64 -2.88
100 0.25 0.45 0.15 0.15 2.5 10 1.5 4.5 6.025 13.64 2.88
101 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 6 0 4 10.5 5.95 13.67 -14.61
102 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.5 12 6 8 6.05 13.67 14.61
103 0.25 0.2 0.35 0.2 9.5 0 8.5 3.5 6.05 13.70 -32.19
104 0.35 0.15 0.2 0.3 9 0 9.5 3 5.95 13.70 -20.42
105 0.2 0.15 0.3 0.35 2.5 12 9 3 6.05 13.70 20.42
106 0.2 0.2 0.35 0.25 12 8.5 3.5 2.5 5.95 13.70 32.19
107 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.45 10 3.5 0.5 8.5 5.975 13.71 -26.28
108 0.35 0.2 0.35 0.1 10 8 2.5 0.5 6.025 13.71 -8.67
109 0.2 0.1 0.35 0.35 4 11.5 2 9.5 5.975 13.71 8.67
110 0.45 0.15 0.25 0.15 3.5 2 11.5 8.5 6.025 13.71 26.28
111 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.15 9.5 0.5 7.5 8.5 6.05 13.75 -37.90
112 0.3 0.15 0.3 0.25 11.5 3.5 4.5 2.5 5.95 13.75 37.90
113 0.2 0.2 0.45 0.15 7 0 9.5 2 5.975 15.31 -32.16
114 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.45 5 12 10 2.5 6.025 15.31 32.16
115 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.5 2 9 10 6 15.35 -26.18
116 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 2 10 11.5 3 6 15.35 26.18
117 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.55 8.5 1 0.5 9 6.05 15.37 -37.92
118 0.55 0.2 0.15 0.1 3 11.5 11 3.5 5.95 15.37 37.92
119 0.2 0.3 0.25 0.25 11.5 6.5 0 7 6 15.38 -20.44
120 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.3 0.5 5 12 5.5 6 15.38 20.44
121 0.3 0.1 0.25 0.35 10.5 6 7.5 1 5.975 15.39 -14.41
122 0.3 0.35 0.1 0.25 1.5 11 6 4.5 6.025 15.39 14.41
123 0.25 0.35 0.2 0.2 1.5 8.5 11 2 5.95 15.45 -2.80
124 0.35 0.2 0.2 0.25 3.5 10 1 10.5 6.05 15.45 2.80
125 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.5 5 9.5 10 6 15.45 -8.78
126 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 2 2.5 7 10.5 6 15.45 8.78
127 0.15 0.1 0.4 0.35 9.5 10.5 1 9 6.025 17.01 -26.28
128 0.15 0.1 0.35 0.4 2.5 1.5 3 11 5.975 17.01 26.28
129 0.15 0.25 0.2 0.4 3 0 9 9.5 6.05 17.05 -38.06
130 0.4 0.2 0.15 0.25 2.5 3 9 12 5.95 17.05 38.06
131 0.5 0.15 0.2 0.15 10 0.5 4 1 6.025 17.09 -14.59
132 0.2 0.5 0.15 0.15 8 2 11.5 11 5.975 17.09 14.59
133 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 10.5 10 1 2.5 6 17.10 -3.15
134 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 11 9.5 2 1.5 6 17.10 3.15
135 0.1 0.15 0.4 0.35 11.5 8.5 1 9 5.975 17.11 -20.29
136 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 4.5 8.5 1 10.5 5.975 17.11 -8.74
137 0.35 0.15 0.35 0.15 11 7.5 1.5 3.5 6.025 17.11 8.74
138 0.35 0.15 0.4 0.1 3 3.5 11 0.5 6.025 17.11 20.29
139 0.4 0.1 0.35 0.15 9.5 10 0.5 6.5 5.95 17.12 -32.09
140 0.1 0.15 0.4 0.35 2 5.5 2.5 11.5 6.05 17.12 32.09
269
141 0.25 0.4 0.2 0.15 1.5 10.5 1 8 5.975 18.76 -8.72
142 0.25 0.2 0.4 0.15 10.5 11 1.5 4 6.025 18.76 8.72
143 0.3 0.3 0.25 0.15 0 9.5 10 4.5 6.025 18.81 -37.85
144 0.1 0.25 0.2 0.45 11 0 3 9.5 5.975 18.81 -26.20
145 0.25 0.1 0.45 0.2 12 1 2.5 9 6.025 18.81 26.20
146 0.3 0.3 0.25 0.15 2.5 12 2 7.5 5.975 18.81 37.85
147 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 7 0.5 1 10.5 5.95 18.82 -14.66
148 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 11.5 1.5 11 5 6.05 18.82 14.66
149 0.3 0.35 0.15 0.2 0 7.5 6.5 12 6 18.83 -20.40
150 0.15 0.3 0.4 0.15 1 1.5 9 12 6 18.83 -2.89
151 0.15 0.4 0.15 0.3 11 3 0 10.5 6 18.83 2.89
152 0.3 0.15 0.2 0.35 12 5.5 0 4.5 6 18.83 20.40
153 0.25 0.35 0.2 0.2 9 10 1 0.5 6.05 18.90 -31.96
154 0.2 0.25 0.35 0.2 11.5 3 2 11 5.95 18.90 31.96
155 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 10.5 1 0.5 3 6.05 20.47 -8.68
156 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 11.5 11 9 1.5 5.95 20.47 8.68
157 0.35 0.15 0.4 0.1 11 9 1 4 6 20.50 -3.00
158 0.4 0.35 0.1 0.15 11 1 8 3 6 20.50 3.00
159 0.45 0.1 0.2 0.25 1 11.5 10 9.5 5.975 20.54 -14.55
160 0.25 0.1 0.45 0.2 2.5 0.5 11 2 6.025 20.54 14.55
161 0.2 0.2 0.35 0.25 8.5 7.5 0 11 5.95 20.55 -37.47
162 0.35 0.2 0.2 0.25 12 3.5 4.5 1 6.05 20.55 37.47
163 0.2 0.2 0.45 0.15 0.5 6 10.5 0 6.025 20.56 -26.21
164 0.2 0.45 0.25 0.1 2.5 9.5 0 12 5.975 20.56 -20.14
165 0.45 0.1 0.2 0.25 2.5 0 9.5 12 6.025 20.56 20.14
166 0.45 0.2 0.2 0.15 1.5 11.5 6 12 5.975 20.56 26.21
167 0.4 0.15 0.35 0.1 0.5 11 9 10 6 20.60 -31.95
168 0.35 0.4 0.1 0.15 3 11.5 2 1 6 20.60 31.95
169 0.4 0.35 0.1 0.15 11 0.5 2.5 7.5 5.95 22.15 -8.69
170 0.4 0.1 0.15 0.35 1 9.5 4.5 11.5 6.05 22.15 8.69
171 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 8.5 1.5 10.5 0 6.05 22.17 -37.66
172 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.5 12 3.5 10.5 5.95 22.17 37.66
173 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 11.5 7.5 8 0.5 6 22.20 -14.70
174 0.15 0.15 0.45 0.25 3 4 11 0 6 22.20 -3.00
175 0.15 0.45 0.25 0.15 8 1 12 9 6 22.20 3.00
176 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 4.5 4 11.5 6 22.20 14.70
177 0.1 0.15 0.4 0.35 4.5 11.5 9.5 0 5.975 22.26 -32.16
178 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.35 6.5 11.5 10.5 0 5.975 22.26 -26.16
179 0.1 0.25 0.15 0.5 5 0 1.5 10.5 5.975 22.26 -20.54
180 0.5 0.15 0.25 0.1 1.5 10.5 12 7 6.025 22.26 20.54
181 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.35 0.5 5.5 1.5 12 6.025 22.26 26.16
182 0.4 0.35 0.15 0.1 2.5 12 0.5 7.5 6.025 22.26 32.16
183 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 2 7.5 0 12 6.05 23.87 -8.97
184 0.15 0.4 0.3 0.15 8.5 0.5 12 6.5 6.05 23.87 -2.97
185 0.15 0.4 0.3 0.15 3.5 11.5 0 5.5 5.95 23.87 2.97
186 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0 4.5 10 12 5.95 23.87 8.97
187 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 5 8 11.5 0 5.975 23.94 -14.52
188 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.15 4 12 0.5 7 6.025 23.94 14.52
189 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 10.5 0 0.5 6.5 5.95 23.97 -32.27
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190 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 5.5 12 1.5 11.5 6.05 23.97 32.27
191 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.4 0 7.5 0.5 11 5.975 23.99 -26.48
192 0.4 0.15 0.2 0.25 1 11.5 4.5 12 6.025 23.99 26.48
193 0.1 0.15 0.35 0.4 1 11.5 0.5 10 6 24.03 -20.18
194 0.15 0.35 0.4 0.1 0.5 11.5 2 11 6 24.03 20.18
195 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.4 12 9 10 0 5.95 24.25 -38.41
196 0.4 0.25 0.25 0.1 12 2 3 0 6.05 24.25 38.41
197 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 7 0 11 10.5 6.05 25.57 -37.80
198 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 1 5 1.5 12 5.95 25.57 37.80
199 0.45 0.2 0.15 0.2 0.5 11 11.5 9.5 6.05 25.60 -20.18
200 0.2 0.2 0.45 0.15 1 2.5 11.5 0.5 5.95 25.60 20.18
201 0.4 0.35 0.15 0.1 0 11 10 7 6.05 25.65 -36.80
202 0.5 0.15 0.25 0.1 11 1 0 4 6.05 25.65 -14.90
203 0.1 0.5 0.15 0.25 8 1 11 12 5.95 25.65 14.90
204 0.1 0.4 0.15 0.35 5 12 2 1 5.95 25.65 36.80
205 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 9.5 11 0 6.5 6 25.65 -32.10
206 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1 1 5.5 12 2.5 6 25.65 32.10
207 0.1 0.25 0.45 0.2 8.5 12 0.5 9.5 5.975 25.69 -8.80
208 0.25 0.45 0.2 0.1 0 11.5 2.5 3.5 6.025 25.69 8.80
209 0.35 0.1 0.45 0.1 0 2.5 11 8.5 6.05 25.70 -25.93
210 0.15 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0 1.5 11 5.95 25.70 -2.98
211 0.25 0.1 0.5 0.15 10.5 12 1 11.5 6.05 25.70 2.98
212 0.1 0.35 0.45 0.1 3.5 12 1 9.5 5.95 25.70 25.93
213 0.3 0.1 0.25 0.35 10.5 1.5 11 0 6.05 26.95 -30.17
214 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.1 12 1.5 1 10.5 5.95 26.95 30.17
215 0.35 0.3 0.1 0.25 0 12 2 9 6.05 27.25 -14.54
216 0.1 0.35 0.25 0.3 10 12 3 0 5.95 27.25 14.54
217 0.4 0.35 0.1 0.15 11.5 0 9.5 3 6 27.28 -8.81
218 0.35 0.4 0.15 0.1 12 0.5 9 2.5 6 27.28 8.81
219 0.25 0.1 0.25 0.4 10 5.5 12 0 6.05 27.42 -20.53
220 0.1 0.4 0.25 0.25 6.5 12 2 0 5.95 27.42 20.53
221 0.1 0.35 0.45 0.1 5.5 0 11.5 2.5 5.975 27.46 -2.97
222 0.1 0.1 0.35 0.45 9.5 6.5 12 0.5 6.025 27.46 2.97
223 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.45 12 0 0.5 10.5 6.05 27.47 -26.31
224 0.25 0.1 0.2 0.45 11.5 0 12 1.5 5.95 27.47 26.31
225 0.4 0.15 0.15 0.3 11.5 0.5 9 0 6.025 28.79 -21.32
226 0.3 0.15 0.15 0.4 12 3 11.5 0.5 5.975 28.79 21.32
227 0.45 0.1 0.35 0.1 11 0.5 0 10.5 6.05 28.90 -31.21
228 0.45 0.1 0.35 0.1 1 1.5 12 11.5 5.95 28.90 31.21
229 0.25 0.25 0.1 0.4 12 10.5 3.5 0 5.975 29.09 -9.00
230 0.25 0.4 0.1 0.25 0 12 8.5 1.5 6.025 29.09 9.00
231 0.15 0.4 0.3 0.15 5 0 12 11 6 29.10 -3.00
232 0.15 0.15 0.3 0.4 7 1 0 12 6 29.10 3.00
233 0.45 0.15 0.1 0.3 11.5 0.5 7.5 0 6 29.18 -14.55
234 0.15 0.1 0.3 0.45 11.5 4.5 12 0.5 6 29.18 14.55
235 0.15 0.1 0.3 0.45 12 10 10.5 0 5.95 29.27 -26.67
236 0.15 0.1 0.45 0.3 0 2 12 1.5 6.05 29.27 26.67
237 0.1 0.35 0.45 0.1 10.5 11 0 11.5 6.05 30.00 -32.20
238 0.1 0.45 0.1 0.35 0.5 12 1.5 1 5.95 30.00 32.20
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239 0.15 0.25 0.45 0.15 11.5 11 0 10.5 6.05 30.02 -31.83
240 0.45 0.25 0.15 0.15 12 1 0.5 1.5 5.95 30.02 31.83
241 0.2 0.15 0.2 0.45 11.5 11 10.5 0 6.05 30.05 -31.46
242 0.2 0.15 0.45 0.2 1.5 1 12 0.5 5.95 30.05 31.46
243 0.2 0.1 0.45 0.25 12 11.5 0 10 6.05 30.42 -25.93
244 0.25 0.1 0.45 0.2 2 0.5 12 0 5.95 30.42 25.93
245 0.35 0.1 0.1 0.45 12 8 10 0 6 30.80 -14.40
246 0.35 0.45 0.1 0.1 0 12 4 2 6 30.80 14.40
247 0.1 0.45 0.15 0.3 11 0 9 12 6.05 30.85 -20.48
248 0.3 0.15 0.1 0.45 12 11 7 0 5.95 30.85 -8.92
249 0.45 0.15 0.1 0.3 12 1 5 0 6.05 30.85 8.92
250 0.3 0.15 0.45 0.1 0 3 12 1 5.95 30.85 20.48
251 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 12 0 3 9.5 6.05 30.92 -3.05
252 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 2.5 9 0 12 5.95 30.92 3.05
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Trial P1 P2 P3 P4 A1 A2 A3 A4 EV Variance Skew
1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 4 5 9.5 6 6.05 1.72 3.13
2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 6.5 7 3.5 6 6.05 1.72 -2.95
3 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 6 6.5 1.5 7 5.95 2.27 -8.60
4 0.25 0.1 0.55 0.1 6 4 5.5 10.5 5.98 2.56 8.44
5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 1 7 6.5 6 6.05 2.92 -12.58
6 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 4 5.5 11 6 5.95 3.07 12.07
7 0.15 0.2 0.1 0.55 10 6.5 4 5 5.95 3.40 8.78
8 0.55 0.2 0.15 0.1 7 5.5 2 8 6.05 3.40 -8.78
9 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.35 4.5 3 8 6.5 5.95 3.42 -2.95
10 0.35 0.15 0.3 0.2 5.5 7.5 4 9 6.05 3.42 2.95
11 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 6 6.5 0.5 7 6.05 3.52 -16.72
12 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 6.5 0.5 6 8 5.95 3.57 -15.23
13 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 6 11.5 4 5.5 6.05 3.57 15.23
14 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 0 7 6 6.5 5.95 4.02 -20.63
15 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 4 6 5.5 12 6.05 4.17 20.09
16 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 7 6.5 7.5 0 6.05 4.17 -21.61
17 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0 6 6.5 7 6.05 4.17 -21.69
18 0.1 0.55 0.2 0.15 0 7 6.5 6 6.05 4.20 -21.65
19 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 5.5 4 12 5 5.95 4.27 21.25
20 0.45 0.1 0.35 0.1 5 4 6 12 5.95 4.45 21.02
21 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 12 5 7 3.5 5.95 5.02 20.39
22 0.1 0.55 0.25 0.1 6.5 7.5 5 0 6.03 5.11 -20.36
23 0.4 0.1 0.15 0.35 8 0.5 7 5 6.05 5.12 -14.41
24 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 10 7 2.5 5 5.95 5.12 8.78
25 0.35 0.15 0.4 0.1 7 5 4 11.5 5.95 5.12 14.41
26 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 2 5 9.5 7 6.05 5.12 -8.78
27 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.4 6.5 9.5 7 3.5 5.98 5.16 2.89
28 0.25 0.15 0.2 0.4 5.5 5 2.5 8.5 6.03 5.16 -2.89
29 0.15 0.1 0.6 0.15 7.5 6.5 7 0.5 6.05 5.50 -24.66
30 0.55 0.1 0.15 0.2 5 4 11.5 5.5 5.98 5.54 24.00
31 0.15 0.15 0.6 0.1 11.5 5.5 5 4 5.95 5.57 24.37
32 0.15 0.1 0.65 0.1 0 6.5 7 7.5 5.95 6.30 -30.46
33 0.15 0.6 0.1 0.15 7.5 7 6.5 0 5.98 6.36 -30.80
34 0.55 0.2 0.15 0.1 5 5.5 12 4 6.05 6.40 30.07
35 0.1 0.15 0.6 0.15 4 12 5 5.5 6.03 6.44 30.50
36 0.15 0.1 0.1 0.65 12 5.5 4 5 6.00 6.48 30.94
37 0.15 0.25 0.1 0.5 0 7.5 6.5 7 6.03 6.49 -31.53
38 0.3 0.1 0.45 0.15 7.5 6.5 7 0 6.05 6.55 -31.91
39 0.35 0.15 0.15 0.35 7.5 0 6.5 7 6.05 6.57 -31.84
40 0.15 0.15 0.55 0.15 12 5.5 5 4 5.98 6.59 31.13
41 0.1 0.6 0.15 0.15 5.5 5 4 12 5.95 6.62 31.58
42 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.45 5.5 4 12 5 5.95 6.70 31.33
43 0.1 0.1 0.15 0.65 5.5 3.5 12 5 5.95 6.70 31.18
273
44 0.25 0.1 0.55 0.1 4 10 5 12 5.95 6.75 26.46
45 0.3 0.2 0.15 0.35 2 7.5 7 8 5.95 6.80 -14.56
46 0.5 0.15 0.25 0.1 7.5 0 7 5.5 6.05 6.80 -31.49
47 0.2 0.35 0.15 0.3 4.5 4 5 10 6.05 6.80 14.56
48 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 6 4 4.5 11 6.05 6.82 20.44
49 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 1 8 7.5 6 5.95 6.82 -20.44
50 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 1 0.5 7.5 7 5.95 6.82 -26.36
51 0.15 0.25 0.2 0.4 7 2 5 8.5 5.95 6.85 -8.77
52 0.4 0.15 0.2 0.25 3.5 5 7 10 6.05 6.85 8.77
53 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 9 4.5 2.5 8 6.00 6.88 -2.81
54 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 9.5 7.5 4 6.00 6.88 2.81
55 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 7.5 7 0 0.5 6.00 8.30 -35.78
56 0.35 0.3 0.2 0.15 2 8.5 7.5 8 5.95 8.52 -14.56
57 0.2 0.3 0.35 0.15 4.5 3.5 10 4 6.05 8.52 14.56
58 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 3.5 12 6 9 5.95 8.52 20.47
59 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.1 6 3 8.5 0 6.05 8.52 -20.47
60 0.15 0.1 0.5 0.25 12 9 4 5 5.95 8.55 32.13
61 0.5 0.15 0.1 0.25 8 0 3 7 6.05 8.55 -32.13
62 0.4 0.25 0.15 0.2 6.5 9 7 0.5 6.00 8.55 -26.33
63 0.2 0.4 0.15 0.25 11.5 5.5 5 3 6.00 8.55 26.33
64 0.2 0.15 0.3 0.35 8.5 4.5 9 2.5 5.95 8.57 -3.00
65 0.15 0.3 0.35 0.2 7.5 3 9.5 3.5 6.05 8.57 3.00
66 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 1 11.5 8 6.5 6.05 8.57 -8.77
67 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.1 11 4 5.5 0.5 5.95 8.57 8.77
68 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 4 12 11.5 5 5.95 8.62 35.93
69 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 3.5 5 4.5 12 6.05 9.02 38.63
70 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0 7 8.5 7.5 5.95 9.02 -38.63
71 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.45 4.5 11.5 8.5 3.5 6.05 10.25 26.38
72 0.2 0.2 0.45 0.15 7.5 0.5 8.5 3.5 5.95 10.25 -26.38
73 0.45 0.15 0.25 0.15 2.5 9 8 10 5.98 10.26 -2.87
74 0.15 0.5 0.1 0.25 11.5 3 7.5 8 5.98 10.26 14.56
75 0.6 0.15 0.1 0.15 3.5 11.5 8.5 9 6.03 10.26 20.42
76 0.4 0.2 0.15 0.25 5.5 12 2 4.5 6.03 10.26 31.94
77 0.15 0.1 0.15 0.6 3 3.5 0.5 8.5 5.98 10.26 -20.42
78 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.45 3 4 2 9.5 6.03 10.26 2.87
79 0.15 0.4 0.25 0.2 10 6.5 7.5 0 5.98 10.26 -31.94
80 0.25 0.15 0.5 0.1 4 0.5 9 4.5 6.03 10.26 -14.56
81 0.35 0.1 0.35 0.2 9 11 3.5 2.5 5.98 10.29 8.68
82 0.2 0.1 0.35 0.35 9.5 1 8.5 3 6.03 10.29 -8.68
83 0.2 0.15 0.5 0.15 0 5 8 8.5 6.03 10.29 -37.78
84 0.15 0.2 0.5 0.15 7 12 4 3.5 5.98 10.29 37.78
85 0.35 0.15 0.1 0.4 2 9.5 3 9 6.03 11.94 -8.76
86 0.35 0.4 0.1 0.15 10 3 9 2.5 5.98 11.94 8.76
87 0.3 0.1 0.45 0.15 11 4 3 6 5.95 11.95 26.34
88 0.15 0.3 0.45 0.1 6 1 9 8 6.05 11.95 -26.34
89 0.25 0.25 0.4 0.1 11.5 4.5 3 7.5 5.95 11.95 32.08
90 0.25 0.1 0.25 0.4 7.5 4.5 0.5 9 6.05 11.95 -32.08
91 0.4 0.25 0.25 0.1 2.5 10 5.5 11.5 6.03 11.99 14.56
92 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.3 1.5 8 10.5 3.5 5.98 11.99 2.77
274
93 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.25 0.5 2 9.5 6.5 5.98 11.99 -14.56
94 0.25 0.25 0.3 0.2 1.5 4 8.5 10.5 6.03 11.99 -2.77
95 0.15 0.2 0.1 0.55 5 12 9.5 3.5 6.03 12.01 37.84
96 0.1 0.55 0.15 0.2 2.5 8.5 7 0 5.98 12.01 -37.84
97 0.15 0.45 0.25 0.15 11.5 5 2 10.5 6.05 12.02 20.37
98 0.45 0.25 0.15 0.15 7 10 1.5 0.5 5.95 12.02 -20.37
99 0.45 0.15 0.25 0.15 10 4.5 2.5 1.5 6.03 13.64 2.88
100 0.45 0.25 0.15 0.15 2 9.5 7.5 10.5 5.98 13.64 -2.88
101 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.5 8 12 6 6.05 13.67 14.61
102 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 0 10.5 6 4 5.95 13.67 -14.61
103 0.35 0.15 0.3 0.2 3 12 9 2.5 6.05 13.70 20.42
104 0.2 0.15 0.3 0.35 9.5 0 3 9 5.95 13.70 -20.42
105 0.35 0.2 0.2 0.25 3.5 12 8.5 2.5 5.95 13.70 32.19
106 0.25 0.2 0.35 0.2 9.5 3.5 8.5 0 6.05 13.70 -32.19
107 0.1 0.2 0.35 0.35 0.5 8 2.5 10 6.03 13.71 -8.67
108 0.15 0.25 0.45 0.15 8.5 11.5 3.5 2 6.03 13.71 26.28
109 0.15 0.25 0.45 0.15 3.5 0.5 8.5 10 5.98 13.71 -26.28
110 0.35 0.1 0.2 0.35 2 11.5 4 9.5 5.98 13.71 8.67
111 0.25 0.3 0.3 0.15 2.5 4.5 11.5 3.5 5.95 13.75 37.90
112 0.3 0.15 0.3 0.25 7.5 8.5 0.5 9.5 6.05 13.75 -37.90
113 0.15 0.45 0.2 0.2 10 2.5 12 5 6.03 15.31 32.16
114 0.2 0.45 0.2 0.15 7 9.5 0 2 5.98 15.31 -32.16
115 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 3 11.5 2 10 6.00 15.35 26.18
116 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 10 2 0.5 9 6.00 15.35 -26.18
117 0.2 0.1 0.15 0.55 0.5 8.5 1 9 6.05 15.37 -37.92
118 0.55 0.1 0.2 0.15 3 3.5 11.5 11 5.95 15.37 37.92
119 0.25 0.2 0.3 0.25 12 0.5 5.5 5 6.00 15.38 20.44
120 0.3 0.2 0.25 0.25 6.5 11.5 0 7 6.00 15.38 -20.44
121 0.25 0.1 0.35 0.3 4.5 6 11 1.5 6.03 15.39 14.41
122 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.1 1 10.5 7.5 6 5.98 15.39 -14.41
123 0.2 0.25 0.35 0.2 1 10.5 3.5 10 6.05 15.45 2.80
124 0.2 0.35 0.25 0.2 2 8.5 1.5 11 5.95 15.45 -2.80
125 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 7 2.5 10.5 2 6.00 15.45 8.78
126 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 9.5 5 1.5 10 6.00 15.45 -8.78
127 0.15 0.35 0.4 0.1 9.5 9 1 10.5 6.03 17.01 -26.28
128 0.15 0.1 0.4 0.35 2.5 1.5 11 3 5.98 17.01 26.28
129 0.2 0.15 0.4 0.25 9 3 9.5 0 6.05 17.05 -38.06
130 0.15 0.4 0.25 0.2 9 2.5 12 3 5.95 17.05 38.06
131 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.5 8 11 11.5 2 5.98 17.09 14.59
132 0.2 0.15 0.5 0.15 4 1 10 0.5 6.03 17.09 -14.59
133 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 11 2 9.5 1.5 6.00 17.10 3.15
134 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 2.5 10.5 10 1 6.00 17.10 -3.15
135 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.35 4.5 10.5 8.5 1 5.98 17.11 -8.74
136 0.15 0.35 0.35 0.15 3.5 1.5 11 7.5 6.03 17.11 8.74
137 0.15 0.35 0.4 0.1 3.5 3 11 0.5 6.03 17.11 20.29
138 0.1 0.15 0.35 0.4 11.5 8.5 9 1 5.98 17.11 -20.29
139 0.4 0.1 0.15 0.35 2.5 2 5.5 11.5 6.05 17.12 32.09
140 0.4 0.15 0.1 0.35 9.5 6.5 10 0.5 5.95 17.12 -32.09
141 0.2 0.4 0.25 0.15 1 10.5 1.5 8 5.98 18.76 -8.72
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142 0.15 0.25 0.2 0.4 4 10.5 11 1.5 6.03 18.76 8.72
143 0.25 0.3 0.15 0.3 10 9.5 4.5 0 6.03 18.81 -37.85
144 0.45 0.1 0.2 0.25 2.5 1 9 12 6.03 18.81 26.20
145 0.1 0.45 0.25 0.2 11 9.5 0 3 5.98 18.81 -26.20
146 0.25 0.15 0.3 0.3 2 7.5 2.5 12 5.98 18.81 37.85
147 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 1 10.5 7 5.95 18.82 -14.66
148 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 11 5 11.5 1.5 6.05 18.82 14.66
149 0.3 0.15 0.4 0.15 1.5 1 9 12 6.00 18.83 -2.89
150 0.35 0.3 0.15 0.2 4.5 12 5.5 0 6.00 18.83 20.40
151 0.35 0.2 0.15 0.3 7.5 12 6.5 0 6.00 18.83 -20.40
152 0.3 0.15 0.4 0.15 10.5 0 3 11 6.00 18.83 2.89
153 0.25 0.35 0.2 0.2 3 2 11.5 11 5.95 18.90 31.96
154 0.35 0.2 0.2 0.25 10 0.5 1 9 6.05 18.90 -31.96
155 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 9 11 11.5 1.5 5.95 20.47 8.68
156 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 10.5 0.5 1 3 6.05 20.47 -8.68
157 0.15 0.4 0.35 0.1 9 1 11 4 6.00 20.50 -3.00
158 0.35 0.15 0.1 0.4 1 3 8 11 6.00 20.50 3.00
159 0.1 0.45 0.2 0.25 11.5 1 10 9.5 5.98 20.54 -14.55
160 0.1 0.45 0.2 0.25 0.5 11 2 2.5 6.03 20.54 14.55
161 0.35 0.2 0.2 0.25 12 3.5 4.5 1 6.05 20.55 37.47
162 0.2 0.35 0.2 0.25 7.5 0 8.5 11 5.95 20.55 -37.47
163 0.2 0.45 0.25 0.1 9.5 2.5 12 0 6.03 20.56 20.14
164 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.45 6 11.5 12 1.5 5.98 20.56 26.21
165 0.15 0.2 0.45 0.2 0 6 10.5 0.5 6.03 20.56 -26.21
166 0.25 0.1 0.2 0.45 0 12 2.5 9.5 5.98 20.56 -20.14
167 0.1 0.35 0.15 0.4 10 9 11 0.5 6.00 20.60 -31.95
168 0.4 0.1 0.15 0.35 11.5 2 1 3 6.00 20.60 31.95
169 0.4 0.15 0.35 0.1 11 7.5 0.5 2.5 5.95 22.15 -8.69
170 0.1 0.4 0.35 0.15 9.5 1 11.5 4.5 6.05 22.15 8.69
171 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 10.5 8.5 0 1.5 6.05 22.17 -37.66
172 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 10.5 1.5 12 3.5 5.95 22.17 37.66
173 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.45 8 12 9 1 6.00 22.20 3.00
174 0.15 0.25 0.45 0.15 3 0 11 4 6.00 22.20 -3.00
175 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 4.5 0.5 4 11.5 6.00 22.20 14.70
176 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 7.5 8 11.5 6.00 22.20 -14.70
177 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.35 10.5 11.5 6.5 0 5.98 22.26 -26.16
178 0.1 0.15 0.5 0.25 7 10.5 1.5 12 6.03 22.26 20.54
179 0.4 0.35 0.15 0.1 9.5 0 11.5 4.5 5.98 22.26 -32.16
180 0.35 0.15 0.25 0.25 12 0.5 5.5 1.5 6.03 22.26 26.16
181 0.5 0.25 0.1 0.15 10.5 0 5 1.5 5.98 22.26 -20.54
182 0.35 0.4 0.1 0.15 12 2.5 7.5 0.5 6.03 22.26 32.16
183 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 2 7.5 0 12 6.05 23.87 -8.97
184 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0 4.5 12 10 5.95 23.87 8.97
185 0.15 0.15 0.3 0.4 5.5 3.5 0 11.5 5.95 23.87 2.97
186 0.3 0.15 0.15 0.4 12 6.5 8.5 0.5 6.05 23.87 -2.97
187 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.15 11.5 0 5 8 5.98 23.94 -14.52
188 0.15 0.15 0.35 0.35 4 7 0.5 12 6.03 23.94 14.52
189 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 10.5 6.5 0 5.95 23.97 -32.27
190 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 11.5 12 5.5 1.5 6.05 23.97 32.27
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191 0.25 0.15 0.2 0.4 12 11.5 4.5 1 6.03 23.99 26.48
192 0.15 0.25 0.4 0.2 0.5 0 11 7.5 5.98 23.99 -26.48
193 0.15 0.4 0.1 0.35 0.5 2 11 11.5 6.00 24.03 20.18
194 0.4 0.35 0.1 0.15 10 0.5 1 11.5 6.00 24.03 -20.17
195 0.4 0.1 0.25 0.25 12 0 3 2 6.05 24.25 38.41
196 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.4 12 9 10 0 5.95 24.25 -38.41
197 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 5 1.5 1 12 5.95 25.57 37.80
198 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0 10.5 7 11 6.05 25.57 -37.80
199 0.15 0.2 0.2 0.45 11.5 11 9.5 0.5 6.05 25.60 -20.18
200 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.45 1 2.5 0.5 11.5 5.95 25.60 20.18
201 0.15 0.25 0.1 0.5 11 12 8 1 5.95 25.65 14.90
202 0.15 0.4 0.1 0.35 10 0 7 11 6.05 25.65 -36.80
203 0.15 0.4 0.35 0.1 2 12 1 5 5.95 25.65 36.80
204 0.5 0.15 0.1 0.25 11 1 4 0 6.05 25.65 -14.90
205 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 2.5 1 12 5.5 6.00 25.65 32.10
206 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 11 9.5 6.5 0 6.00 25.65 -32.10
207 0.2 0.45 0.1 0.25 2.5 11.5 3.5 0 6.03 25.69 8.80
208 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.45 8.5 9.5 12 0.5 5.98 25.69 -8.80
209 0.1 0.15 0.25 0.5 12 11.5 10.5 1 6.05 25.70 2.98
210 0.1 0.35 0.45 0.1 3.5 12 1 9.5 5.95 25.70 25.93
211 0.45 0.1 0.35 0.1 11 8.5 0 2.5 6.05 25.70 -25.93
212 0.1 0.5 0.25 0.15 0 11 1.5 0.5 5.95 25.70 -2.98
213 0.25 0.1 0.3 0.35 1 10.5 1.5 12 5.95 26.95 30.17
214 0.1 0.3 0.35 0.25 1.5 10.5 0 11 6.05 26.95 -30.17
215 0.1 0.25 0.3 0.35 10 3 0 12 5.95 27.25 14.54
216 0.35 0.1 0.25 0.3 0 2 9 12 6.05 27.25 -14.54
217 0.35 0.15 0.1 0.4 12 9 2.5 0.5 6.00 27.28 8.81
218 0.35 0.1 0.4 0.15 0 9.5 11.5 3 6.00 27.28 -8.81
219 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.25 6.5 0 12 2 5.95 27.42 20.53
220 0.25 0.4 0.25 0.1 12 0 10 5.5 6.05 27.42 -20.53
221 0.35 0.1 0.1 0.45 12 9.5 6.5 0.5 6.03 27.46 2.97
222 0.35 0.1 0.45 0.1 0 5.5 11.5 2.5 5.98 27.46 -2.97
223 0.1 0.45 0.2 0.25 12 10.5 0 0.5 6.05 27.47 -26.31
224 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.45 0 12 11.5 1.5 5.95 27.47 26.31
225 0.15 0.4 0.3 0.15 9 11.5 0 0.5 6.03 28.79 -21.32
226 0.15 0.15 0.3 0.4 3 11.5 12 0.5 5.98 28.79 21.32
227 0.1 0.1 0.35 0.45 0.5 10.5 0 11 6.05 28.90 -31.21
228 0.1 0.1 0.35 0.45 1.5 11.5 12 1 5.95 28.90 31.21
229 0.25 0.25 0.4 0.1 1.5 0 12 8.5 6.03 29.09 9.00
230 0.25 0.1 0.4 0.25 12 3.5 0 10.5 5.98 29.09 -9.00
231 0.15 0.3 0.4 0.15 1 0 12 7 6.00 29.10 3.00
232 0.3 0.15 0.15 0.4 12 11 5 0 6.00 29.10 -3.00
233 0.15 0.1 0.3 0.45 0.5 7.5 0 11.5 6.00 29.18 -14.55
234 0.45 0.1 0.3 0.15 0.5 4.5 12 11.5 6.00 29.18 14.55
235 0.1 0.45 0.3 0.15 2 12 1.5 0 6.05 29.27 26.67
236 0.15 0.1 0.3 0.45 12 10 10.5 0 5.95 29.27 -26.67
237 0.45 0.1 0.35 0.1 12 0.5 1 1.5 5.95 30.00 32.20
238 0.45 0.35 0.1 0.1 0 11 11.5 10.5 6.05 30.00 -32.20
239 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.45 1.5 0.5 1 12 5.95 30.02 31.83
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240 0.45 0.25 0.15 0.15 0 11 11.5 10.5 6.05 30.02 -31.83
241 0.45 0.2 0.15 0.2 12 1.5 1 0.5 5.95 30.05 31.46
242 0.2 0.2 0.45 0.15 11.5 10.5 0 11 6.05 30.05 -31.46
243 0.1 0.45 0.2 0.25 11.5 0 12 10 6.05 30.42 -25.93
244 0.2 0.45 0.25 0.1 0 12 2 0.5 5.95 30.42 25.93
245 0.1 0.45 0.1 0.35 2 12 4 0 6.00 30.80 14.40
246 0.45 0.1 0.1 0.35 0 10 8 12 6.00 30.80 -14.40
247 0.15 0.1 0.45 0.3 11 7 0 12 5.95 30.85 -8.92
248 0.3 0.45 0.1 0.15 0 12 5 1 6.05 30.85 8.92
249 0.1 0.15 0.3 0.45 11 9 12 0 6.05 30.85 -20.48
250 0.1 0.3 0.15 0.45 1 0 3 12 5.95 30.85 20.48
251 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 3 12 0 9.5 6.05 30.92 -3.05
252 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 12 0 2.5 9 5.95 30.92 3.05
